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STANDARDS AND DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM KENYA’S 
HORTICULTURAL EXPORT INDUSTRY - GLORIA OTIENO   
 
 Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines perspectives on standards and 
development in Kenya’s horticulture sector. The debate on 
standards and development is at the forefront of global policy 
discussions. The proliferation of trade standards is often seen 
as a threat to poor countries that will diminish their export 
opportunities and lead to an unequal distribution of the gains 
from trade and result in marginalization of poor farmers. 
However, empirical studies have produced diverse conclusions 
about the effects of standards on development. The ability to 
comply with international standards has emerged as a key 
factor of success in developing countries’ participation in 
international trade. Kenya’s horticulture sector continues to 
play a major role in development as it directly provides export 
income to numerous small and large scale producers, provides 
labour and is the second largest forex exchange earner for the 
country. The success of this sector largely depends on the 
ability of key stakeholders to meet market requirements. The 
thrust of this thesis is to present the different perspectives of 
standards and development in Kenya’s horticulture sector 
using case studies that provide linkages and insights into this 
debate. These different aspects of analysis generate different 
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dimensions of the link between standards and development. 
In this research, three key aspects are analysed: the effect of 
standards on export supply; the link between standards, 
governance and distribution of rent along the value chain; and 
the social micro-processes of smallholder participation in this 
global value chain. Finally, the different institutional 
implications of standards are also discussed. 
Key findings indicate that standards negatively affect export 
supply with rejections affecting exports in the short run and 
SPS measures affecting exports in the long run. Intricacies at 
the value chain level indicate that governance structures as a 
result of standards and subsequent power relationships 
influence the distributional outcomes of value chains with 
smallholders bearing the burden for compliance and reaping 
the lowest benefits comparatively. Participation of 
smallholders in these global chains is influenced by a number 
of factors including levels of capitalization, having contracts 
and belonging to a producer organization. The importance of 
intermediaries such as producer organizations, contracts and 
private public partnerships in capacity building, upgrading and 
linking smallholders to export markets is underscored.  
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NORMEN EN ONTWIKKELING: 
PERSPECTIEVEN VANUIT DE 
TUINBOUWEXPORT IN KENIA 
 Samenvatting 
 
In dit proefschrift worden perspectieven ten aanzien van 
normen en ontwikkeling onderzocht in de tuinbouwsector in 
Kenia. Het debat over normen en ontwikkeling speelt een 
belangrijke rol in mondiale beleidsdiscussies. De toename van 
handelsnormen wordt vaak beschouwd als een bedreiging 
voor arme landen omdat die zou leiden tot minder 
exportmogelijkheden en een oneerlijke verdeling van de 
handelsopbrengsten en marginalisatie van arme boeren. Uit 
empirisch onderzoek kunnen echter verschillende conclusies 
over de effecten van normen op ontwikkeling worden 
getrokken. Het vermogen van ontwikkelingslanden om te 
voldoen aan internationale normen blijkt beslissend te zijn 
voor een succesvolle deelname aan de internationale handel. 
De Keniaanse tuinbouwsector speelt nog altijd een hoofdrol 
in de ontwikkeling omdat deze een directe bron van 
inkomsten uit export is voor vele klein- en grootschalige 
producenten, werkgelegenheid biedt en de op een na grootste 
deviezenbron van het land is. Het succes van deze sector is 
grotendeels afhankelijk van het vermogen van essentiële 
stakeholders om aan de vereisten van de markt te voldoen. Dit 
proefschrift presenteert de verschillende perspectieven ten 
aanzien van normen en ontwikkeling in de tuinbouwsector in 
Kenia met behulp van casestudy’s die verbanden tonen en 
inzicht bieden ten behoeve van dit debat. Uit de verschillende 
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aspecten die worden geanalyseerd komen verschillende 
dimensies van het verband tussen normen en ontwikkeling 
naar voren. In dit onderzoek worden drie essentiële aspecten 
geanalyseerd: het effect van normen op de export, het verband 
tussen normen, governance en de verdeling van huur over de 
waardeketen, en de sociale micro-processen van deelname van 
kleine boeren aan deze mondiale waardeketen. Ten slotte 
worden de verschillende institutionele implicaties van normen 
besproken. 
Uit de resultaten blijkt dat normen een negatief effect op de 
export hebben, waarbij afkeuringen de export op de korte 
termijn beïnvloeden en sanitaire en fytosanitaire (SPS)-
maatregelen de export op de lange termijn beïnvloeden. Op 
het niveau van de waardeketen blijkt dat governance-
structuren als gevolg van normen en de daaruit voortvloeiende 
machtsrelaties van invloed zijn op de verdelingsresultaten van 
waardeketens. Hierbij komt de last van de naleving vooral neer 
op kleine boeren en plukken die er in mindere mate de 
vruchten van. Deelname van kleine boeren aan deze mondiale 
ketens wordt beïnvloed door een aantal factoren, waaronder 
niveau van kapitalisatie, bezit van contracten en behoren tot 
een organisatie van producenten. Het belang van 
tussenliggende schakels zoals organisaties van producenten, 
contracten en publiek-private samenwerkingsverbanden bij het 
opbouwen van de capaciteit, opwaarderen en koppelen van 
kleine boeren aan exportmarkten wordt onderstreept.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The impact of standards and technical regulations1 on trade is at the 
forefront of global policy discussions. Understanding the link between 
standards, technical regulations, and trade is crucial in the design of 
broader developmental goals that can create new opportunities for pro-
poor growth (Wilson & Abiola, 2003). Income growth in developed 
countries has led to an increase in demand for high quality health, safety 
and ethical standards2. More recently, international campaigns against 
child labour and genetically modified food, Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) environment activities and several food safety 
crises, such as the food dioxin crisis and the appearance of BSE in 
Europe, have contributed to a rising demand for high quality, safe and 
traceable products in the production chains of many nations (Swennen et 
al., 2008).  
This demand for quality has led to a complex and costly process in 
the formulation of conformity and the enforcement of standards to 
producers. This is seen as a major constraint, especially for producers in 
developing countries. The high costs of compliance and certification 
have, therefore, excluded from global chains many small-scale producers. 
On the other hand, standards embody technological and innovative 
aspects that are passed down to developing countries and which 
                                                 
1 In this research EU standards is used to refer to voluntary and market driven 
standards as well as technical regulations (both product and process standards) 
including those not directly related to health and safety such as worker welfare 
and ethical trading standards originating from EU. 
2 Generally, consuming countries require that many domestically produced and 
imported goods should satisfy certain minimum levels of quality, health and 
safety standards (Oyejide et al., 2000).  
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invariable help them upgrade their production, and thereby enable them 
to participate effectively in global chains thus improving incomes and 
poverty (Ibid). 
Over the last few decades, many African countries, Kenya included, 
have intensified the implementation of export-led policies aimed at 
export expansion and diversification. Africa3, being a primary commodity 
dependent producer has emerged to have comparative advantage in 
agricultural production including horticulture due to favourable climatic 
conditions, abundant land; and cheap labour. Horticultural exports have 
grown dramatically in many sub-Saharan African countries while many 
other agricultural commodities such as tea and coffee have faced 
stagnation and declining world prices. In addition, the horticulture 
industry provides an important source of foreign exchange, generates 
substantial employment and has contributed to the upgrading of 
agricultural production skills (McCulloch & Ota, 2002).  
Further to this, in Africa, trade barriers, such as tariffs, and other non-
tariff barriers like standards, undermine progress in the trade frontier.  
Standards4 are the focus of this research. As such, developing countries 
rely on exports into foreign markets which require compliance with 
standards, rules and regulations set by these markets they are in effect 
standard takers rather than standard makers (Wilson, 2006) which places 
the burden of compliance on them. Findings from a study by Wilson in 
2006 indicates that for most developing countries, the process of 
developing their own standards tends to be more costly as they typically 
have neither the public resources to provide national laboratories for 
testing and certification nor the capability for collective action to raise 
their own standards. A significant portion of meeting costs of standards 
are borne by individual firms and farmers (Wilson, 2006; Athukorala & 
Jayasuriya, 2003), which adds cost to firms and limits export 
competitiveness.  
A study by Wilson & Abiola, 2003 argues that there are five main 
‘functions” of standards:  
                                                 
3 Kenya Included. 
4 Standards in this context are generally rules and regulations that govern the 
market for goods and therefore determine their suitability and acceptance in 
those markets.  
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(i) Standards act as a pre-requisite for market access and benefit 
largely those who are able to upgrade their production 
processes while excluding those who are not able to upgrade;  
(ii) They determine competitive advantage especially when they 
involve costs as they may alter relative gains by producers. 
(iii) Standards may also act as a medium for innovation, knowledge 
transfer and upgrading which leads to production of higher 
value products, which fetch higher incomes. 
(iv) In some cases, standards may be seen as instruments of 
commercial policy –i.e. stringent levels of protection set by 
dominant interest groups, and may eventually monopolize the 
market, block market entry and exclude competition.  
 
Greater market power in turn may be used to influence allocation of 
benefits that may accrue from the use of these standards. Thus, interest 
groups with less bargaining power and who are unable to participate in 
the rule making process become standard “takers” and in many cases 
may end up as “bearers” of compliance costs rather than “reapers” of 
benefits accrued to the standards (Wilson & Abiola, 2003). The study 
further argues that differences in institutional and financial capacities; 
infrastructure; human capital; consumer preferences and technological 
capacity may create a gap between standard setting countries and 
standard ‘taking” countries and termed a “standards divide” which may 
alter the gains of trade in high value products. 
Many empirical studies on standards and trade in developing 
countries have come to diverse findings (Swinnen, 2007; Maertens & 
Swinnen, 2009). Evidence from studies on supermarket chains suggests 
that these chains exclude smallholders due to issues ranging from non-
compliance to inability to supply in large desired quantities (Sautier, 
Vermeulen, Fok, & Bienabe´, 2006). Others find very different effects 
such as the study by Minten, Randrianarison, & Swinnen (2006) that 
found that most FFV exports are produced on very small farms, often 
on a contract basis with the agro-food industry, and with important 
positive effects on farmers’ productivity. Some studies in South Asia also 
find that due to standards, there is inclusion of smallholders in modern 
supply chains (Gulati, Minot, Delgado, & Bora, 2007), China (Wang, 
Dong, & Rozelle, 2006), and in Eastern Europe (Dries & Swinnen, 
2004). Moreover, in several cases, this smallholder inclusion in modern 
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supply chains is associated with vertical coordination, leading to 
increased access to inputs, technology, and increased productivity and 
investments (Maertens & Swinnen, 2009). 
Therefore, within development studies, two opposite perspectives on 
the developmental relevance of standards are emerging. The first focuses 
on the costs of compliance and exclusionary effects of standards, and 
standards are viewed as barriers to trade. The second perspective 
emphasizes the potential opportunities provided by the mainstreaming 
of standards and the likelihood that certain developing countries can 
utilize such opportunities to their competitive advantage. Clearly, the 
developmental aspects of standards can be two sided, but there still 
exists a gap in understanding these effects particularly with respect to 
different players such as firms, and smallholder farmers which make up a 
majority of producers in most developing countries, it is this gap that 
this study aims to shed light on. 
From the above discussions, it is clear that empirical studies have 
mainly focused on the question of small farmers’ contribution in 
supplying high-standards value chains and have failed to measure the 
overall trade and welfare effects of the standards at the various levels 
notwithstanding investigating the distributional effects of the standards. 
This study analyses the effects of standards on the Kenyan horticulture 
sector with a view to finding the different effects of standards on 
different aspects of development.  
These investigation is centred around three main questions – i.e. 
whether and how standards affect exports in the sector; the subsequent 
outcomes related to the realities on the value chains i.e. how standards 
have shaped the distributional outcomes, more specifically, how benefits 
related to the adoption and compliance to standards are accrued to 
various actors in the chain; and at the micro-level, the factors that 
motivate farmer participation in these chains, the intermediaries they use, 
the sustainability of their participation; and finally the institutional 
implications of standards. 
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1.2 The Research Problem 
In Kenya horticulture plays a vital role in development given the 
adaptability of a wide range of crops to many agro-ecological zones in 
the country. It is an important source of livelihood (including, incomes 
and employment) for over 2.5 million people either directly or indirectly. 
Of this total, farmers engaged in semi or commercial horticultural 
production is in the order of 80,000 who produce both for the domestic 
and export markets. The sub-sector is a major source of income having 
generated products locally valued at over 3.5% of the overall GDP, it 
also contributes appropriately 13 per cent to the agricultural GDP. In 
2012 horticultural exports were valued at 870 million Euros. Despite the 
often-sluggish overall economic growth in the last two decades, 
horticultural production has continued to show impressive growth 
trends – approximately 6 per cent per annum and has subsequently 
become one of the most important Agri-food sectors that provides 
incomes to smallholders in Kenya. 
The EU is Kenya’s most important trading partner for horticultural 
produce and accounts for over 75 per cent of horticultural exports. In 
the past, Kenya benefited under the Cotonou regime from duty and 
quota-free market access for its horticultural produce, and more recently, 
in the year 2008/2009, through the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs). This has seen a rise in the value of horticultural exports by 
approximately 70 per cent in the past 10 years. Despite the growth in 
value, Kenya's horticultural exports continue to encounter constraints in 
international markets and local domestic supply, especially those directly 
affecting competitiveness. In recent years, the challenges of international 
competitiveness have moved well beyond the price and basic quality 
parameters to placing a greater emphasis on other market requirements 
such as standards and regulations in order to access markets in 
developed countries, more specifically the EU.  
These market requirements take food safety beyond the checks and 
inspections of the end product. The new requirements are a consequence 
of consumer demand for assurance that food is safe – one of the 
strongest forces shaping today's agricultural production. Therefore, 
exporters not only have to comply with sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
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standards and maximum residue Limits5 (MRLs) as required by the 
WTO, but they also have to deal with other market specific requirements 
such as environmental sustainability as well as traceability and labelling of 
produce that is embedded in EU’s market requirements. A further new 
crop of standards driven by consumer organizations and Non-
Governmental Organizations aim at pushing Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) to adopt Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) especially as 
related with labour standards including the use of child labour, worker 
welfare and gender equality in production of goods entering the EU 
market. Fair Trade labels have also lately played a major role in accessing 
certain niche markets by advocating for responsible production including 
observing social and environmental responsibility in return for a certain 
per centage of the premium prices to producers. 
It is clear therefore, from the foregoing, that standards encompass a 
wide range of quality, health, environmental and ethical concerns, that 
are implemented as mandatory government standards, or as voluntary 
private standards. They diverge in terms of requirements for compliance 
and certification coupled with the fact that they (especially private 
voluntary standards) continuously change over time. This has an 
implication on the terms of trade, costs and benefits for compliance for 
the various stakeholders participating in the export business; investments 
in infrastructure needed for compliance and upgrading of production 
systems; learning effects; and institutional changes that occur in order to 
accommodate new compliance structures which are often diverse among 
different stakeholders and different sizes of farms and/or firms, and for 
different scope of standards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Maximum Residue Levels are the maximum amount of the trace residues of 
pesticides themselves, or their breakdown products, which are legally permitted 
in or on produce 
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1.3 Objectives and Scope 
1.3.1 Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to determine the impact of 
standards on the Kenyan horticultural export industry. It aims to provide 
insights on the different dynamics standards have on various aspects of 
trade-poverty and development on Kenya’s horticultural exports 
industry:  
1. To map out the industry’s standards; the evolution and 
organization of compliance structures from top echelons 
of exports to smallholders’ levels 
2.  To investigate the impact of standards on horticultural 
exports at the sector level, i.e whether standards have 
enhanced or reduced exports  
3.  To determine the distributional outcomes of compliance 
to standards at the value chain level, identifying the 
winners and losers and how the costs and margins of 
compliance to standards and the distribution of incomes 
and value added are determined at various levels.  
4. The fourth and final objective is to provide insights into 
the micro-social implications of standards on producer 
participation in high value chains and the sustainability 
issues they face.  
1.3.2 Scope and Context 
  The Country Context and Time Frame 
The focal point of this study is based on the dynamics of different trade 
standards and different aspects of development in the horticultural 
sector in Kenya6. The sector is from an economic point of view, one of 
the most important foreign exchange contributors and subsequently, 
economic growth and development in agriculture. The sector also has 
numerous backward and forward linkages with many players including 
large and small-scale producers and is a source of livelihood to over 5 
million people - 2.5 million directly and another 2.5 million indirectly. 
                                                 
6 This is an agricultural related sector in a developing country. 
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Today, horticulture, at a rate of 6 per cent per annum, is the fastest 
growing agricultural sub-sector in Kenya and horticultural products have 
accounted for two-thirds of all growth in agricultural exports and has 
recently surpassed coffee to become the second largest merchandise 
export, after tea (Onjala & Otieno, 2010). Kenya is the second largest 
horticultural exporter in Sub-Saharan Africa (after South Africa), the 
second largest developing-country exporter of flowers in the world (after 
Colombia), and the second largest developing-country supplier of 
vegetables to the European Union (after Morocco). 
Therefore, in Kenya today, export horticulture represents an 
opportunity for reducing poverty through income generation among 
smallholders, rural labourers on larger farms, and unskilled or semi-
skilled factory workers. The EU is still the most important market for 
Kenyan horticultural products. Exports of fresh fruits and vegetables 
(FFVs) and cut flowers to the EU accounted for about 80 per cent of the 
total exports of FFVs and cut flowers from Kenya in 2009 and in 2013 it 
rose to 81 per cent. 
However, the EU market has various trade standards that govern it 
and which farmers and exporters have to comply with in order to access 
this important market. Consumer concerns about food safety, resulting 
largely from food safety failures in the 1980s and 1990s have been one of 
the key drivers for standards and regulations (Dolan & Humphrey, 
2000). These two decades were marked by a series of food-borne disease 
outbreaks in Europe linked to produce originating from developing 
countries; these include a Salmonella outbreak in the UK in 1989, an E. 
coli outbreak in fast food hamburgers in the United States in 1993, and 
Dioxin contamination of animal feed in Belgium in 1999 (World Bank, 
2005). Importing countries have also become concerned about the 
introduction of pests through imports from developing countries. The 
EU, for instance, formulated and implemented Council Directive 
2000/29/EC to control the introduction of pests and diseases harmful 
to plants and plant products. This directive requires that phyto-sanitary 
certificates accompany imported produce declaring them free of pests 
and disease.  
With the rise in incomes in developed countries, specifically in the 
EU, the demand for more differentiated goods has led to the 
development of private standards. Consumer pressure, protection of 
brand image, stricter food regulation in the EU during the 1990s, and the 
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need for access to a due diligence defence drove retailers to develop 
strict commercial standards which encompass food safety and quality as 
well as environmental, and ethical concerns. Likewise, supermarkets in 
developed countries have responded to changing regulatory and demand 
conditions by seeking to meet consumer demands for all products 
(Dolan & Humphrey, 2000). 
Consumer organizations and other Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) have also recently expressed ethical concerns in the production 
of goods in developing countries and this has consequently led to the 
proliferation of Social standards. These standards are however not 
mandatory requirements but are all the same, important if one wants  to 
access certain niche markets. Therefore producers from developing 
countries, Kenya included, are faced not only with legal mandatory 
requirements but also numerous private voluntary standards. This has 
implications on certain factors that affect development such as transfer 
of technology, transaction costs, distribution of rent, institutional 
changes as well as terms of trade as will be discussed in this research.  
 The time frame of this research is limited to 1995-2012. This time 
frame is significant because: it is during this time that the horticulture 
sector picked up and became a major export sector important for the 
economy, it is also the period within which complete data on exports of 
horticulture to the EU can be obtained.  
 
 The Development Context  
Development is a complex concept and often has many definitions. 
However a basic perspective equates development with economic 
growth. Chambers (1997) describes development as a process of social 
change that takes place after long periods of time and brings about 
economic growth that should translate into poverty reduction and 
general well-being.  Economic growth is therefore seen as a means for 
achieving development but which cannot take place without qualified 
labour, technological innovations and advancements, trade and sound 
fiscal management (World Bank 2004) and the ‘right’ institutions (North, 
1990). Furthermore proponents of sustainable development see it as a 
process of development by which specific needs of developing 
economies are met without destruction of the environment.  It therefore 
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encompasses three constituent parts ie, economic, social and 
environmental and the equitable sharing of benefits. 
 In the context of trade, various trade-growth theories explain that for 
countries to achieve economic growth and development through trade, 
they must reach out to other markets through trade. The classical view, 
often associated with Adam Smith, is that free trade will lead to the most 
efficient use of a country’s resources and therefore yield the highest 
national income. Trade improves economic performance by increasing 
competition and by giving domestic firms access to the best foreign 
technology, which can be adopted to raise domestic productivity. Trade 
contributes to productivity by forcing domestic industries to become 
more efficient.  Trade increases competition in the domestic market, 
diminishing the market power of any firm and forcing them to behave 
more competitively.  Competition also stimulates firms to improve their 
efficiency, otherwise they risk going out of business. A frequently 
mentioned concern is that trade liberalization or an open system of 
world trade may exacerbate world income inequality.   
 Developing country exports face a couple of barriers internally and 
externally which are conditioned by a number of factors reflecting 
marketing costs, tariffs, the costs of complying with both public and 
mandatory standards and other market requirements or government 
regulations (Josling & Roberts 2003). This raises trade costs and affects 
competitiveness especially for developing country producers and this has 
implications on their incomes. Furthermore, in order to access markets, 
producers must comply with the standards and regulations set by 
developed country markets. Often their compliance may stimulate not 
only firms to upgrade but also the domestic regulatory and institutional 
environment to improve efficiency and ultimately the competitiveness in 
the global market. 
 The horticulture sector in Kenya represents a typical sector in which 
the country has comparative advantage for production; is open to 
international competition and presents an opportunity for access to 
technology by complying with various standards; upgrading production 
and increasing incomes; and the development of domestic institutional 
and regulatory environment. However barriers such as standards which 
ultimately increase trade costs may affect exports and ultimately growth 
and poverty reduction; due to transaction costs related to compliance, 
standards may ultimately lock out non-complying and often smaller scale 
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producers from the market. Through value chains, different players have 
different roles and power relationships in these value chains may dictate 
the distribution of costs and incomes in the chains, thus income 
inequality becomes a key factor determining sustainable development in 
this sector. 
 In this study, we investigate three main constituents of development 
in the horticulture sector in relation to standards: the trade-growth effect 
of horticulture exports and whether standards lead to enhancing or 
diminishing exports; the income inequality effect in the high value chains 
(HVCs) i.e the cost-benefit effect of standards on the value chain 
participants and the distribution of costs and benefits in the value chains; 
finally we look at the sustainability of smallholder participation in these 
value chains through the social and economic lenses. 
 The time frame presented in this study runs from 1995 to 2012. The 
year 1995 is significant because it is the year that Kenya joined the WTO 
and thus started complying with WTO rules and regulations including 
standards. For data availability and reliability, 1995 presents the year 
when the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) was set up and proper data 
on exports by volume, value and destination were recorded. Shortly 
thereafter the country embarked on a major trade-poverty-export and 
development strategy which saw the horticulture sector become one of 
the major sectors selected for income generation and poverty reduction.   
The Standards Context 
The main focus of this dissertation is the effect of standards on 
horticulture sector exports where the main market for Kenya’s products 
is the European Union. The global economy for export horticulture is 
increasingly structured around global value chains (GVCs) that account 
for a rising share of international trade, global gross domestic product 
(GDP), and employment. The horticultural value chain includes several 
segments: inputs, production, packing and storage, processing, and 
distribution and marketing. The chain is buyer-driven; the lead firms are 
large supermarkets in key markets in the European Union. The value 
chain is governed by public and private standards, which control sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary conditions, quality, quantity, traceability, and pesticide 
use. Through these standards, lead countries and firms determine which 
products are produced, how, and when, often shaping access to end 
markets, in this case private supermarket standards prevail. The main 
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standard is the GLOBALGAP (formerly EUREPGAP) which is a 
private standard encompassing traceability, quality and safety 
specifications, maximum residue limits and labelling and packaging.
 Market access in the value chain is further regulated by trade 
agreements in this case (WTO). Governments tend to use instruments to 
protect their domestic markets and consumers and in this case public 
mandatory standards prevail such as the EU regulations on food and feed. These 
also specify maximum residue limits, phyto-sanitary requirements, 
packaging and labelling according to EU regulations and also include 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures. 
This dissertation does not look at ethical standards, labour standards 
or fair trade standards that may attract premiums. The focus of this 
dissertation is both public mandatory and private standards that prevail 
in the horticulture sector. The scope of standards is wide and depending 
on the case study approach used in this dissertation, it will vary for each 
of the empirical chapters. For the first empirical chapter, the study 
analyses the effect of standards on export volumes. The second empirical 
chapter will use a case study of the green beans value chains to analyse 
how GLOBALGAP and other EU regulations related to SPS and MRLs 
will determine governance structures and distribution of margins along 
the value chain. Both product and process standards are taken into 
consideration. The final empirical chapter looks at smallholder 
participation in global value chains and looks at standards as a whole.   
  
1.4 The Questions 
The main question in this research is – what is the link between 
standards and development in Kenya’s horticultural exports sector? And 
what are their dynamics with respect to trade effects, distributional 
outcomes and inequality and social micro-processes of sustainable 
participation of smallholders? 
The results of this study can be used to facilitate four important 
questions.  
x What is the scope and context of standards in Kenya’s 
horticulture sector? What is the typology of standards in the 
sector and related compliance structures, and what are the 
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implications on organization of the sector and the 
institutions? 
x Are EU standards and regulations trade restricting or 
enhancing? Have EU regulations led to a decrease or increase 
in the export of horticultural produce in Kenya?  
x  Who are the winners and losers in high value chains and what 
are the distributional outcomes with respect to costs and 
benefits?  
x  What can be learned at the micro-level from smallholders 
that choose to export and therefore comply with the 
standards? What affects their choices and what intermediaries 
do they use to mitigate the costs related to compliance? 
 
1.5 Case Studies, Methodology and Data 
1.5 .1 Case Studies Approach 
In order to comprehensively capture the effects of EU standards on 
Kenya’s Horticultural exports Industry7 case studies that answer each of 
the research questions have been used and both quantitative and 
qualitative methods applied.  
A multi-Stage Approach: 
The research relies on both secondary and primary data. Secondary data 
has been obtained from various sources including various databases. A 
farm/firm-level survey was done to capture primary data and specifically 
to provide information for the various stages of the analysis, which also 
form the basis of various chapters of this study. 
The first part involves the identification of EU standards that are 
applicable on Kenya’s horticulture sector; and the analysis of their key 
features i.e. determine what standard each specifies, whether these are 
processes or performance standards or both, what conformity 
assessment procedures are used to enforce the standards, how and where 
are the procedures implemented. Furthermore the different sets of 
                                                 
7 Agricultural products are for the various product groupings namely, Fruits, 
vegetable and cut flowers. 
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standards are analysed to determine their typology, their origin and their 
modes of compliance and their regulatory and institutional implications. 
The second part is a case study that focuses on the effects of 
standards on trade at a macro-level. Information from part one is used to 
identify the set of standards that the sector complies with based on 
WTO notifications for the mandatory standards and other private 
standards and the number of rejections of export produce due to non-
compliance. This analysis is quantitative and determines the effects of 
standards and other macro-economic variables on export supply. An 
econometric model is used to estimate the effects of standards on 
various product groupings (Fresh Fruits and Vegetables and Cut 
Flowers) exported to the EU. This is aggregated at product level for the 
period8 1995 to 2012.  
The third case consists of the analysis of the value chain dynamics of 
standards using the sector’s green beans value chain as an illustrative 
case. It determines the key value chain actors and activities while 
estimating various cost and revenue margins that are related to both 
inputs and outputs for different actors.  The cost implications of meeting 
standards and the return on investments are determined and compared 
across actors to show how value and rent is distributed. The main 
technique applied is a combination of value chain analysis and an input 
output - filiere, and is mainly drawn from primary data collected from 
various chain actors. 
The fourth and final case analyses the social micro-processes that 
have been formed in order for smallholders to comply with standards 
and participate in the export chain. It involves the use of primary data 
collected from smallholders to analyse their motivation to participate in 
the horticultural exports value chain as well as their cooperative 
behaviour associated with the formation of market intermediaries to 
mitigate on costs of meeting standards. 
                                                 
8 The selected period 1995-2012 has been done because the horticultural 
industry flourished in the year beginning 1995. 
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1.5.2 Data  
Primary and secondary data sources involving both qualitative and 
quantitative data are used.  
Secondary Data 
Secondary data was obtained from various sources. HCDA provided 
time series data on exports by category ie cut flowers, fresh fruits and 
vegetables by volume, value and destination. This data was supplemented 
by data from EUROSTAT and Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) to fill 
in any existing gaps. Standards data was obtained from WTO database 
on standards notifications, and the PERINORM data base, and Rapid 
Alert System for Food and Feed (RASSF). World Bank provided data on 
other economic variables such as FDI inflows. GDP, Exchange rates 
and FDI were obtained from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
(KNBS). 
Primary Data: The Survey  
Primary data was collected in two phases during the fieldwork process in 
2008. The first phase mainly involved the quantitative data collection and 
the second phase involved qualitative data collection from key 
informants and focus group discussions (FGDs) with farmers. The 
Survey took place in 5 provinces over 9 districts (Table 1.1). The target 
sample was 250 respondents 63 exporters (whole population sample) and 
187 farmers. The Survey was done with coordination with the Ministry 
of Agriculture (District Agricultural offices) as well as the HCDA, which 
played a crucial role in providing networks through which Producer 
organizations and farmer groups were interviewed. HCDA field officers 
also played a critical role in acting as “guides” to various places and 
providing a sampling frame for each district. For Nairobi the 18 
respondents included the export firms - both briefcase exporters and 
integrated pack-houses. 
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Sampling Methodology 
Simple random sampling was done in 9 districts where horticulture is the 
main income generating activity. The sampling occurred in 3 main stages:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sampling done was in proportion to size using a sampling frame 
provided by HCDA for each district. The sample size was calculated for 
each district and farmers selected randomly using excel. 
1. Purposeful selection of provinces (districts) where horticulture is 
the main economic activity 
2. Determining the sample size for each district 
3. Sample selection of farmers for surveying using a sampling 
frame provided by HCDA and District Agricultural Officers 
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Table 1.1: Farmers Sampled per Region 
 
District Province/Region 
Total 
Population Sample Size  
Mwea Eastern 317 30 
Meru Eastern 287 28 
Kibwezi Eastern 178 18 
Sagana Central 267 27 
Limuru Central 257 26 
Nakuru Rift Valley 178 18 
Naivasha Rift Valley 197 20 
Taveta Coast 168 16 
Total  1850 187 
 
In Nairobi province, although 63 exporters (the total population of 
registered exporting firms) had been targeted for interviews, only 14 
exporters accepted to be interviewed. They included 5 brokers 
(middlemen) that do not own farms but export produce, 7 large scale 
producers that export and have large farms, and two medium to small 
scale producers who export and own pack houses (Table 1.2). The 
response rate was very low for exporters. However, out of 187 targeted 
farmers interviewed, 181 valid responses were obtained.  
 
Primary Data Farm Level Survey 
Out of the total 201 respondents interviewed in the primary survey, 181 
were smallholders with land sizes ranging between 0.25-10 acres, 6 
medium scale producers with an acreage of 10-20 acres but do not own 
pack houses; 2 small scale exporters who own pack houses and have 
farms of their own; and 7 large scale producers with land ranging 
between 50-5000 acres who export their produce directly. Five brokerage 
firms (middlemen) were also interviewed (summary Table 1.2). The 
middlemen own pack-houses, they buy their produce from smallholders 
and export it after meeting the required packaging and labelling 
standards. They also have contracts with some supermarkets in the EU 
where they supply fresh produce even though they do not have farms or 
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grow any of the produce. At least 22 such companies were identified but 
only 5 were willing to be interviewed.  
 
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Producer and Exporter Categories 
 
Source: Survey, 2009 
 
A total of 128 farmers grow vegetables for export in Nyeri, Embu, 
Meru, Mwea, Sagana and Limuru. Most farmers grow upto three main 
vegetables. The French bean is the most commonly grown vegetable by 
62 farmers. Thirty (30) grow snow peas, 36 Rafaya, 20 baby corn and 18 
okra for export. A total of 31 farmers grew tomatoes for the local market 
alongside their export vegetables. Fruits are grown mainly in Taveta, 
Kibwezi and Mwea. The main export fruits are passion fruits, mangoes 
and oranges. Thirty eight (38) farmers grow passion fruits, 31 grew 
mangoes for export to the Middle East and 27 grow oranges for 
exported to the Middle East. Farmers in Mwea, Meru and Taveta also 
grew bananas for the local market alongside their export fruits. 
Flowers were mainly grown my medium and large scale farmers. Four  
(4) large scale farmers said during the interview that they grow mainly 
flowers for export and 3 grew French beans and snow peas  and 15 
smallholder farmers grew flowers for export through their producer 
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organizations. Two (2) medium scale farmers who grow vegetables 
(mainly green beans and snow peas) have pack houses on their farms 
where all the value addition is done and to boost their export volumes 
they have supply contracts with smallholder groups. Exporters also had 
contracts with large and small retail supermarkets in the EU – Spar and 
Carefour in EU countries, Albertheijn in Netherlands; Waitrose, ASDA 
and Tescos in the UK; Carefour, and Delhaize in Belgium. 
 Some exporters prefer to have contracts with farmers only through 
their producer organizations. The terms of contract are negotiated 
between farmers and exporters. On the hand, exporters who have 
contracts with main supermarkets in the EU, have contracts that specify 
the different products they will supply, quantities, quality of the produce, 
packaging and labelling requirements, prices, traceability requirements 
and sanctions related to breach of contract. Sixty nine (69) per cent of 
smallholders belong to producer organizations. A total of 18 producer 
organizations with a membership of between 15 to 50 farmers were 
interviewed. 
 
 
Key Informant Surveys and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
Key informant interviews involved mainly key government officials in 
various ministries and departments, key government officials involved in 
the implementation and administration of standards in various 
standardization, testing and certification bodies, key industry players 
involving producer organizations and umbrella bodies, credit facilities, 
airports authorities and export promotion agencies.  
The final stage involved focus group discussions with producer 
organizations. Appendix 2.1 gives a summary of the key informants’ 
interviewed from various institutions. FGDs supplemented primary data 
and a total of 18 producer organizations were also interviewed 
(Appendix 5.1) 
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1.6 Limitations and Challenges of the Study 
The study is not without its limitations. First, the context of 
development is wide and has many implications including poverty and 
welfare effects; distributional effects and sustainability issues. However, 
this thesis does not consider the general equilibrium effects of standards 
and subsequently trade within the sector or on the economy in general. 
In this regard, this is a country and sector specific case study that looks 
at the horticulture sector in isolation. This approach has its benefits in 
that it allows the scrutiny of the effects of standards on the sector. While 
looking at the effects of standards on export supply, other macro-
economic variables that might affect export supply are taken into 
consideration. The study does not analyse the effect of standards on 
welfare and poverty mainly because these factors have already been 
analysed by numerous researchers. The scope of standards is also limited 
to those that directly affect costs of production and directly affect 
smallholders, the most common being GLOBALGAP and other 
mandatory requirements such as the Maximum residue Limits (MRLs). 
In this regard, the study does not focus on labour, ethical, or other 
standards.  
Second, challenges faced in data collection also limited the analytical 
approaches that could have been used. For instance the majority of 
exporters were not willing to give information regarding their production 
costs or margins. This made it difficult to analyse the cost-margin 
component as had been envisioned. This limited the study to the use of 
an input-output analysis of costs and margins using data from a few of 
the exporters that agreed to provide the information.  
 
1.7 The Chapters 
The thesis is organized as follows: the preceding section is an outline of 
the introduction and sets the pace for this study. It gives the research 
questions, objectives and scope and an outline of the methodology 
which will be used to answer the research questions. The second chapter 
presents the conceptual framework used to analyse the different effects 
standards on trade. It provides a theoretical background and gives an 
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overview of the standards–development debate as is conceptualized in 
this research.   
 Chapter 3 mainly presents the typology of standards and their 
implications on Kenya’s horticulture sector. Also covered in this section 
is an outline of the value chain participants and their relationships; the 
key standards and stakeholders involved in their implementation; and the 
key institutional dynamics related to standards implementation in 
Kenya’s horticulture sector.  
Chapter 4 is an empirical chapter that gives an overview of the effects of 
standards on the horticulture sector, and their impact on the level of 
exports. The chapter investigates whether standards are export 
enhancing or reducing while also taking into consideration other factors 
that may affect exports.  
Chapter 5 uses a case study of the green beans value chain to analyse 
value chains effects of standards i.e the distribution of costs vs. benefits 
and distributional outcomes along the value chain for the different types 
of chain participants. The margins (which include both costs and 
standards margins) are compared with the distribution of revenue and 
profits obtained as a result of compliance to the standards. The method 
applied here is a combination of a value chain approach with a simplified 
input/output accounting matrix.  
The final empirical chapter 6 analyses the participation of 181 
smallholders in the value chains and the market intermediaries that 
prevail in this value chain using a regression analysis of factors that in 
theory may influence their participation and subsequent compliance with 
standards in order to access the export markets. In order to understand 
the sustainability of smallholder participation in these chains, special 
attention is paid to market intermediaries in the sector. 
  Chapter 7 gives a summary of the empirical findings of the study 
and how these are linked to various aspects of development and 
participation in the export value chains.  It provides a summary of the 
answers to the research questions outlines the methods and approaches 
used to arrive at the answers and sums up the study. It will indicate  
whether these answers can in future have policy implications for 
participation in global export value chains. 
 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
2  Context and Framework for Analysis  
2.1 Introduction 
In its basic form, economic theory suggests that gains from trade arise 
when countries specialise in production of those goods to which they 
are best suited, thereby earning export income that allows for poverty 
reduction. However, trade takes place under certain important market 
conditions such as imperfect competition, economies of scale, and 
distortions in factor markets which affect various segments of its 
participants who may lose or gain from trading in certain specialised 
products therefore creating winners or losers in a globalized trading 
system. In this regard it is assumed that access into global markets and 
increase in exports will invariably lead to reduction in poverty and 
consequently, development.  
Owing to a fall in prices of traditional exports such as tea, coffee and 
cocoa, there has been a dramatic shift from exporting these traditional 
cash crops towards high value fresh fruits and vegetables; which in 
recent years have become rapidly growing ventures for many producers 
and exporters in developing countries (Temu & Marwa, 2007). This 
rapid growth and expansion can be attributed to the need to fulfil 
demand for exotic and out of season products in the EU and other 
Western countries. However, these consumers and producers have 
become sensitized to health, safety and environmental concerns; which 
are embedded in the products as standards. Accessing these markets 
requires compliance with standards comprising of a strict regulatory 
framework of measures designed to ensure not only human and plant 
health but also environmental and ethical issues which sometimes go 
beyond the international requirements set under the SPS and TBT 
agreements administered by the WTO (Maskus et al. 2005).  
A major concern about these new global developments and trade is 
that they may accelerate growth but the poor may not benefit 
proportionately. Global literature on standards in high value chains 
argues that standards are causing new non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and 
may be trade reducing instead of enhancing (Wilson & Otsuki, 2001). 
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The second concern is that benefits accrued from the compliance of 
standards may be distributed disproportionately especially when costs of 
compliance and due diligence are pushed downstream (Dolan 
&Humphrey, 2000). The third concern is that standards increase the 
marginalization of smallholders and may lead to their exclusion from 
high value chains, income generation and poverty reduction (Unnevehr 
2000).  In addition, standards have increasingly been used in the 
governance of global agri-food chains, shaping the coordination 
mechanisms and ultimately changing the rules of the game for 
producers and exporters (Ouma, 2010, Graffham et al. 2007, Henson et 
al 2009). On a positive note, some authors have recognized the 
importance of standards in upgrading of production chains and 
increasing competitiveness (Gereffi et al, 2001). Another positive study 
linking standards to development has demonstrated the ability of 
standards to stimulate institutional change in response to requirements 
for certification and accreditation (Otieno & Knorringa, 2012). 
This chapter that comprises three parts discusses the relevant 
concepts and the study’s main analytical framework. The first part begins 
with a discussion on the global context of standards, regulatory 
measures and their link with development. It analyses the typology of 
standards, their modes of compliance and processes involved and looks 
at how standards are linked to development. The second part sets out the 
main theoretical and analytical framework of the study and the analytical 
approach that will be used to answer the research questions. The final 
part concludes by summarizing the key issues arising from the two 
parts. 
2.2 Global Context of Standards and Their Link with 
Development 
2.2.1 Definition and Classification of Standards 
Standards can be defined as a limit or rule that is approved and 
monitored for compliance by an authoritative agency or professional or 
recognized body as a minimum acceptable benchmark. Standards may 
be classified as (1) government or statutory agency standards and 
specifications enforced by law, (2) proprietary standards developed by a 
firm or organization and placed in public domain to encourage their 
widespread use, and (3) voluntary standards established by consultation 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
24 
and consensus and available for use by any person, organization, or 
industry (Figure 2.1) (den Butter et al, 2007). The WTO defines 
standards as 
 
"Technical specifications contained in a document that lays characteristics of a 
product such as levels of quality, performance, safety, or dimensions. Standards may 
include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, testing and methods, packaging, or 
labeling requirements as they apply to a product."  
  
Standards are therefore the language of trade and have many roles 
and functions. Not only do they establish a common trading language 
between buyers and sellers, but they also ensure public safety and the 
protection of the environment within and outside national borders. 
Moreover, in today’s globalized production systems, standards ensure 
that parts produced across borders fit and that networks are compatible. 
Emerging standards are both complex and dynamic, incorporating 
features that go beyond simple quality, to less apparent characteristics of 
product safety, environmental management, and human rights 
(Kaplinsky, 2006). More recently, standards have also been driven by a 
philosophy, which integrates profitability with continual improvement 
in environmental and social performance in everyday business practices. 
Public Mandatory vs. Private and Voluntary Standards  
Standards can be classified into several categories depending on their 
function or the way standards originate as summarized in the figure 
below. The first distinction made in figure 2.1 is between public and 
private standards. This classification refers to the way standards 
originate. Whether the market responsible for their development or if it 
is a government initiative. A private standard is a standard, which primarily 
focuses on the interests of the private stakeholders that develop the 
standards. These stakeholders will only take the interests of consumers 
into account to the extent that it benefits their own interests (den Butter 
et al., 2007).  
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Figure 2.1: Classification of Standards 
 
 
Private standards are therefore voluntary in that there is no legal 
recourse for failure to comply. However public standards are government 
initiatives and the government has the ability to make the standards 
mandatory through the introduction of legislation (Ibid). This is in 
contrast to voluntary standards. The distinction made in figure 2.1 is that 
between standards that are related to products and those related to 
production processes. Product standards are requirements with respect to 
some characteristics of the product itself, they are verified through 
quality control of finished products. Process standards are standards that 
prescribe how certain steps in the production process should take place 
and most often are enforced through regular inspections of the 
processes. Producers in developing countries thus have to comply with 
both public and privates standards in order to access the export market 
in the EU. 
 Recently, literature form Henson & Humphrey (2010), further 
classify standards according to who sets them and who is ultimately 
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responsible for overseeing their implementation. They identify three 
main categories: Individual firm standards e.g. Nature’s Choice (Tesco) 
which are developed by large retailers and adopted along their supply 
chains and require private labelling; Collective national Standards e.g. 
Kenya Flower Council, set by collective national organizations and may 
represent interests of commercial entities; and Collective international 
standards e.g. GLOBALGAP, BRC etc. which are set by international 
collective organizations, industry associations, NGOs and independent 
standards setting bodies. They are designed to be adopted and 
implemented internationally. The authors also suggest that private 
standards go beyond public regulations by addressing issues that go 
beyond public regulations e.g. fair trade and they may have additional 
attributes that are desirable for certain niche markets. Private standards 
also provide a ‘reinforcement’ of public standards e.g. food safety and 
health standards of GLOBALGAP or BRC provide additional layers of 
supervision, certification and accreditation, which traverse regulatory 
jurisdictions but none the less provide additional assurances to 
consumers and retailers that rules will be adhered to. 
Public Mandatory Standards: WTO Rules and Regulations 
SPS Measures and the WTO 
Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures are applied to protect 
human, animal and plant life or health from risks arising from the 
introduction and spread of pests and diseases and from risks arising 
from additives, toxins and contaminants in foods and feedstuffs. SPS 
measures are subject to rules set under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). In particular, the use of SPS measures is governed by the 
provisions of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phyto-sanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement). Therefore, all countries 
that are signatories of WTO ascribe to the principles of the WTO and 
have to meet WTO requirements including SPS Measures. Kenya joined 
and became a signatory of WTO in 1995. These requirements basically 
cover food safety and health standards also9 as well as Codex 
                                                 
9 The Agreement on the Application of SPS Measures sets out the basic rules 
for food safety and animal and plant health standards. It allows countries to 
set their own standards. But it also says regulations must be based on science. 
They should be applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal 
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Alimentarius10 standards and Hazard and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP)11 standards.  
The SPS Agreement provides WTO member countries with the right 
to use SPS measures to protect human, animal and plant life or health. 
Each WTO member country is also charged with maintaining a level of 
protection it considers appropriate12 to protect life or health within its 
territory. The SPS Agreement applies to all SPS measures, which may 
directly or indirectly affect international trade. The right to adopt SPS 
measures is accompanied by obligations aimed at minimizing the 
negative impacts of SPS measures on international trade. The basic 
obligations are that SPS measures must: 
x be applied only to the extent necessary to protect life or health 
and not be more trade restrictive than required;  
x be based on scientific principles and not maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence, and  
x not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable treatment or a disguised 
restriction on trade.  
Article 3 and Article 5 of the SPS Agreement give provisions where 
members are permitted to adopt SPS measures which are more 
stringent than the relevant international standards or adopt SPS 
measures when international standards do not exist, provided the 
                                                                                                                 
or plant life or health. And they should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminate between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail. 
(WTO, 1998). 
10 The Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) is an intergovernmental body 
to implement the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, which was 
established by an FAO Conference resolution in 1961, and a World Health 
Assembly resolution, (WHA) 16.42, in 1963. Its principle objective is to 
protect the health of consumers and to facilitate the trade of food by setting 
international standards on foods (i.e. Codex Standards) and other texts, which 
can be recommended to governments for acceptance. 
11 HACCP standards on the other hand are standards that are developed in 
order to prevent hazards that could introduce potentially dangerous food-born 
illnesses in food by applying science-based controls that cover all aspects from 
raw resources through preparation to final product 
12 This is called the appropriate level of protection (ALOP). 
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measures are based on scientific risk assessment; consistently applied; 
and not more trade restrictive than necessary. These provisions have 
hence led to many developments in the standards arena has seen an 
introduction of a myriad of other standards not related to food safety 
and health but equally important for producers to access consumer 
markets. 
The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement 
According to the TBT Agreement, a standard is a set of rules, guidelines 
or characteristics for products or related processes and production 
methods (provided for common and repeated use) approved by a 
recognized body with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also 
include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method. The scope of the TBT Agreement covers all 
products both industrial and agricultural except services, SPS measures 
and purchasing specifications for consumption by governments. The 
agreement therefore provides for both mandatory and voluntary 
standards. 
Principles of the Agreement include: non-discrimination; avoidance 
of unnecessary obstacles; harmonization; equivalence; mutual 
recognition and transparency. However, the agreement also recognizes 
countries’ rights to adopt the standards they consider appropriate - for 
example, for human, animal or plant life or health, for the protection of 
the environment or to meet other consumer interests. Harmonization as 
outlined in article 5.5 requires members to have National Enquiry 
Points (NEP) to act as national reference points for harmonization and 
notification of new standards.  
Through the TBT Agreement, members have expressly accepted a 
number of obligations in relations to the conduct of non-governmental 
bodies13. Article 4 lays down obligations in relation to the preparation, 
adoption and application of standards by non-governmental bodies.  
The type of requirements in Article 4 partly mirrors those in Article 13 
of the SPS Agreement where members must “take such reasonable 
measures as may be available to them to ensure” that non-governmental 
bodies comply with obligations that are largely similar to those set forth 
                                                 
13 Defined as bodies “other than a central government body or a local 
government body” TBT Agreement, Annex 1, paragraph 8.   
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by the TBT Agreement for governmental measures; and “not take 
measures which have the effect of … requiring or encouraging non-governmental 
bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with those obligations. Article 4 further 
specifies that the obligations of Members with respect to compliance of standardizing 
bodies with the provisions of the Code of Good Practice shall apply irrespective of 
whether or not a standardizing body has accepted the Code of Good Practice”.  
Moreover, Article 14 of the TBT Agreement provides that the WTO 
dispute settlement provisions “can be invoked in cases where a Member 
considers that another Member has not achieved satisfactory results and its trade 
interests are significantly affected.  In this respect, such results shall be equivalent to 
those as if the body in question were a Member”. 
2.2.2 The Link between Standards and Development 
Standards in many cases are public goods.  For this reason, they must 
serve to solve common problems, generating joint consumption 
benefits for the public.  Standards facilitate comparisons by consumers 
across products with common essential characteristics (Maskus & 
Wilson, 2000). Product and process standards are necessary because 
they contribute to the provision of public goods for which people have 
preferences. Standards also improve the flow of information between 
suppliers and consumers about the characteristics and quality of 
products, thereby facilitating market transactions. In this regard, 
standards are designed to facilitate information exchange and ensure 
quality. For example, sanitary standards contribute to public health. 
Sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements can improve health and quality 
of life with spill over benefits into higher productivity, as well as 
expanded export opportunities (Wilson, 2001). 
Principles of the agreement include: non-discrimination; avoidance 
of unnecessary obstacles; harmonization; equivalence; mutual 
recognition and transparency. However, the agreement also recognizes 
countries’ rights to adopt the standards they consider appropriate - for 
example, for human, animal or plant life or health, for the protection of 
the environment or to meet other consumer interests. Harmonization as 
outlined in article 5.5 requires members to have National Enquiry 
Points (NEP) to act as national reference points for harmonization and 
notification of new standards. 
The role of standards in the value chain has been discussed as 
important in improving efficiency through quality cost and delivery 
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(QCD), but also through meeting demands of high-income economies 
that are largely the “drivers” of these standards (Kaplinsky, 2006). This 
results in firms demanding performance by their suppliers and the 
threat of exclusion for non-performance but it also raises costs for 
complying firms. When products and processes become more 
standardized, transparency increases and trade becomes more 
predictable and easy to control, thus reducing costs involved in 
transactions (Kaplinsky, 2006; Tander & Tilburg 2007; Busch, 2000). 
Implementing standards can therefore improve operational and 
managerial efficiency.  
Standards also have technological and innovative features embedded 
in them and hence the process of complying to standards lies in the transfer 
of advanced production capabilities to low-wage economies who in turn gain by 
acquiring knowledge through spill-overs and ‘learning by doing’ 
(Grossman & Helpman, 1989). This process enables small 
firms/farmers to upgrade their production, thereby resulting in increased 
incomes. 
With the emerging and increasing demanding for health and safety 
standards over and above the governmental standards in the EU, 
private sectors are imposing additional standards in order to protect 
their safety reputation and also to differentiate themselves from competitors.  
Retailers have also imposed many requirements informally through 
individual supply chains (Jaffe & Henson, 2004) and hence exporters 
are concerned about the cost of monitoring a large number of 
smallholders for compliance with increasingly strict regulations. These 
safety standards have thus created immense constraints for existing 
exporters/suppliers while raising the bar for new entrants into the 
market. Therefore as standards increase in number, complexity and 
stringency, they have a direct impact on competition and market access 
and hence those firms that are unable to fulfil all requirements are faced 
with export supply constraints and risk exclusion (Tander & van Tilburg 
2007). 
Some Authors (Wilson, 2001; Wilson & Abiola 2003), have also 
pointed out that countries use regulation for protectionist purposes. Technical 
regulations may discriminate against foreign suppliers, both in their 
construction and in their outcomes. They may be used to gain strategic 
trade advantages for domestic firms over foreign competitors. 
Standards are often non-transparent and in some cases needlessly force 
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firms to duplicate testing and certification costs. Regulations may be 
drafted to exclude both domestic and foreign entrants into a particular 
market, which then serves to support entrenched monopolies. 
Standards - particularly those that require independent certification - 
intrinsically fulfil many of the broader requirements for producers to 
participate in global supply chains or compete in high-value products. 
For example, detailed record keeping of production inputs, traceability, 
and third party monitoring that are part of organics and GlobalGAP are 
also useful in improving chain competitiveness and more effective 
participation in lucrative markets. Sustainability-oriented standards appear to 
have some additional benefits for farmers. For example, several 
recommend diversification from dependence on a single cash crop, 
thereby reducing a producer’s risk of crop failure. Environmental 
standards also help to ensure sustainable production and are beneficial 
to farmers (Okello, 2005).  
More recently ethical standards like fair trade have been used to promote 
social justice. Fair trade standards resulted from developed country 
consumers concerns over the progress of development through global 
trade. It is therefore a market-based mechanism aimed at improving the 
lives of producers in developing countries. Fair trade has been seen as a 
mechanism through which producer’s needs can be addressed. It 
incorporates equity in supply chains by addressing market failures and 
their social impacts at source (Nicholls & Opal, 2004). Other recent 
ethical standards have also included labour standards that ensure 
conducive and humane working conditions, fair wages and non-
exploitation of children in farms. 
In view of this, producers and exporters operate in an environment 
full of uncertainties. Concerns related to food quality and safety; 
resource use, land degradation and environmental pollution as well as 
labour and worker welfare continue to dog the sector in many ways. 
While standards may at the same time pass knowledge and information 
necessary for producers to participate in global chains, they may also act 
as “barriers” to trade and increase transaction costs for exporting firms. 
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2.2.3 The Nature and Extent of EU Standards  
In the EU, consumer concerns about food safety, resulting largely from 
food safety failures in the 1980s and 1990s has been one of the key 
drivers for standards and regulations (Dolan & Humphrey, 2002). These 
two decades were marked by a series of food-borne disease outbreaks in 
Europe linked to produce originating from developing countries; these 
include a Salmonella outbreak in the UK in 1989, an E. coli outbreak in 
fast food hamburgers in the United States in 1993, and Dioxin 
contamination of animal feed in Belgium in 1999 (World Bank, 2005). 
Importing countries have also become concerned about the 
introduction of pests through imports from developing countries. The 
EU, for instance, formulated and implemented Council Directive 
2000/29/EC to control the introduction of pests and diseases harmful 
to plants and plant products. This directive requires that by phyto-
sanitary certificates accompany imported produce, declaring them free 
of pests and disease. Likewise, supermarkets in developed countries 
have responded to changing regulatory and demand conditions by 
seeking to meet consumer demands for all products (Dolan & 
Humphrey, 2002). Consumer pressure, protection of brand image, 
stricter food regulation in the EU during the 1990s, and the need for 
access to a due diligence defence drove retailers to develop strict 
commercial standards which encompass food safety and quality as well 
as environmental, and ethical concerns as will be discussed below. 
EU Food and Safety Regulations 
In the aftermath of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 
crisis and several other food scandals, the EU published its White Paper 
on Food Safety setting out a legislative action plan for a pro-active new 
food policy.  Key elements in the new approach were the establishment 
of a framework regulation, the establishment of an independent body 
providing scientific advice to the legislators, the development of specific 
food and feed safety legislation including a major overhaul of the 
existing hygiene legislation, and the creation of a framework for 
harmonized food controls. As a result of this, in January 2002, the 
European Parliament together with the council of the European Union, 
passed the EC Regulation number 178/2002 laying down the general 
principles and requirements of the food law and establishing the 
European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in 
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matters of food safety (Official Journal of European Communities 
2002a). 
The new legislation adapted an integrated approach to food safety 
known as “from farm to fork” which lays the primary responsibility of 
food safety on producers and retailers and encompasses traceability – as 
the basic principle; transparency; risk analysis and risk assessment using 
the best scientific evidence and the precautionary principle. This 
legislation also gave responsibility to the European Food safety 
authority for scientific and technical advice as well as passing 
information to the community. Implementation of the legislation 
therefore, resulted in frequent checks on imports as well as inspections 
in countries exporting to the EU. 
The white paper on food safety outlines a radical revision of EU 
food hygiene rules. It developed a “hygiene package” with the aim of 
merging, harmonizing and simplifying very detailed and complex 
hygiene requirements scattered over 17 directives.  The overall aim was 
to create a single hygiene regime covering food and food operators in all 
sectors, together with effective instruments to manage food safety and 
any possible food crises, throughout the food chain.  Food producers 
would bear primary responsibility for the safety of food through the use 
of a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) system.  It 
also had requirements for food establishments to be registered or to be 
approved by competent authorities, which should have control systems 
in place in order to verify the food law in general and food hygiene in 
particular. These requirements came into force on January 1st 2006. 
Voluntary and Private Standards in the EU 
Consumer pressure, protection of brand images and stricter food 
regulations in the EU, and the need for access to a due diligence 
defence, drove retailers to develop strict commercial standards. 
Governments tended to respond by adopting stricter legislation placing 
the liability for food contamination on the industry and retailers (e.g. the 
‘due diligence’ requirements in the United Kingdom). In turn, retailers 
and food manufacturers sought to make their suppliers responsible for 
the safety of their products, notably through the development of 
standards for good agricultural practices and good manufacturing 
practices and the requirement that suppliers be certified. In some cases, 
firms have developed standards individually (e.g. Carrefour’s “filière 
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qualité”), while in others they have acted collectively (e.g. the 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative was created by leading global agri-food 
firms such as Nestlé and Danone to pursue mutual sustainability 
interests while some European supermarket chains formed the Euro-
retailer Produce Group to develop the (EUREPGAP) standard which 
then evolved to become the GLOBALGAP standard. 
The GLOBALGAP (EUREPGAP) Standard 
The GLOBALGAP code for the production of fresh fruits and 
vegetables was first introduced in 1996 by a group of eleven British and 
Dutch retailers and was initially referred to as EUREPGAP. Its main 
objective was to create a single private sector standard. EUREPGAP 
certification can be given either to an individual grower or to a 
marketing organization attached to an exporter (Okello, 2005). Some of 
these regulations included Phytosanitary measures; conformity to quality 
standards, labelling and traceability requirements; Maximum Residue 
Limits (MRLs); new organic inspection requirements. 
GLOBALGAP14 is key reference for Good Agricultural Practice 
(GAP) in the global market that translates consumer requirements in 
agricultural production with an aim to establish one standard for GAP. 
These requirements reflect both the technical regulations laid down by 
governments and the private standards of major supermarket chains - 
the latter of which are employed both to manage regulatory and liability 
risks and as the basis of product differentiation. Existing national or 
regional farm assurance schemes are required to benchmark their 
processes on GLOBALGAP standards (GLOBALGAP, 2009).  
GLOBALGAP is a single integrated standard with modular 
applications for different product groups, ranging from plant and 
livestock production to plant propagation materials and compound feed 
manufacturing. It integrates all agricultural products into a single audit 
(GLOBALGAP website, 2009). It also encompasses standards on 
labour rights and worker welfare; environmental standards; 
requirements for record keeping & auditing and traceability among 
others. The principles of GLOBALGAP include general regulations; 
                                                 
14 GLOBALGAP is a pre-farm gate standard which covers the process of 
certified product from farm inputs, the process of production and inspection 
and the quality of the final products. It is subject to three-year revision cycle to 
take into account technological and market developments. 
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critical control points and compliance criteria; provisions for 
benchmarking and national interpretation guidelines. Before developing 
a standard, GLOBALGAP evaluates other existing standards to see if 
there can be mutual cooperation between countries. A number of 
country governments have joined with private sector producers’ 
associations to create their own countries’ GAP standards for fruits and 
vegetables and have submitted them to GLOBALGAP for certification. 
Mexico, Chile, Kenya, Japan, some European counties, and New 
Zealand have all had their local standards certified or provisionally 
certified by GLOBALGAP. 
The British Retail Consortium (BRC) Standard  
The BRC Standards are a suite of four industry-leading?? led??? 
technical standards that specify technical requirements to be met by 
organizations to facilitate the production, packaging, storage and 
distribution of safe food and consumer products. Originally developed 
in response to the needs of UK members of the BRC, the standards 
have gained usage world-wide and are implemented by growing 
numbers of retailers and branded manufacturers in the EU, North 
America and further afield. Certification to a global standard which is 
achieved through audit by third party certification bodies reassures 
retailers and branded manufacturers of the capability and competence 
of the supplier, and reduces the need for retailers and manufacturers to 
carry out their own audits, thereby reducing the administrative burden 
on both the supplier and the customer. 
Other Private Voluntary Standards Which Producers Have to Meet 
Include: 
Organic Standards – these are specific process standards where 
certification covers several important areas of agriculture and more 
recently of aquaculture. There are preliminary conversion requirements 
that help to ensure that the cultivation medium and the area are 
reasonably free of contaminants or synthetic agrochemicals. 
Certification addresses the processes of cultivation, particularly issues of 
fertilization, crop protection and risks of contamination. Within the EU, 
it encompasses such standards as EU organic, a standard used to label 
all organic foods sold in the EU. 
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Social/Human Rights Standards 
Fair Trade – these standards, for socially conscious product labelling, 
mainly deal with human and worker rights. They guarantee minimum 
prices considered as fair to producers. They provide a Fair Trade 
Premium that the producer must invest in projects to enhance its social, 
economic and environmental development. They strive to create  
mutually beneficial long term trading relationships. They set clear 
minimum and developmental criteria and objectives for social, 
economic and environmental sustainability. 
SA8000 – this is a voluntary universal standard that is auditable by a 
third party and are voluntarily adopted by companies that adhere to 
specific standards for working conditions and labour rights. SA8000 is 
based on the principles of international human rights norms as 
described in International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It measures the performance 
of companies in eight key areas: child labour, forced labour, health and 
safety, free association and collective bargaining, discrimination, 
disciplinary practices, working hours and compensation. SA8000 also 
provides for a social accountability management system to demonstrate 
on-going conformance with the standard. 
Both the safety and the ethical dimension of food depends to a large 
extent on production and trade processes. Since buyers cannot monitor 
directly these processes, private companies and NGOs have developed 
certification programmes to accompany their standards. Certification 
allows buyers to verify that the certified supplier complies with the 
standard through its control by an independent third party. From the 
foregoing, the typology of standards in the EU can be summarized 
using the following criterion (see also table 2.1 below) 
x Scope – process and product 
x Geographical reach- national, regional, global 
x Function – social, labour, health and environmental, quality, 
ethical 
x Key drivers – public, private (NGOs, supermarkets) and a mix 
of public and private 
x Forms – management, public codes, labels 
x Coverage – generic, sector specific, value chain specific 
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x Regulatory implications- legally binding, mandatory, voluntary 
 
 
Table 2.1: Typology of EU Standards 
 
Field of 
Application Form  Coverage Key Drivers 
Certification 
process 
Regulatory 
Implications 
Quality 
Assurance 
Codes of 
Conduct 
Firm/Valu
e Chain 
Specific Lead Firms First Party Mandatory 
Environmenta
l Label 
Sector 
Specific 
International 
NGOs Second Party Voluntary 
Health 
Standard
s Generic 
International 
Organization
s Third Party 
 
Market 
Competition 
Requirement 
Labour      
Social    NGOs   
Ethical       Government   
Source: Nadvi & Waltring, 2002 
 
2.3 Theoretical and analytical Framework 
2.3.1 Standards and the Trade-development Agenda 
The Panacea of Trade Growth and Poverty 
Trade growth theories assume that access into global markets and 
increase in exports will lead to a reduction in poverty. Ricardian theories 
proposed that trade enables a country to specialise in the production of 
a commodity in which it has a comparative advantage. However, 
According to Biggs (2007), the fact that in many cases comparative 
advantage arises from self-reinforcing externalities rather than as a result 
of underlying factor advantages is particularly important for developing 
countries. For the case of Africa, where they have a comparative 
advantage in primary commodities, this allows for them to specialise in 
products where they have competitive advantage and which would 
invariably lead to growth and development. Such has been the 
assumption with the horticultural sector, which is seen by most as an 
opportunity especially for small scale farmers to participate in the global 
market, improve their incomes and subsequently reduce poverty. 
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Developing countries are more endowed with labour and therefore 
specialise in production of labour intensive goods (Hillebrand, 1996). 
This theory was disputed, and a structuralist school of thought emerged 
in which the basis for sustained integration of the developing countries 
into the world economy depends on systematic learning, technological 
competence, external economies and agglomeration advantages 
(Linemann, 1966:22). These contributions made by the structuralists 
have undoubtedly advanced the debate on competitive advantage, more 
recently, theories of innovation and competition state that the most 
important comparative advantages relevant to development and also to 
trade enjoyed by countries stem from their ability to: innovate; produce 
differentiated goods; satisfy differentiated consumer preferences; exploit 
economies of scale; introduce cost reducing process innovations; 
rationalise production processes – process innovation and 
organizational progress  and finally use production capacities to 
compensate for production constraints in other countries. They also 
recognize that abilities that lead to comparative advantages are unevenly 
distributed internationally and become unstable over time (Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan, 2002). 
Other economists point out that, in addition to this static gain, freer 
trade provides domestic firms access to a wide variety of foreign inputs 
at a lower cost. Furthermore, to the extent that exports help increase 
the access to foreign capital and technology via the greater availability of 
foreign exchange, as well as the fact that Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) tends to concentrate in more open economies, expanding exports 
could lead to higher rates of economic growth and more rapid 
economic development and by engaging in world trade, developing 
countries hope to achieve economic growth and ultimately poverty 
alleviation. However, it has been argued that trade is not a panacea for 
poverty alleviation and development, but one of the factors that 
contribute to economic growth though at a modest rate (Polaski, 2005; 
Rodrik, 2007). Trade creates “winners” and “losers”. If the “losers” in 
the globalization era had been confined to those who have been 
excluded from global processes, then the policy conclusions would have 
been clear – enter the global economy as rapidly as possible and take 
advantage of these economies of specialization (Ibid). However, the 
“losers” in recent decades include those producers who have 
participated in the global economy, but who have done so in ineffective 
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ways. The key challenge thus is not whether to participate in global 
processes, but how to do so in ways which provide for sustainable 
income growth. In this regard, export led growth as has been observed 
in many Asian countries like Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan which 
have achieved remarkable economic growth over the last two decades. 
This growth has been accompanied by persistent export expansion in 
these countries (World Bank, 1993). This older trade theory has been 
strongly criticized for ignoring many important market conditions.  
 New trade theories, on the other hand, discuss the effects on trade 
and investment patterns of imperfect competition, economies of scale, 
and distortions in factor markets. It is particularly interested in 
explaining how trade and inherent imperfections affect various 
segments of its participants and how various participants may lose or 
gain from trading in certain specialised products. These theories also 
take into account the fact that transaction costs, economies of scale and 
subsequent agglomeration effects in themselves create winners and 
losers in a global world trading system (Rodrik, 2007).  
Enter Global Standards and its Effects on Trade 
While trade liberalization is important for development, the 
proliferation of standards casts doubt on the beneficial effects of trade. 
Many authors have pointed out that standards are acting as new non-
tariff barriers to trade (Unnevehr, 2000, Wilson and Otsuki 2001). 
Studies quantifying the impact of standards on trade generally have 
mixed findings: on the one hand some authors find that an increased 
stringency of standards will have a negative effect on trade Wilson and 
Otsuki, 2001; Lacovone 2002; Anders & Caswell 2007). Another set of 
findings indicate that harmonized or commonly shared standards may 
increase trade (Moenuius 1999, Czubala, Shepherd and Wilson 2007). 
The effect of standards on trade can be summed up using evidence 
from various studies: Wilson and Otsuki (2001) estimated the trade 
impact of the “aflatoxin standards” on cereal exports from 4 developing 
countries and 15 importing countries and found that the standards tend 
to be significant in most cases and have a disruptive impact on trade 
quantified in about 670 million US dollars. Otsuki, Wison and Sewadeh 
in 2001, also estimate trade effects of aflatoxin standards on groundnuts 
from Africa to Europe between 1989-1998. They further compare the 
effects when a new European Union aflatoxin regulation standard is 
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used vs the Codex Alimentarius international standards. According to 
the study, a 10 per cent increase in aflatoxin standards would result in 
an 11 per cent reduction in trade, whilst use of a new EU regulation on 
aflatoxins would result in a decrease in trade by 63 per cent as 
compared to when the Codex Alimentarius standard is applied. Similarly, 
a study by Lacovone in 2002, estimates the effect of standards on 
exports of nuts from 21 Latin American countries and 14 EU importing 
countries. The period covered is between 1990-1998. Results from this 
study indicate that the EU standard has a negative impact on exports of 
nuts – a 15 per cent decrease in export volumes.  
 Harmonization of standards however is seen to have a positive 
impact on trade as illustrated by several authors.  Moenius (1999) finds 
that shared standards have a positive and significant effect on bilateral 
trade. He estimates that a 10 per cent increase in the number of shared 
standards enhances bilateral trade by about 3 per cent. Another study by 
Czubala, Shepherd and Wilson, 2007, test the hypothesis that EU 
product standards harmonized with international standards are less 
restricting to African exports than those that are not harmonized to 
international standards. The results from this study support the 
hypothesis that EU standards harmonized with international norms 
(proxied by ISO standards) exert a less negative impact on African 
exports than non-harmonized standards. Van Caturen & De Frahan, 
2003, also estimated and tested the hypothesis that EU harmonization 
of food regulation standards increases EU bilateral trade between 12 
EU member states trade in the year 1998 in 10 food-sectors; they find 
that there is a significant and positive effect of harmonization of food 
regulations. Bilateral exports in sectors subjected to harmonized EU 
regulations increases intra-EU trade by 253 per cent compared to 
sectors not subject to harmonized standards. 
Evidence from country specific and or/sector specific studies are 
scarce, however in recent years some studies have been carried out in 
different countries. Anders & Caswell, 2007, assess the impact of 
HACCP implementation on US Sea Food imports and find that 
mandatory HACCP implementation had an overall negative and 
significant effect on seafood imports to the United States. Import 
volumes declined by up to -0.34 per cent. Burnquist and Souza (2010) 
investigated the impact of sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations on the 
bilateral trade of goods between Brazil and some of its major trading 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
41 
partners. According to their results, sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
regulations restrict commercial flows between the countries evaluated.  
Another study by Fassarella et al. (2011determines the effect of SPS and 
TBT measures on Brazilian exports of poultry meat to the main world 
importers between 1996 and 2009. They found that conformity to 
assessment-related measures decreased the volume of poultry meat 
exports from Brazil to its major trade partners, while requirements on 
quarantine treatment and labelling increased the volume of Brazilian 
poultry trade. 
From the above studies, two main issues can be deduced: that 
standards can be trade restricting, and the more stringent a standard is, 
the more trade restricting it is bound to be and that the use of 
internationally harmonized standards is far less restricting than 
country/region specific standards.  
 
2.3.2 Global Standards, Governance and Income 
Distribution in High–Value Chains 
Standards are seen as commonly accepted benchmarks that transmit 
codified information to end users on a product’s technical 
specifications. This is corroborated by several studies (Ruben et al. 2007, 
Laven 2007, Nadvi, 2008). Standards therefore, can extend to customers 
and end users a basis for attaching credence, or value, to particular 
claims made about a product’s characteristics and specification or the 
ways in which it has been produced (Nadvi, 2008). As argued in that 
study, the key policy challenges around the debate on global standards 
centred on the questions of who sets standards, who monitors 
standards, what are the costs of non-compliance and what are the 
governance implications. According to Renard (2003), quality is an 
endogenous social construct that contributes to coordinate the 
economic activity of the actors. It can be constructed by two routes: the 
introduction of collective institutions that establish rules for quality and 
the means to uphold them or the acknowledgement of forms of local 
ties among actors that allow them to communicate and negotiate which, 
in reality often cross (Ouma, 2010). They are thus important for 
promoting economic efficiency and reducing information related 
transaction costs (Nadvi, 2008). Standards therefore influence the 
nature of governance of global value chains because they provide the 
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potential to codify complex forms of information (Kaplinsky 2006, 
Tander & Tilburg 2007, Nadvi 2008). 
 Standards and Governance of Global Value Chains 
Value chains are governed when parameters requiring product, process, 
and logistic qualification are set which have consequences up or down 
the value chain encompassing bundles of activities, actors, roles, and 
functions (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). Gerreffi et al. 2005 identify three 
key determinants of value chain governance patterns: (i) the complexity 
of information and knowledge transfer required to sustain a particular 
transaction, especially with respect to product and process 
specifications; (ii) the extent to which this information and knowledge 
can be codified and, therefore, transmitted efficiently and without 
transaction-specific investment between the parties to the transaction; 
and (iii) the capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to 
the requirements of the transaction. 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) further argue that governance is 
important because the intricacy and complexity of trade in the 
globalization era requires sophisticated forms of coordination, not 
merely with respect to positioning (who is allocated what role in the 
value chain) and logistics (when and where intermediate inputs, 
including services, are shipped along the chain), but also in relation to 
the integration of components into the design of the final products, and 
the quality standards with which this integration is achieved. It also 
requires the monitoring of outcomes, linking the discrete activities 
between different actors, establishing and managing the relationships 
between the various actors comprising the links, and organizing the 
logistics to maintain networks of a national, regional or global nature. It 
is this role of coordination, and the complementary role of identifying 
dynamic rent opportunities and apportioning roles to key players, which 
reflects an important part of the act of governance of value chains, they 
argue. 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2001 distinguish three forms of governance as 
legislative - i.e. the rules defining the basis of participation in the chain; 
judicial - the monitoring or auditing of compliance with set rules; and 
executive - as assistance to value chain participants in meeting the set 
rules. The same firm or even different firms can perform these three 
forms in the value chain depending on the type and structure of the 
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particular chain. Gerreffi and Sturgeon (2003) further identify five 
coordination structures of value chains as market, modular, relational, 
captive and hierarchical, all depending on the degree of control by lead 
firms and the relationships between the various actors. They attribute 
the mode of governance to a combination of complexity of 
transactions, ability to codify transactions and the competency of 
supplier base, the combinations of which result in different 
coordination structures. Riisgaard et al. (2008) recently suggested a 
simplification of this typology to include market organization, vertical 
integration and “contractualization”, with the latter referring generally 
to contracts (explicit or implicit) within or between actors in the chain.  
Numerous players characteristically dominate high value chains - 
often many smallholders or clusters of producers exporting though lead 
firms. They are very sensitive to health and safety requirements and are 
faced by many other standards such as labour or ethical; which pose 
numerous challenges with respect to coordination and monitoring of 
compliance. For instance food safety and health requirements are 
covered by HACCP and ISO standards and by the EU’s Food safety 
regulations. In addition, private sector standards such as GlobalGAP, 
British Retail Consortium (BRC) and the Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI) are also required in order to participate in the chain. These private 
standards often require compliance at the very lowest level of the chain 
and producers are often closely monitored, audited and certified by 
third parties. This in effect means greater coordination by lead firms -
which provides another angle to the role of standards in shaping 
governance of global value chains.   
Through the implementation of standards, especially technical 
product, and process standards, the codifiability of information can be 
improved and governance of inter-firm ties can move away from 
relatively more hierarchical forms to more modular or market based 
interactions which require less co-ordination by lead firms (Nadvi, 2008, 
Tander & Tilburg, 2007). However, for high value chains like 
horticulture, this may not hold because of the nature of standards in 
these chains which require strict monitoring and enforcement by lead 
firms at the farmer-lead firm level and hence have not shifted entirely to 
market based interactions but rather a hybrid leaning towards 
hierarchical forms (Nadvi, 2008).  
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For instance Dolan & Humphrey, 2004 in a study on the vegetables 
chain, observe a shift away from company specific standards towards 
generic social and sectoral codes such as EurepGAP and Ethical 
Trading Initiative (ETI) as alternative instruments in parameter setting 
which are then monitored by actors outside the chain and hence 
supermarkets are less involved in monitoring exporters, effectively 
shifting their relationships from hierarchy to market types of 
governance at the exporter-supermarket level. Another study on the 
South African wine value chain by Ponte, 2009 draws attention to the 
different forms of governance in three strands of quality of wine – low 
quality wine as more governed by lead firms and based on quality and 
price; mid to top quality firms more governed by external actors, mostly 
industry wine critics’ appreciation of quality. This study concludes that 
chain governance is more based on a normative work where different 
players in different markets define quality conventions. A more recent 
study (Tallantoire et al. 2009) on Kenya’s horticultural exports industry 
specifically looked at KenyaGAp and ETI, the authors conclude that 
the implementation of standards influences horizontal aspects of 
governance especially the ones related to legislative and judicial 
governance. Another study by Konefal et al. in 2005 looks at agro-food 
networks and the rise of private standards. The authors argue that the 
rise of these private standards and the increasing authority by 
supermarkets to enforce them have led most agro-food networks to 
restructure away from market based forms of governance towards 
hybrid forms leaning more towards hierarchy. 
 Judging from the preceding analysis of literature, the power of 
global lead firms to organize and structure value chains has been one of 
the core elements of the GVC approach (Gereffi, 1999, Humphrey & 
Schmitz, 2004, Gereffi et al. 2005, Gibbon & Ponte 2005, Altenburg 
2006, Nadvi, 2008). These authors recognize that there is asymmetrical 
power exercised by lead firms whose major task is reducing the costs of 
organizing these chains, coordinating dispersed and varied suppliers and 
dealing with concerns such as asset specificity. Lead firms also face the 
task of specifying quality standards and parameters to chain participants 
down-stream; and may use tactics to transfer costs of quality control to 
suppliers and achieve quality control at a distance – mainly achieved 
through the use of third party certification (Gibbon & Ponte 2005, 
Nadvi, 2008). This phenomenon, they say, depends on the various 
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forms of coordination and the mechanisms for transmitting knowledge 
and information to various actors along the chain. Thus in cases where 
standards are used to set the parameters that govern the chain, 
monitoring and enforcement by lead firms is often imperative hence a 
tendency towards  (quasi) hierarchy type of chains with lead firms 
wielding more power than other chain participants (Tallantoire et al. 
2009).  
All of this implies that quality is not simply a dimension of 
competition, but an object of collective understanding and negotiation 
among major actors in the chain some of whom are more powerful than 
others (Valceschini & Nicolas, 1995). Power relations are therefore 
important in defining who and who does not participate in the chain, 
the setting of rules of inclusion, assisting chain participants to achieve 
these standards, and monitoring their performance (Kaplinsky & 
Morris, 2001) and to a large extent the distribution of costs and rents. 
A Transaction Cost Perspective of Standards in High-Value Chains and 
the Distribution of Rent 
The costs involved in communicating and enforcing transactions and 
the property rights on which they are based are known as transaction costs 
and these are incurred in order to reduce the risks of loss from 
transaction failure (Doward et al, 2005). Traditionally, TCE allows for 
industries to organize as markets, hierarchies or hybrids (Williamson 
1985) and standards as already seen in the previous section determine 
the patterns of these arrangements. Transaction costs in a value chain 
depend on the structure and governance of the chain. In a market, a 
transaction is arranged with an anonymous economic agent, usually 
based on price. The transaction is independent of the parties involved 
and does not build on other transactions. In a hierarchy, a transaction is 
arranged with a specific, familiar economic agent. The transaction 
partner is predetermined and is specific to the parties involved 
(Aggarwal & Walden, 2005). 
With respect to standards in high value chains, transaction costs can 
materialize before, during and after the transaction itself i.e. the contact 
phase, the contract phase and the control phase (Den Butter et al. 
2007). The contact phase often involves search and information costs 
and constitute sunk costs; the contract phase consists of negotiating the 
contract terms - more specifically - spelling out the requirements to be 
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met in order to fulfil the contract terms; while the control phase 
involves coasts related to monitoring and enforcement (Ibid). 
Furthermore, there are also various forms of costs incurred by 
participants along the value chains that constitute production costs, 
opportunism costs, search costs and coordination costs which vary 
depending on the governance structure (Aggarwal & Walden 2005). 
Standards are said to reduce transaction costs because they are codified 
and carry information, and therefore reduce information asymmetry and 
lower costs related to obtaining information (Aggarwal & Walden 2005, 
Den Butter et al. 2007). Furthermore, when product specifications are 
standardized and known to trading partners, the bargaining process will 
cover only the price and conditions of delivery. When the product has 
not been standardized, bargaining will also be needed with respect to 
the specifications of the product (Den Butter et al. 2007). Standards can 
also increase transaction costs especially those related to their 
establishment and implementation including monitoring and 
enforcement costs. 
Several studies have analysed the effects of standards on transaction 
costs and how this may act as a barrier to entry. A study by Wilson et al. 
(2003), revealed that Africa’s cereal exports will decline by 4.3% and 
that of nuts and dried fruits by 11% with a 10% tighter EU standard on 
contamination levels of aflatoxin in these products. The EU has also 
estimated the costs of technical standards as being equivalent to a tax of 
2% of the value of goods traded (Otsuki et al. 2001). Fixed costs in 
compliance with standards may affect the decision to export. Maskus et 
al. 2005 show that the higher setup costs needed to meet strict 
standards also increase the variability of production costs. Equally, 
compliance includes not only the cost of meeting the technical 
requirement but also the cost of verifying that the requirement is met, 
known as the conformity assessment. This cost represents the largest 
barrier to trade competitiveness (Lyakurwa, 2007, Sanchez et al. 2006). 
Chen et al. (2006) find that technical regulations adversely affect a 
developing country firm’s propensity to export. They also reveal that 
standards and testing procedures impede market entry for exporters, 
reducing the likelihood of exporting to multiple countries. 
Few studies have analysed how transaction costs differ for chain 
participants.  For instance costs of compliance with a certain quality 
standard may be higher for small producers. This could result from the 
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fixed cost component of complying with the standard, which would 
favour larger producers due to economies of scale (World Bank, 2005). 
However, it could also be due to farm characteristics such as illiteracy of 
farmers, which makes information and documentation requirements 
more costly, or illiquidity, which may exclude farmers from the 
investments necessary to upgrade their farm to comply with the 
standard (Aloui & Kenny 2005, Jaffee & Henson 2004, Willems et al. 
2005) 
Standards as Repositories for Rent and How They Influence 
Distribution of Incomes 
Economic rent arises as a result of differential productivity of factors 
and barriers to entry (scarcity). Makakok (2001) identifies three kinds of 
rents in value chains which are intra-chain or individual: monopolistic 
rents result in protected market power; Ricardian rents depending on 
special resource and Schumpeterian Rents originated in dynamic 
capability of the firm. Kaplinsky (2000) argues that most economic rent 
in value chains is dynamic in nature and eroded by forces of 
competition where producer rent is converted into consumer surplus 
through competition. Barriers to entry and rent have been identified as 
important determining factors of rent distribution. Kaplinsky (2000) 
argues that primary returns in value chains accrue to those parties who 
are able to protect themselves from competition encapsulated by 
possession of scarce attributes and involves barriers to entry. Classical 
economists also argue that economic rent accrues on the basis of 
unequal ownership or access to control over an existing scarce resource. 
However, as Schumpeter showed, scarcity can be constructed through 
purposive action and hence surplus accrues to those who create scarcity 
(Tullock, 2005). This is essentially what happens in the case of 
innovations such as standards; because they create greater returns from 
a product than required to meet the cost of innovation (DFID, 2008).  
Standards when viewed as innovations that attract intellectual 
property rights can be used to create barriers to entry and rent. In a 
hierarchical system, all resources (codes, procedures and policies) 
needed to create and implement a standard are produced in-house. The 
resources so developed become the intellectual property of the firm and 
can be protected by way of patents (Swinnen et al. 2010). In a hierarchy, 
the lead firm bears all the cost of research and standards development. 
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Since internal organizational communication is centralized the decision 
making, and information dissemination, is fast and inexpensive – which 
in effect reduces transaction costs in the entire value chain. However, 
lead firms extract more rent/surplus because of their bargaining power 
in the chain, which is augmented by their relative positions in the chain 
(Ibid).  
The nature of distribution of economic rent results in different 
outcomes for different players and this can have serious consequences 
to developing countries especially in terms of poverty reduction and 
consequent development. For developing countries, an unbalanced 
outcome measured by the costs associated with accessing foreign 
markets vs. returns from sale of goods in foreign markets.  This is 
further exacerbated by the nature of products (mainly agricultural) with 
little value addition and which in most cases fetch low prices as already 
discussed in previous sections. Technological divide has also been cited 
by some authors as reasons for unequal distribution of rent (Grossman 
& Helpman, 1991). More recently however, some authors like 
Kaplinsky, 2000 have argued that the problem of falling returns not 
only afflicts countries but also individual firms especially when they 
confine their competences to simple and low value adding activities 
firms fail to insert themselves into global production chains by 
participating in high value adding activities. The consequence of this 
failure is immiserizing growth as earlier discussed in a previous section. 
Several papers describe examples of small farmers losing market 
share as a result of the increasing quality standards. Humphrey et al. 
(2004), describe the redistribution of market shares as a result of quality 
standards in the fruit and vegetable sector in Kenya. They underline that 
“own farm production” of downstream actors increased from 40% in 
1998 to more than 60% in 2001. All interviewees stated that they had 
reduced their smallholder supply due to concerns expressed by 
supermarket buyers about product characteristics and product quality. 
Other studies (Chemnitz et al. 2007, Okello 2005) find that producers in 
developing countries especially small farmers have a comparative 
disadvantage in complying with standards due to high transaction costs 
and diseconomies of scale; and those that comply with the help of 
downstream actors are better off and that cost of compliance are greatly 
reduced for farmers who opt for group certification.  
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2.3.3 Social Micro-processes of Standards in the New 
Agricultural Economy of High Value Chains  
Smallholder Participation in HVCs in the Context of Standards 
Motivation is the force that triggers, energizes, guides and/or sustains 
behavior (Vallerand & Thill, 1993). There are two major trends in the 
motivation theory: the theory of characteristic/environment of the job 
and the equity theories (Roussel, 2000). These theories assume that 
factors that procure feelings of autonomy, competence and relatedness 
foster intrinsic motivation (Moumouni et al. 2009). The equity theory 
(Adams, 1963, 1965), suggests that the motivation to work stems from 
the individual’s comparison of his/her situation to those of other 
people to assess the equity within the organization. Moumouni et al. 
2009, have developed an alternative explanation framework that could 
better account for the farmers’ motivation. Within this context, their 
framework suggests that motivation factors could be associated with the 
context (organizational and financial factors) or with the content 
(technological factors) of the services offered to farmers by service 
providers or other intermediaries; services that are seen to enhance their 
motivation to participate in certain economic activities.  
According to Blandon et al. 2009, a small scale producer’s decision to 
participate in a value chain is governed by a wide range of factors 
including access to information on market requirements, credit and the 
ability to lower transaction costs and minimize risk. These relate to 
(among other things) the efficacy of input and output markets and 
related transaction costs, access to land and water, provision of 
agricultural services. A number of authors have shown the importance 
of transaction costs in determining farmers’ participation in value chains 
(Holloway et al. 2000, Winters et al. 2005). Another study carried out in 
Honduras found that farmer participation in food supply chains is 
explained by factors related to relative price and transaction costs rather 
than farm characteristics or other demographics such as age (Blandon et 
al. 2009). Other studies have also shown a positive relationship between 
farmer participation in value chains with farm characteristics and asset 
variables (Hernandez et al. 2007, Neven et al. 2007. 
Earlier studies indicate that there are conditions required for 
smallholders to participate in these value chains: first, the cultivated 
crop should be suitable for smallholder production ie labour intensive 
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and the second pre-condition is that they should have access to ancillary 
services such as information, transport, credit facilities and equipment 
which are often difficult for them to obtain because of their prevailing 
low assets and poor financial positions (Glover 1984). Farmers 
choosing to participate in these value chains often possess some 
competitive advantages over larger producers in the sense that they can 
access low cost family labour and have intensive local knowledge 
(Poulton et al. 2005). They have numerous constraints related to market 
imperfections and high transaction costs (especially those related to 
quality and standards compliance) (Markelova et al. 2009) and may 
therefore consider the second precondition when choosing to 
participate in a value chain. 
Recently, the use of standards and voluntary codes of conduct in 
combination with certification schemes have spread significantly in may 
horticultural value chains (Bitzer et al. 2008). With these schemes there 
has emerged a global audit culture by supermarkets and developed 
country participants that places emphasis on inspection, measurement, 
certification and accreditation, which are often costly. These costs are 
pushed downstream to the producers (including smallholders) and 
which are often relatively higher for smallholders (Kirsten & Sartouris 
2005, Bitzer et al. 2008). Hobbs 2003 gives incentives and disincentives 
of farmers to adopt standards. Incentives include economic incentives such 
as increasing and/or stabilizing revenue, reducing average costs, 
improved market access, increased capital valuation of farm assets, 
reduced vulnerability to poor agricultural practices of other farmers; 
regulatory or legal incentives which include changes in ownership rights or tax 
burdens, liability rules, subsidies; and human capital incentives including 
access to new skills. Disincentives for farmers to adopt standards 
include economic disincentives such as: increased production costs, 
investment in assets that are specific to one buyer and/or cannot be 
recovered if the buyer-seller relationship breaks down; institutional 
constraints including inadequate quality monitoring infrastructure, weak 
or corrupt public institutions that oversee standards, and; human capital 
constraints such as literacy limits on documentation capabilities; 
constraints on labour or management time, and weak public extension 
amongst others. 
 The proliferation of standards and regulations in high value 
horticultural chains has seen their transformation from spot markets to 
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more controlled and closely monitored quasi-hierarchical chains as 
already established in the previous chapter.  Dolan & Humphrey in 
2001, explain this transition in terms of UK supermarkets’ triggering 
rising entry barriers for exporters. Supermarkets’ demands implied that 
exporters had to invest heavily in post-harvest cold chain facilities, 
guarantee high and consistent volumes, respond very quickly to orders 
and assure traceability. In order to do so profitably, implied optimising 
the economies of scale, both in fixed investments and in monitoring 
quality. This implied a shift towards vertical integration, which was also 
favoured to better assure quick a response. In the process, smallholders 
were replaced by estates (and estate labour), and small exporters by large 
companies – in some cases very large (Dolan & Humphrey, 2001). 
These findings have been broadly confirmed by subsequent, more 
detailed, studies of UK-destined horticulture in Kenya (Jensen 2000) 
and Tanzania (Jensen 2002). In this regard some degree of vertical 
coordination is observed in these chains which subsequently affect the 
modalities for participation of smallholders (Kirsten & Sartouris 2005) 
in some cases even the reorganization of the support mechanisms. 
Market Interventions and Intermediaries for Smallholder Participation 
in HVCs 
Lack of information on prices and technologies, lack of connections to 
established market actors, distortions or the absence of input and 
output markets and credit constraints, often make it difficult for small 
farmers to take advantage of market opportunities (Narrod et al. 2009, 
Markelova et al. 2009). High transaction costs faced by smallholders due 
to their small scale exacerbate these challenges, especially in quality-
conscious markets (Poulton et al. 2005). Standards also pose 
coordination problems such as monitoring and enforcement and may 
be costly for exporters, especially with respect to smallholders largely 
due to their scale. The problem of coordinating with many small 
farmers is exacerbated by their geographic dispersion, low educational 
levels, and poor access to capital and information (Humphrey 2005, 
Rich & Narrod 2005, Narrod et al. 2009).  
Due to these coordination problems, there is increasing vertical 
coordination in many chains as upstream actors such as exporters strive 
to implement and enforce Quality Management Systems (QMS) in their 
chains in order to minimize risk. Dries & Swinnen (2004) found that 
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high standards led to increased vertical coordination in supply chains 
that is realized in their study area by the emergence of extensive 
contracting between processing companies and farmers. The rise of 
contracting, far from leading to the exclusion of poorer farmers, is 
shown to improve access to credit, technology and quality inputs for 
poor, small farmers that heretofore were faced with binding liquidity 
and information constraints due to poorly developed input markets. 
Minten et al. (2009) and Maertens & Swinnen (2009) also found 
increased vertical coordination in newly emerging supply chains 
between buyers and poor, small farmers in African countries. The need 
for increased coordination can also be attributed to the failure of 
traditional (spot) agricultural markets to deal with this new scenario as 
the demands for standardized differentiated products cannot be met 
through spot markets. 
Standards as rules, conventions and shared expectations are part of 
the intermediaries that are used to provide certain ancillary services, for 
smallholders. The imposition of quality and safety standards led to 
significant organizational changes, resulting in new forms of collective 
action that try to minimize the asymmetries in information across 
principal (exporter) and agent (the farmers). In this regard standard 
necessitates the role of collective action in solving information 
asymmetry problems amongst other things. Moreover, the conventional 
role of collective action, which is the exploitation of economies of scale, 
also applies with food safety standards: traceability which is central to 
the system with standards is more economical for both exporters and 
producers to achieve collectively (Narrod et al. 2009). Standards may 
therefore act as a response to institutional failure, when they correct 
market failure caused by transaction costs arising from search - locating 
buyers and sellers; negotiation of quantities and quality; monitoring 
product quality and enforcing contractual agreements (Hobbs 2003). 
Subsequently, standards can lead to introduction of new institutions to 
overcome these costs or may even act as a conduit for information flow - by 
improving the flow of information in the supply chain because quality 
and quantities are readily verifiable and prices are agreed upon in 
advance, this in turn reduces transaction costs (Narrod et al. 2009) 
Theoretically, a number of intermediaries for integrating smallholder 
farmers into the HVC exist. First, smallholder farmers could orient their 
product to target markets that are less demanding by shifting from the 
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demanding supermarket chain to the less stringent wholesale chain and 
domestic markets (Okello et al. 2009). Second, smallholders can, 
through collective action, invest jointly in lumpy/costly assets together 
hence take advantage of economies of scale and reduce per farmer costs 
of such investment (Narrod et al. 2009). Third, public sector could 
partner with the private sector to help smallholders overcome the 
challenges of market requirements by investing on infrastructural 
requirements that are lumpy or have public good characteristics 
(training and extension, road, supply of safe water) (Okello et al. 2009). 
This section reviews several institutional mechanisms that have been 
used to overcome market failure, or achieve economies of scale and 
their by enhance smallholder inclusion in HVCs with a view to 
understanding the subtle role of standards. 
Contract Farming 
The integration of small holders into globalized value chains has been 
applauded as a key element in increasing their incomes and reducing 
poverty especially in rural areas. In many developing countries most 
notably Africa, contract farming is believed to help farmers by 
providing new technology, ready markets and secured inputs and prices. 
Furthermore, contract farming offers a mechanism that ensures self-
sustained development (Glover 1987, Key & Runsten 1999, 
Weatherspoon et al. 2001).  
Eaton and Shepherd (2001) define contract farming as ‘an agreement 
between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms for the production and 
supply of agricultural products under forward agreements, frequently at predetermined 
prices’. The arrangement often ‘involves the purchaser in providing a 
degree of production support through, for example, the supply of 
inputs and the provision of technical advice’. For this arrangement to 
work the farmer commits him or herself to ‘provide a specific commodity in 
quantities and at quality standards determined by the purchaser’. The company 
on the other hand agrees to ‘support the farmer’s production and to 
purchase the commodity’.  
There is a wide range of literature on contract farming. Proponents 
of contract farming outline its positive outcomes such as: it enables risk 
sharing in production and/or marketing of crops and enhances the 
access of poor farmers to technology and other inputs and services at 
lower cost. In addition, they argue that contract farming can improve 
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the income of small holders, with significant spillover effects in the 
form of upgrading production technologies (Govereh & Jayne 2003; 
Key & Runsten 1999, Masakure & Henson 2005). Other contrasting 
studies have also outlined the dangers of contract farming for small-
scale producers (Singh 2002, Watts 1994), arguing that contracts are 
replete with manipulation of producers and in addition the unequal 
nature of such relationships can lead to skewed income distribution, 
pervasive indebtedness and enclave development, among other ills. 
An analysis of literature (Kursten & Sartorius 2009) unveils three 
main types of contracts: 
i. Marketing specification contract in which the producer sells the 
produce to exporter at a specified time, quantity and quality 
and the producer has full autonomy of the production 
process (Rehber 1998). 
ii. The second type of contract involves some degree of control by 
the exporter who gives some specifications however the 
producer sells at an agreed time, quantity, quality and price. 
iii. The final type of contract farming is where the exporter has full 
control of the production process, gives specifications of 
product and gives inputs and various other support services 
such as transport at an agreed price. 
Strohm & Hoeffler (2006) in their study on contract farming in five 
HVCs in Kenya find that standards and the obligation to comply with 
them are a motor for contract farming and induce its diffusion.  Their 
analysis shows that contract farming is driven by: 
 the nature of perishable products in these chains requiring fast and 
efficient collection of produce form dispersed and differentiated 
producers; coupled with the need to closely monitor Quality 
Management Systems (QMS) making the chain more vertically 
coordinated; and the need for traceability of produce which means 
exporters have to procure produce from sources that are known to be 
complying to standards. 
 Furthermore, in order to ensure the quality they require, companies 
often have to provide technical assistance and inputs on credit to meet 
standards. Therefore, they have to bind the farmers via contracts to sell 
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the produce to them only so that they do not lose their upfront 
investments.  
Collective Action, Producer Organizations & Intersectoral Partnerships 
Vermillion (1999) defines collective action as the coordinated behaviour 
of groups toward a common interest or purpose. High value chains 
characterized by quality and safety requirements, traceability and 
perishability of produce as well as requirements for specialised 
production usually have high transaction costs which can be offset by 
collective action in order to achieve economies of scale. According to 
Narrod et al. 2009, the economic rationale for collective action by 
smallholders derives from two features of markets with food safety 
standards: (i) economies of scale that are magnified by food safety 
standards, such as the requirement of traceability, and (ii) the need for 
specific skills for meeting the standards that smallholders may not have.  
Acting collectively, smallholders are in a better position to reduce 
transaction costs of accessing inputs and outputs, obtain the market 
information, secure access to new technologies, and tap into high value 
markets (Stockbridge et al., 2003). In addition, there is evidence that 
collective action can help smallholders reduce barriers to entry into 
markets by improving their bargaining power with buyers and 
intermediaries (Thorp et al. 2005, Kherallah et al. 2002, Narrod et al. 
2009). In the majority of cases, larger companies have an advantage in 
both technical and market sophistication, so they can keep a large share 
of the value in distant (national or export) markets, even when 
smallholders participate as illustrated by a number of studies that show 
how collective action can allow smallholders to tap into HVCs: grapes 
in India and beans in Kenya (Narrod et al. 2009) or vegetables in Central 
America (Hellin et al. 2009). 
There are various forms of collective action summarized from 
literature: some forms are farmer/producer organizations which may 
exist formally (registered and well organized) or an informal group of 
farmers located in adjacent areas to one another who come together 
only to access certain services such as transport, inputs etc. A number 
of typologies have been developed that distinguish various forms of 
collective action on the basis of their legal status, function, geographical 
scope and size (Bijman, 2008). The WDR 2008, for instance, 
distinguishes three categories of functions: economic services by 
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commodity-specific organizations, broad interest representation by 
advocacy groups, and diverse economic and social services by 
multipurpose organizations. Organizations that provide economic 
services include cooperatives that process and/or market the products 
of their members. Multipurpose organizations often combine economic, 
political and social functions. They provide farm inputs and credit to 
their members, process and/or market their products, offer community 
services and carry out advocacy activities (Bijman, 2008). 
Collective action can exist in the absence of farmer organizations, 
which we see as a more formal expression of collective action. 
Moreover these organizations have their dynamics for instance it is 
often a challenge to establish collectively agreed rules, to secure 
members’ commitments to abide by the rules, and to monitor and 
enforce compliance. In some cases, the establishment of farmer 
organizations incurs transaction costs that imply that farmers may be 
better off not organizing (Stockbridge et al. 2003, Hellin et al. 2009). 
Masakure & Henson 2005 in their study of Zimbabwe found that many 
local farming groups established to access inputs and/or market outputs 
disintegrated partly because there was considerable mistrust between 
farmers. Narrod et al. 2009 also find a similar predicament among 
vegetable growers in Kenya and grape fruit farmers in India that are 
trying to comply to various standards and therefore access foreign 
markets. 
Producer Organizations (POs) 
Producer organizations act as intermediary15 market organizations that 
coordinate the exchange of goods and services between farmers and 
purchasers of their produce. Intermediaries appear on the market if the 
net gains from trade exceed those obtained through direct exchange. 
The profit of intermediaries is raised by identifying innovative 
transactions that either increase gains from trade or reduce transaction 
costs associated with search, negotiation, communication, computation, 
contracting, and monitoring the transaction and its partners (Spulber 
1999). In this respect, producer groups take the role traditionally 
                                                 
15 Intermediaries are firms that seek out suppliers, find and encourage 
purchasers, select buy and sell prices, organize the transactions, keep the 
records, and hold inventories to supply liquidity or availability of goods and 
services (Spulber 1999: 3). 
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fulfilled on the market by middlemen and other traders. Nonetheless, 
the advantage to producer groups, which puts them in competition with 
middlemen and traders are the potential savings on transaction costs 
offered to the farmers associated in producer groups due to horizontal 
and vertical integration. On the input side, POs improve farmers’ access 
to seeds, fertilizers, and other inputs as well as credit and information at 
lower cost. A study in Kenya found that lack of credit was the single 
major constraint limiting the success of producer marketing groups 
(Shiferaw, et al. 2006). On the output side, it can make it possible to 
combine many farmers’ production into larger lots and increase value in 
the supply chain.  
According to Bijman (2008), POs exist at various levels and can 
range from small village level organizations to regional, national and 
even international level organizations that are bound together by a 
common course such as utility principle (where they share similar 
objectives) or identity principle (they share a similar history and/or 
geographical space). POs can also take various legal forms ranging from 
formal to informal. Informal POs are a group of producers that come 
together to exchange experiences or market information, to receive 
technical assistance or as a self-help group (Bijman, 2008, Narrod et al. 
2009). Formal POs include cooperatives, associations and societies that 
are distinguished by a formal constitution and the legislation that 
applies. An association is a non-profit organization that enables 
members to collaborate for services, information exchange and 
representation. Studies show that legally constituted POs are more 
sustainable and better protected in terms of liability and can enter legal 
contracts; they have more bargaining power with exporters and can 
even access credit through their groups unlike informal groups where 
contracts are between individual farmers and exporters belonging to the 
PO (Glover 1984, Bijman 2008). Many POs if properly organized can 
give smallholders a political voice, enabling them to hold policy makers 
and implementing agencies accountable by participating in agricultural 
policy making, monitoring budgets and engaging in policy 
implementation. Such advocacy organizations, or farmer unions, may 
lobby local, regional or national policy makers on behalf of their 
members. Consequently, by reducing transaction costs, strengthening 
bargaining power and giving smallholders a voice in the policy process, 
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POs are a fundamental building block of the agriculture for 
development agenda (Bijman 2008). 
A study by Okello et al. (2008) on POs in Kenya and Zambia’s 
vegetable chains reveal that through the POs, farmers jointly: invested 
in fixed assets (e.g., grading and cooling facilities); raised the volume of 
produce sold (thus attaining economies of scale); reduced the exporters’ 
training, monitoring and coordination costs; hired own technical staff to 
monitor members’ compliance with pesticide residue and hygiene 
requirements and; implemented traceability system. The POs in return 
reduced buyers’ transaction costs of sourcing from small-scale farmers 
making it profitable to do so. Under the producer contracts, farmers 
gained access to essential inputs, technical advice and a ready market. 
Smallholders received technical information relating to pesticide residue 
and hygiene requirements, training and field extension services by 
exporter’s field extension officers, and, improved seeds and protective 
clothing under interlinked credit arrangements. 
Intersectoral Partnerships or Pubic Private Partnerships(PPPs) 
Partnerships are defined as voluntary and collaborative arrangements 
between actors from two or more sectors of society that have an 
institutionalized, yet non-hierarchical structure and strive for a 
sustainability goal (Glasbergen et al., 2007). Partnerships combine the 
resources of governments with those of private agents in order to 
deliver services. Partnerships in high value chains can take various 
forms; including the provision of services by the governments such as 
infrastructure, legal environment and policy, and common public goods 
that may be required by smallholders. The private sector on the other 
hand may support farmer organizations in order to access sustainable 
quantities or acceptable quality of products. However, questions arise 
regarding equity and the distribution of benefits. Contract farming is, 
perhaps, the most common form that private sector uses in providing 
certain services. More recently development agencies are also seen to 
play a pivotal role for some specific sectors in the Aid for trade 
programs (Otieno & Knorringa, 2012). 
In a study by Hellin et al. both the private and public sectors are 
found to have key roles to play in contributing to agricultural 
development. Governments are of central importance in determining 
how markets should function, especially in creating an enabling policy 
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environment. Governments can help ensure that the legal and judicial 
system supports low-cost contract enforcement, facilitate the flow of 
market information, and make transport, electricity, water and other 
infrastructure systems widely available to help support smallholders. 
More recently the structural adjustment programs and trade 
liberalization policies in the 1980’s an 90’s saw the withdrawal of 
government support from many agricultural sectors and hence roles 
that were traditionally played by the public sector (for example, 
extension services) were transferred, or shared with, the private sector.  
The role of NGOs and International donors has also evolved in 
recent years. Narrod et al. 2009 in a study of Kenya’s green beans sector 
found partnerships between the government and donors in providing 
funds for training service provides in the horticulture sector, these 
service providers in turn provide services to smallholders and their 
respective groups. Some NGOs had also partnered with private firms to 
train, audit and/ or provide financial aid for small-scale green bean 
farmers seeking to obtain certification. 
There are some instances where inter-sectoral partnerships have 
been used to organize farmers, often the process is instigated by outside 
agents such as government and NGOs, or sometimes by the private 
sector (e.g. dedicated wholesalers) (Hillen et al. 2009). Narrod et al. also 
found that governments, exporters, NGOs and donors facilitated 
formation of some smallholder organizations. For example, the 
Government of Kenya, in partnership with the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), established a fresh produce handling 
company, which mobilizes and recruits smallholders to form farmer 
groups. However some authors argue that where farmer organizations 
established with government or NGO support encounter financial 
difficulties, there is often a tendency to provide further assistance, thus 
externalizing some of the organization’s costs (Berdegué, 2001). This 
partly isolates the farmer organization from its market context and may 
begin a vicious circle requiring more and more subsidies.  
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Sustainability of Smallholder Participation in HVCs 
Economic sustainability of smallholder participation in high-value 
chains is when the farmers can continue to produce for the global 
market indefinitely; production for HVCs must be sufficiently attractive 
for smallholders to remain in the chains on a long-term basis. 
Participation on a long term basis will hence depend on a number of 
things: the risk reward factors for participating in this market rather 
than the local market; their competitiveness and ability to overcome 
production, financial and other related constraints; and the way the 
market is maintained in terms of its structure and related standards so as 
to avoid exclusion of smallholders.  
As seen from the previous chapter, global value chains have 
undergone various transformations with more consolidated retail 
power, and quality based competition, which have significantly 
transformed how the global agri-food system operates and the role of 
smallholders in this system. Secondly, in these globalized chains, power 
has shifted in favour of retailers vis á vis producers (Lee et al, 2010), as 
such the rules of engagement are set by retailers and this in itself can 
determine whether smallholders become excluded or not.  
Maartens & Swinnen’s (2006) extensive study of the impacts of 
standards on green bean producers in Senegal found that despite 
increasingly strong EU food standards Senegal’s exports to the EU had 
grown sharply over the previous decade. They found that tightening 
standards had induced structural changes in the supply chain, including 
a shift from smallholder contract farmers to large-scale integrated estate 
production. Participation in contract farming was increasingly biased 
towards households with more land and labour. Poorer producers were 
able to participate as wage labourers and gain significant benefits 
compared to those not participating in formalized markets and value 
chains. (Maartens & Swinnen, 2006). 
Another study by Graffham et al. (2009) found that export markets 
may exclude smallholders through new buyer standards, according to 
the study 10 exporters controlled over 50 per cent of the Kenyan export 
horticulture market. The survey found a 60 per cent drop in formal 
participation of small-scale growers in these companies’ supplier 
networks between 2005 and 2009. The authors suggest that the primary 
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reason for this decline is financial, rather than technical. GLOBALGAP 
certification requires far more capital than many small-scale farmers can 
afford on their own (Graffham et al. 2009). In another study (Donovan 
2010) exploring the effects of certifications in the Nicaraguan coffee 
market found that producers starting with relatively high levels of assets 
(natural, financial and human capital) received significantly positive 
benefits from organic certification. These producers made up a minority 
(20 per cent) of the sample group and were relatively well endowed 
with: natural capital (more than 10 manzanas  - about 7 hectares) in 
coffee production), financial capital (income and access to larger credit 
for investing in fertilizer and labor), and human capital (ability to 
experiment and learn for increased productivity). Producers starting 
with lower asset endowments benefited only marginally from 
participation in organic certification vegetable producers.  
Poor households may not be able to participate in or benefit from 
participation in value chains unless they have access to and the ability to 
use (and accumulate) certain assets effectively (McKay 2009). Assets 
may be substitutable and it may be possible to design interventions to 
compensate for weak or non-existent assets. Unorganized farmers can 
benefit significantly from contract farming schemes (Gibbon et al. 2009; 
Minten et al. 2005). Value chain interventions often offer a range of 
ancillary benefits and services that build human and natural capital 
(Seville et al, 2003) and these interventions may go a long way in 
ensuring sustainability of smallholder participation in HVCs.  
 
 2.3.4 Contextualizing Institutions in the Standards Debate 
Institutional dynamics in this study are analysed at the various levels of 
analysis from the lens of “new institutional economics” and “market 
failure”. Institutions are rules, enforcement mechanisms, and 
organizations (World Development Report, 2002). Institutions are the 
rules, including behavioural norms, by which agents interact - and the 
organizations that implement rules and codes of conduct to achieve 
desired outcomes (North, 1990). Institutions are often considered as 
exogenous and the problem becomes of “getting prices right”; while 
this is necessary to address market failure it is not enough to achieve 
complete markets. In recent years, some authors (notably Rodrik, 2007) 
have contributed significantly to this debate by stating that institutions 
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are needed because markets are not self-regulating, self-stabilizing and 
self-legitimizing and that the market economy is “embedded in a set of 
non-market institutions. Rodrik further argues that non-market 
institutions may however provide outcomes that are undesirable i.e. 
outcomes that restrict free play of market forces in pursuit of a larger 
goal such as stability and cohesiveness. 
Institutional change is thus explained in terms of responses of 
powerful groups to changes in relative prices, technologies and 
transaction costs. These groups respond by modifying institutions in 
ways that they perceive to be in their interests and in different countries 
the same sets of changes in relative prices and in transaction technology 
may stimulate radically different types of institutional change (Doward 
et al, 2003). Institutional change can take a broad ‘anti-development’ 
form (structuring transactions to create rents), or a ‘pro-development’ 
form (structuring transactions to reduce costs and thus promote trade 
and investment). Institutions, such as written contracts, charters, 
constitutions, laws, and even unwritten norms and codes of behaviour 
are devised to reduce information uncertainty and transaction costs.  
New Institutional Economics (NIE) thus focuses on the interaction 
between legal (formal and informal) institutions and economic 
behaviour. Both directions of causality concern researchers in the field: 
how institutions influence economic behaviour and how economic 
factors affect institutional change. As such, the NIE abandons standard 
neoclassical economics assumptions that individuals have perfect 
information about the market and important current or future events, as 
well as the assumption that transaction costs of exchange are zero 
(North 1990, pp. 27–35; Williamson 1985, pp. 24–7). As a result, NIE 
introduces observed organization and information costs to neoclassical 
analysis, thereby providing more analytical richness and power for 
examining empirical activities (Leonard, 2003) in the three levels of 
analysis described above. 
Josling et al. (2004), suggest that standards in the food and 
agricultural sector can be classified under two broad categories: (i) 
provision of public goods such as control of pesticide use in agricultural 
production; and (ii) reduction of transactions costs associated with 
information asymmetries between producers and consumers concerning 
food product characteristics, e.g., the extent of pesticide residues in a 
product which consumers are unable to ascertain either before or after 
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its consumption. In the context of this study therefore, institutions are 
necessary for the enforcement of standards - rules and regulations as 
well as preventing market failure by providing means of mitigating 
transactional cost aspects of standards. Davis and North (1971) identify 
two major influences on transaction costs and on the risks of 
transaction failure: the institutional environment, and institutional 
arrangements.  
‘Institutional arrangements’ are the forms of contract or arrangement that are 
set up for particular transactions.   
“The institutional environment (sometimes known as the institutional 
framework) is the broader set of institutions (or ‘rules of the game’) within which 
people and organizations develop and implement specific institutional 
arrangements or requirements for the market such as standards”.  
The Institutional Environment for Standards 
According to the theory of optimal intervention market distortions 
should be targeted at source (Bhagwati, 1984), however, they may also 
provide protection for domestic producers and are, therefore, subject to 
“regulatory capture” (Roberts, 1999; Fischer and Serra, 2000; Sturm, 
2006; Essaji, 2008; Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2009). Given the 
potential for standards and technical regulations to distort international 
trade, a key outcome of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 was the securing of multilateral 
disciplines on their use through the WTO’s Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and the 
revised Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  
 The objective of these agreements is to ensure that standards and 
technical regulations, while potentially meeting legitimate economic 
objectives, are not disguised restrictions on international trade. As 
signatories of the WTO, governments are obliged to implement SPS 
and TBT requirements through the introduction of legislation (Otieno 
& Ogalo, 2009). Requirements also stipulate that all signatories of the 
WTO implement these agreements by institutionalizing and regulating 
safety and health requirements by setting up inspection, monitoring and 
legislation institutions such as – National Enquiry Points (NEPs) and 
other standards bodies through which notifications take place. 
Moreover, developing countries are seen as “standard takers” rather 
than “standard makers” because they lack the capacity – both technical 
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and financial, to develop their own standards and most often have to 
adopt the standards set by their counterparts in the export markets 
(ibid) and hence abide by the rules and regulations in those export 
markets even if it means changing their own rules. 
 Some of the important assumptions made in this framework are that 
markets are perfectly competitive and that economic agents behave 
“rationally” in maximizing firms’ profit or consumers’ utility. In real life, 
firms must make the decision to enter or expand in markets with a 
different language, preferences, and business practices, where 
information on local markets conditions and reputations may be 
imperfect, and where foreign regulations and laws may be different than 
those applicable in the home market, or poorly enforced. Before a firm 
decides to engage in trade, it must invest in information. And before it 
enters a foreign market, it will probably also need to invest in 
technology. Firms may need to expand their production, and are likely 
to need to adapt their products to be competitive in global markets. The 
firm’s decision to invest in information and technology will be 
influenced by its expectations regarding the security of property rights 
and contract enforcement in both home and foreign markets – all of 
which depend on institutions. These types of institutions are enforcing and 
regulating by nature. 
  Therefore as noted above, standards are often justified as a means 
of solving specific market failures such as externalities. However, it is 
typically claimed that developing countries are hampered in their ability 
to meet such standards due to a lack of the necessary human capital and 
poor governance and institutional failures (Wilson & Abiola, 2003; 
Maskus and Wilson, 2001; Essaji, 2008).  
 The Institutional Arrangements and Standards 
The linkage between institutional change and economic development 
using these concepts is that low income economies are characterized by 
high transaction costs and risks, weak information flows, and a weak 
institutional environment (WDR, 2002). Actors, particularly those with 
little in the way of financial and social resources or political leverage, 
then face high (all too often prohibitive) costs in accessing information 
and in enforcing property rights. These costs inhibit both market 
development and access to existing markets, in turn inhibiting economic 
and technological development. Low levels of economic activity can 
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themselves lead to thin markets, inadequate co-ordination, high 
transaction costs and risks, and high unit costs for infrastructural 
development. The result can easily be a ‘low level equilibrium trap’.  
 In the framework of new institutional economics, the transaction is 
the basic unit of analysis. Williamson (1993) describes transactions as 
the transfer of a good or service across a technologically separable 
interface. One stage of activity ends and another begins. Standards 
involve transactions and incur transaction costs in the process of their 
compliance. Transaction costs can be direct or indirect. And as already 
described above, incurred during contact phase - search and 
information costs; contract phase – monitoring and enforcement; and 
compliance phase – direct costs of compliance such as upgrading, 
certification and accreditation. Furthermore as already discussed in 
previous sections, these standards are dynamic over time and are 
constantly being revised by supermarkets and retailers. Consequently 
producers and exporters in developing countries are also continuously 
putting measures in place in order to meet these standards and incurring 
costs in the process.  
 In view of this, standards can significantly raise setup and production 
costs and act as impediments to competition by blocking firm entry and 
expansion within a country or even act as barriers to trade (Fischer 
&Sierra 2000, Maskus et al 2005); this is particularly more severe for 
African producers and exporters as they may be ‘traded down’ the 
markets (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).  However, some authors argue that 
at firm level, production of goods subject to recognized standards could 
achieve economies of scale and reduce overall costs. A reduction in 
overall costs may occur as a result of an increasing the transparency of 
product information (Maskus et al. 2005, Henson et al. 2009) or by 
using institutional arrangements and market intermediaries that reduce 
transaction costs (Narrod et al, 2009, Markelova et al, 2009).  
  In this case two “types” of institutions and institutional 
arrangements emerge – enforcement institutions that monitor contracts and 
ensure compliance eg certification and accreditation institutions. The 
second types of institutions are facilitating institutions – whose function is 
to mitigate transaction costs related to contact and compliance such as 
market intermediaries – producer organizations, collective action 
institutions and other innovative arrangements to achieve economies of 
scale. Within the context of this research, an analysis of the dynamics of 
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standards in Kenya’s horticultural sector is set to reveal different 
institutional dynamics within the sector. 
2.4 Summary of the Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework for this study takes cognisance of the 
dynamics of trade standards in a globalising world. It is based on the 
link between standards and development drawn from various 
perspectives of Kenya’s horticulture sector. Various aspects of 
development are discussed here and each of these aspects backed by a 
theoretical underpinning. It comprises of four main elements (1) the 
scope and context of standards and subsequent institutional dynamics 
(2) the macro economy of standards and its impact on exports (3) 
standards, governance and the resultant distributional effects (4) the 
social –micro processes of compliance with standards and sustainability 
of smallholder participation. Each of the elements and their theoretical 
grounding and approach for analysis discussed in this section. In 
addition, each of these elements presents institutional dynamics that are 
discussed further in the concluding chapter. 
 The analytical framework (figure 2.1),  begins with the assumption 
that trade and openness stimulate exports, however a country’s ability to 
export is determined by internal and external factors. Major constraints 
and challenges of the external environment could continue to restrict 
the growth of the export sector. Some of these include increased use of 
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) such as standards. In this study, standards 
are seen as a factor of the external environment number. Other factors 
on the internal environment could also restrict export growth, these 
include trade facilitation mechanisms; poor infrastructure; inadequate 
capacity to comply and domesticate international obligations; multiple 
membership in trade pacts; narrow export basket; high taxes and 
inadequate supply capacity exacerbated by low capacity utilization in the 
exporting sector.  
 Trade costs, which include international transportation costs, 
transaction costs e.g. related to meeting standards and regulations, are 
an important barrier to trade (Balat et al, 2008). Estimates from 
Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) and Hummels (1998) indicate that 
these costs can in fact be much larger than tariffs and other trade policy 
barriers. Even in places where formal trade barriers are almost fully 
eliminated, trade costs still remain as strong barriers to exports and 
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imports and prevent the full realization of the gains from trade thus 
diluting positive effects of competitive advantage (Balat et al, 2008). In 
developing countries, these costs can also reduce the poverty alleviation 
role of export opportunities (Gioe, 2007. It is within this backdrop that 
the macro-level effects of standards on exports in the horticulture 
sector are studied while taking into consideration other demand and 
supply side constraints that affect horticultural exports trade. 
  Looking at the global value chain, market imperfections and other 
factors (including standards) may lead to high costs of transactions and 
reduce competitive advantage for some chain actors (Balat et al, 2008). 
In this regard, competitive advantage theory and economies of scale are 
used to unveil the effects of standards on various types actors along the 
value chain and the distributional outcomes related to compliance. In 
achieving competitive advantage, it is very important to minimize 
trade/transaction costs. Humphrey (2006) argues that some 
horticultural products are attractive for small farmers because there are 
few economies of scale in their production and small farmers may have 
a competitive advantage in labour-intensive products that do not have 
economies of scale because of their ability to call upon family labour. 
Small farms’ competitive advantages over large commercial farms lie 
principally in their low transaction costs in accessing and supervising 
motivated family labour and in their intensive local knowledge, but their 
small scale leads to high unit transaction costs in almost all non-labour 
transactions (in accessing capital, market and technical information, 
inputs and output markets, and in providing product traceability and 
quality assurance) (IFAD 2001). Globalization and trade has different 
outcomes for different actors along the exports chain, this is because 
different economic actors interact in different ways so as to maximize 
profits and minimize costs and in doing so, some loose and some gain. 
Therefore at the value chain-level, they may have different distributional 
outcomes resulting from power asymmetries and exclusionary 
tendencies.  
Finally given the costs related to meeting standards, smallholders 
often strategize and co-operate through producer organizations to 
mitigate these costs. In our case, farmers choose production bundles so 
as to maximize profits 'and minimize costs at some specified set of 
prices for their products. Therefore at the micro-level, we analyse two 
main aspects: the smallholders’ decision to comply/not to comply with 
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standards and therefore participate in the export chain as well as their 
strategic cooperative behaviour through different market intermediaries. 
A basic assumption underlying this analysis is that farmers engage in 
collective action via producer organizations and other market 
intermediaries because there are efficiencies in certain joint, as opposed 
to individual, actions.  
 By using empirical work and multiple theoretical inferences 
described above as well as quantitative and qualitative methods16, the 
study will give various perspectives of the effect of standards on 
development. Based on the argument that trade is good for growth and 
for promoting exports especially in developing countries (specifically in 
areas where they have comparative advantage). At the same time, by 
complying to standards, farmers are able to access niche markets but 
various factors (including standards) and other market imperfections 
may lead to high transaction costs and may affect competitiveness of a 
sector thereby negating the benefits that would accrue in terms of 
export flows. Standards also enable transfer of technology and 
innovation to producers thereby enabling them to participate in global 
markets and earn incomes. Benefits accrued from trade, and compliance 
to standards are not shared equally among various actors and the 
introduction of standards and the inherent “difficulties” related to 
meeting them may affect farmers’ decision to participate in the export 
chain or use certain intermediaries for their participation. 
This study is aimed at understanding the effects of standards on 
Kenyan horticultural exports i.e. trade flows, while at the same time 
recognizing that at sector level and through value chains, many market 
imperfections – such as standards, infrastructure, information costs, 
costs of inputs and agglomeration economies among others may play a 
role in increasing/reducing transaction costs thereby impacting 
negatively/positively on competitiveness of the sector and subsequently 
affecting exports. Further to this, the participation of small-scale 
farmers and supporting institutions is crucial in improving their access 
to global markets and hence it is assumed that if they would comply to 
standards they would benefit from trade, however it is also emerging 
that the governance of global chains may also affect the power relations 
                                                 
16 The methods applied for the different levels of analysis will be captured in 
each of the chapters. 
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and hence the distributional outcomes for various interest groups. A 
final question in this study is the dynamics of smallholder participation 
in these markets under the prevailing circumstances and how market 
intermediaries facilitate their participation. This study will attempt to 
offer an explanation of this phenomenon by exploring the connection 
between standards and various aspects of trade and exports i.e. 
unveiling the nexus (Fig 2.2).   
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Figure 2.2: Analytical Framework 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter contextualized the standards-development debate by 
presenting the typology of standards, their processes of compliance and 
global level dynamics. The development and proliferation of standards 
stems from consumer demands for safety health and ethical 
accountability in the production and processing of exports to developed 
countries and therefore developing countries are seen as “standard 
takers” having to comply with these standards in order to access these 
markets. In addition standards are dynamic over time and purpose – i.e 
mandatory vs. voluntary requiring certification and accreditation as ‘due 
diligence’ falls on the producers. This not only raises transaction costs but 
also shapes the governance of the entire global value chain; the legal, 
regulatory and institutional environment; and provides opportunities for 
technology transfer and upgrading. 
       The debate linking standards and development is then elaborated in 
three main contexts. First, the argument behind trade growth and 
development, where the hypothesis that standards act as “barriers” to 
trade rather than “catalysts” is analysed in the context of effects of 
standards on horticultural export volumes or value in relative terms. 
The second argument is that standards influence the nature of global 
governance of value chains and subsequently shape the power relations 
and rent seeking behaviour. In this view two main theoretical and 
analytical elements emerge: a value chain approach used to provide an 
analytical framework for the value chain elements, its governance and 
subsequent power relations that influence distribution of rents. The 
second element is the transaction cost economics concept which 
provides a theoretical rational for the analysis of distribution of costs 
and benefits related to standards along the value chain. The third 
argument presents an analytical framework for the micro level dynamics 
of compliance to standards sustainability issues. Here the approach uses 
motivation theories to analyse the decision to participate based on 
socio-economic factors and institutional constraints. It also looks at 
how intermediaries are used to overcome these constraints and the 
sustainability of smallholder participation in high value chains.  
 The fourth element is the institutional perspective of standards. NIE 
discussed here gives the dynamics of institutional environments vs. 
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institutional arrangements and intermediaries for standards. The analysis 
of institutions here presents first and foremost, how standards shape 
the institutional environment for their adoption and regulation mostly 
through the legal and regulatory requirements. From an institutional 
perspective, we also look at how standards shape the governance of 
value chains and related constraints, and the institutional modalities 
used to overcome these constraints and ensure sustainability of exports.  
 In this study various theories will provide a foundation for analysing 
the effects standards on Kenya’s horticultural sector. In its basic form, 
the economic theory suggests that gains from trade arise when countries 
specialise in production of those goods to which they are best suited, 
thereby earning export income that allows for poverty reduction and 
subsequent development.  
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3 
Standards and Development in the 
Context of Kenya’s Horticulture 
Sector 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In the past two decades, the global development and proliferation of 
standards as a pre-requisite for market access has led to several changes 
within the export sector in most developing countries. Standards are 
developed by developed country retailers and ‘pushed’ downstream to 
developing country exporters.  This creates a series of global-local 
interaction processes over time and these impacts not only on local level 
production but also on the micro-level processes of innovation and 
knowledge dynamics. Furthermore, in order to ensure that these 
standards are complied with, the process of localizing and adopting 
them further leads not only to innovative organization of producers but 
also the creation and/or enhancement of institutions which 
conceptually builds on neo-institutional approaches. The development 
of standards –both public and private, have led to changes in the 
structure and governance of global value chains (Gereffi et al., 2005) 
leading to more vertically integrated of hierarchical chains with close 
control and monitoring of compliance ( Gereffi & Sturgeon, 2003), all 
these lead to different dynamics of power relationships and distribution 
of costs and value added. 
 This chapter analyses the landscape and typology of standards in 
Kenya’s horticulture sector. The subsequent sections below give an 
overview of the global to local map of standards in Kenya’s horticulture 
sector with a view to establishing their dynamics, processes of 
certification, localization and adoption and consequently their 
implications on value chain structures, transaction costs and 
institutional and technical capacity and development. It describes the 
horticulture sector in Kenya while contextualizing it within the 
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standards-trade-development debate. Three main issues are discussed in 
this chapter: the historical context of the horticulture sector production 
and development; the value chains, standard chains and processes for 
compliance; and the institutional context of standards in Kenya’s 
horticulture sector. 
 
Data and Methodology: 
Data used in this section is obtained from two main sources: secondary 
data sources include HCDA data on exports. Primary data sources are 
mainly from key informant interviews of persons from standards related 
bodies and government and semi-government institutions, NGOs, 
international development organizations, producer organizations, 
financial institutions and certification bodies. This was also augmented 
with FGDs conducted with farmers in various districts (Appendix 3.1). 
The key informant surveys were conducted using semi-structured 
questions (Appendix 1.2) and additional information was also obtained 
from publications such as economic surveys, institutional websites and 
institutional newsletters and publications. The information collected 
from key informants was analysed and follow up meetings with 
producer organizations to verify information was also done.  
3.2 Kenya’s Horticulture Sector and Related Standards 
3.2.1 Horticulture Sector in Kenya: Production and 
Development  
Sector structure and key players 
Large-scale horticultural production in Kenya started during World War 
II to supply food to the Allied Forces stationed in East Africa. Since 
then, Kenya’s horticultural industry exports, despite being a latecomer 
in the global market, have rapidly caught up with the market leaders 
(Jaffee 1995). At the time of independence in 1963, horticultural 
products accounted for only 0.3 per cent of total export value, but from 
the late 1960s, exports expanded both in volume and in the diversity of 
crops (Jaffee 1995; McCulloch & Ota, 2002). Between 1963 and 1991, 
horticultural exports from Kenya rose by approximately twelve times in 
terms of tonnage and by forty times in terms of value (Jaffee 1995) 
reaching approximately US$ 167 million by the year 2000. This signifies 
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an annual growth rate of about 6 per cent per year. By the late 1990s, 
Kenya supplied some 75 horticultural products to overseas markets not 
only as raw products but also as pre-packed and pre-prepared 
vegetables (Jaffee 1995; Dolan & Humphrey 2000). 
Today, horticulture is the fastest growing agricultural sub-sector in 
Kenya, contributing close to 3.5 per cent of the GDP, and 13 per cent 
of the agricultural GDP, it is the second biggest foreign exchange earner 
after tourism. Furthermore, the sector supports about 50,000 
smallholders and at least 85,000 workers. Horticultural products have 
accounted for two-thirds of all growth in agricultural exports and 
recently surpassed coffee to become the second largest merchandise 
export, after tea. Kenya is the second largest horticultural exporter in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (after South Africa), the second largest developing-
country exporter of flowers in the world (after Colombia), and the 
second largest developing-country supplier of vegetables to the 
European Union (after Morocco) (Figure 3.1). Moreover, the value of 
horticultural exports has shown an upward trend since 1995 (Figure 
3.1), there was a dip in 1997 followed by a slow but steady rise till 2012. 
 
Figure 3.1: Kenya’s Horticultural Exports 1995-2012 
 
Source: HCDA Data 
 
Overall, the sector directly supports about half a million workers, 
small farmers and families in production and another 1.5 million 
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labourers in exporting or value addition. There are between 80,000 
smallholder exporters with small farms ranging from 0.5 of an acre to 5 
acres, about 200 medium scale farmers with farms sizes ranging 
between 5-50 acres and about 20 large scale farmers with farms over 50-
5000 acres. The sector also comprises of about 10 integrated large scale 
exporters, and about 20 briefcase exporters (Table 3.1). Producer 
organizations form an integral part of   the horticultural production and 
comprise of members ranging between 15 and 250 and who have 
common interests, i.e accessing the export markets. There are over 300 
such groups spread out all over the horticultural production regions. 
The groups are self-managed and registration is required for the group 
to be considered eligible for a contract with an exporter. POs can also 
receive group certification and the group can also provide collateral in 
case one of the members needs to access credit. 
 
 Table 3.1: Horticulture Sector Producers and Exporters in Kenya 
Type of producer Numbers (approximate) Farm size 
(acres) 
Smallholders 80,000 0-5 
Medium scale producers 250 5-50 
Medium scale producers with 
integrated pack houses for export 
158 5-50 
Brief case exporters (own pack 
houses but not farms) 
22 0 
Large scale integrated farms 20 50,000 
Labourers in production and 
exporting 
2 million N/A 
Producer organizations Over 300 N/A 
Source: HCDA estimates, 2009 
 
In Kenya today, export horticulture represents an opportunity for 
reducing poverty through income generation among smallholders, rural 
labourers on larger farms, and unskilled or semi-skilled processing 
factory workers. No reliable figures are available, in part because it is 
difficult to separate the export segment from the much larger, 
domestically oriented business. However, if we conservatively assume 
that each farmer or labourer supports on average at least three to four 
other persons, then the industry supports roughly 2 million Kenyans.  
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There are various factors being seen to contribute to the success of 
the sector: competitive supply chain (off-season producer), vibrant 
private sector (including associations such as KFC and FPEAK), "light" 
regulation and taxation, support by KEPHIS, existence of Task Force, 
etc.  Growth opportunities exist for further export of fruit and 
vegetables, currently only a small share is exported to the EU market 
while the US market remains almost unexplored; there are also 
opportunities for value addition, for instance, in producing semi-
prepared and ready-to-eat combinations. In the region, Kenyan 
horticulture sector faces increasing competition from other African 
countries such as Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Rwanda putting pressure on 
profit margins. 
 The EU is still the most important market for Kenyan horticultural 
products. Exports of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables (FFVs) and cut 
flowers to the EU accounted for about 80 per cent of total exports of 
FFVs and cut flowers from Kenya the rest 20 per cent is mainly to the 
Middle East – United Arab Emirates and Dubai. All consignments of 
fresh fruits and vegetables to the EU must meet the EU 
directive1148/2001 where a certificate of conformity must be issued to 
all consignments and all products are subject to EU market 
requirements. In addition the shift to systems certification which is 
mandatory; both private and public companies are required to 
demonstrate their credibility by adapting to ISO 9001 for quality 
management systems and ISO 22000 for safety and health to improve 
quality and efficiency. These standards and regulations therefore cut 
across both public mandatory and private market requirements making 
the landscape of standards complicated especially for smallholders. 
3.2.2 The Evolution of Standards in Kenya’s Horticulture 
Sector 
In order to participate in global markets and realize gains from trade, 
Kenya had to develop the capacity to meet regulations and market 
requirements. Thus the proliferation of standards led to the 
development of local institutional and technical capacity at various 
levels of government, private sector and smallholders. These 
institutional and capacity changes are essential for the adoption, 
domestication and upgrading of production chains; all of which 
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improve market access and may stimulate exports and generally growth 
and development. 
 Since the 1990s, there has been a more tightly integrated value chain 
especially with the European Union due to a number of factors.  First, 
over the last two decades, many retail chains in Europe have undergone 
major consolidation, expanding in size and market share and thus 
exercising substantial influence on value chains across a wide range of 
products including horticulture from Kenya.  Second, the proliferation 
of mandatory and voluntary standards such as the MRLs has changed 
the value chain.  At the same time, there has been a growing NGO and 
consumer concerns regarding the ethical implications of global value 
chains In order to access the EU market, all horticultural exporters are 
required to implement a number of standards in production systems 
and put in place auditing processes to ensure compliance. 
 Standards in the EU are both complex and dynamic, incorporating 
features that go beyond simple quality, to less apparent characteristics of 
product safety, environmental management, and human rights. This is driven by 
the philosophy of the Triple Bottom Line, which integrates profitability 
with continual improvement in environmental and social performance 
in everyday business practices. Standards in Kenya’s horticulture sector 
have also involved in line with EU standards. Since Kenya joined WTO 
in 1995, it became mandatory to meet SPS and TBT requirements as 
stated by the WTO. Then came the emergence of EU regulatory 
framework and a consortium of EU private supermarket standards which 
have shaped the evolution of standards in the sector in Kenya (Table 
3.2) 
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Table 3.2: Evolution of Standards in Kenya’s Horticultural Exports Sector 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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3.2.3 Mapping the Horticulture Exports Value and 
Standards Chain 
Horticulture Sector Value Chain 
The horticultural value chain in Kenya consists of many players, small-
scale farmers (approximately 140,000 in number); middlemen and 
brokers; large-scale farmers; exporters – both small and large; lead firms 
and some major multinational firms mainly exporting to the EU. Recent 
developments have also seen the emergence of other institutions such 
as cooperatives and producer groups that also participate in the chain.  
Key characteristics of the chain are derived from results of the 
survey carried out in 2009. These indicate that the structure of the 
supply chain comprises of a large number of smallholders with farm 
sizes ranging between 0.25 -5 acres either producing individually or 
through producer organizations having contractual arrangements with 
exporters. It is also evident that most farmers’ export just over 50 per 
cent of what they produce with the rest being sold in the local markets 
or being consumed at home. The main players in the supply chain are 
middlemen and exporters, middlemen continue to play a vital role in the 
supply chain, in providing linkages with farmers and exporters; value 
addition functions such as sorting and grading and carrying out other 
transport and distributive functions within the supply chain. The 
majority of farmers interviewed were primarily vegetable and fruit 
growers and only about 34 out of the 202 interviewed were flower 
farmers, large and medium scale located in clusters in areas around 
Naivasha and Thika.  
Since 2004 activities carried out in the value chain such as sorting, 
grading, dicing, packaging and bar-coding are also carried out 
downstream, seeing major players participating in the chain. The 
horticulture value chain in Kenya comprises of relationships between 
various players in the chain with arm’s length relationships in some 
cases, contractual farming is also observed especially between producer 
groups and large and small-scale exporters. The production end of the 
sector is dominated by small-scale farmers who have contracts with 
large-scale farmers and exporters. The small scale farmers also organize 
themselves in producer groups/cooperatives with which exporters also 
have contracts. Exporters mainly supply seeds and training on standards 
to the farmers who in-turn sell their raw products to exporters. 
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Exporters are in two main categories: large and small-scale and this is 
where the most value addition is done.  Middlemen and brokers also 
play a major role in the sector especially for farmers who do not have 
contracts with exporters or supermarkets. They buy produce from 
farmers and sell it to exporters and in the process derive their share of 
profits, some may add value by mainly sorting and grading and in some 
cases even packaging (Figure 3.2).  
The chain also highlights the role played by middlemen/brokers in 
linking smallholders to the export chain, they often play a vital role in 
buying produce from the smallholders, adding value through sorting 
and grading and selling to exporters at a higher price.  
Information on standards and new requirements flows from the 
retailers to the importers and exporters and eventually gets to the 
production level. This is also often accompanied by information on new 
technologies and innovations, which stimulate upgrading at the lower 
end of the value chain At the meso-level, institutions such as umbrella 
organizations for producers and exporters, through which producers 
would obtain information as well, there are also supporting institutions 
like NGOs and ODAs which provide financial and technical assistance 
to producers in complying with standards, information dissemination 
and addressing other production related constraints through donor-
market linkage programs some of which are in liaison with various 
government institutions. At the retail end, there are also retail chains 
and consumer organizations, which have initiated some of the standards 
such as ethical, environmental and social standards.  
The Standards Chain 
Standards in most cases have generally originated from mandatory 
requirements in developed countries such as food safety and health 
requirements as well as private standards, which are initiated by 
consumer organizations and implemented by supermarkets. 
Information on standards and new requirements flows from the 
retailers to the importers and exporters and eventually gets to the 
production level. This is also often accompanied by information on new 
technologies and innovations, which stimulate upgrading at the lower 
end of the value chain. 
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Consequently retailers in developed countries have developed 
systems that trace products from field to their supermarket shelves17; 
these often include social and environmental standards. Furthermore 
some of these standards are met at different levels; for instance 
exporters owning pack houses need to obtain phyto-sanitary certificates 
as well as HACCP and ISO certification which do not apply to 
producers or farmers; exporters also have to meet certain product 
specificity and conformity including packaging requirements all of 
which are met at pack-house level. Therefore in summary producers at 
the lower end of the chain only have to comply with standards related 
to GAP and social/welfare and environmental standards including soil 
testing and traceability requirements. 
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Figure 3.2: Horticulture Sector Value Chain 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Compliance Requirements and Legal Status for 
Standards for Exporters and Producers in Kenya 
Compliance  
Requirement 
Legally Mandated Not Legally Mandated 
Strict  
Enforcement 
Spot/Sample  
Enforcement 
Required for 
Commercial 
Purposes 
Not Required 
But beneficial 
Phyto-sanitary 
Certificate 9      
MRL Tolerances  9     
HACCP     9
Traceability   9   
GAP/Environmental     9
Social Welfare     9
Packaging Specificity   9   
Product Conformity     9   
Source: Survey data, 2009 
 
From the above table it is evident that only two out of the eight 
types of standards are legally mandated requirements for exports into 
the EU, the rest of the standards are not legally mandated but are 
equally important in order for the exports to access the particular niche 
markets.  
In addition to mandatory food safety requirements, Kenyan 
exporters have to comply with additional private voluntary requirements 
which are not legally mandated but are all the same very important 
requirements and include labelling and packaging and organic standards 
to access certain “niche” markets such as 
EUREPGAP/GLOBALGAP, FLO (see Table 3.2). They also require 
third party certifications and annual auditing.  
Results from the fieldwork indicate that these standards are often 
passed down through exporters to producers. Consumers often 
initialize private standards; however retailers and supermarkets often 
produce their own codes of practice, which are passed on to importers 
and exporters. Testing and certification is then done to ensure 
compliance at both exporter level and producer level. Mandatory 
standards on the other hand are mostly initialled through governments 
perhaps as a result of consumer concern as well, these 
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mandatory/public standards have to be notified to the WTO SPS and 
TBT committees and then passed on to national governments as 
measures/requirements for exporting to a particular country, these are 
then obtained by National enquiry points which in the case of Kenya is 
the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) and which the develop 
guidelines for exporters and producers, this information is passed down 
to the Kenya Plant health Inspectorate services which is responsible for 
standards regulation and enforcement in the horticulture and crops 
sectors (Fig 3.3 below). It is therefore evident that producers and 
exporters have numerous standards they have to comply with in order 
to access developed country markets; and the have to go through both 
mandatory and private standards testing and inspection schemes in 
order obtain numerous certification some of which have to be renewed 
every year.  
Over the years, each of the EU member states has developed its own 
arrangements for phyto-sanitary inspection for their standards, which 
have different requirements for certificates for different 
products/sectors. There has been some convergence has occurred with 
the determination of a number of ‘notifiable’ pests and diseases and a 
system for rapid alert communications among member state agencies; 
this convergence mainly came about when different EU countries 
harmonized their standards under the EU Food safety regulations of 
2002. With regard to food safety, the main issues are the adoption of 
HACCP systems by supplier/exporters, the implementation of 
arrangements for product traceability, and the conduct of 
microbiological tests on products entering the EU. 
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Figure 3.3: Standards Chain in Kenya Illustrated 
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3.2.4 Legal Requirements for Export in the EU 
There are several articles under EU regulations from 1994 to 2015 that 
stipulate the requirements for exporters of any food to the EU. These 
legal requirements also give instructions on how, when, where and by 
whom the controls are implemented and documented. Two specific EU 
requirements are discussed below. 
1. Requirements to set up Competent Authorities 
Article 46 (1) (b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 stipulate that 
EU controls shall have, inter alia, particular regard to the organisation 
of Third Country's (CAs), their powers and independence, the authority 
they have to enforce the applicable legislation effectively, and the 
training of staff in the performance of official controls ( Regulation EC, 
882/2004). In Kenya the Competent authorities are as follows: 
x KEPHIS ( Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services): 
pesticide residue monitoring plans and analysis;  
x HCDA: registration and control of exporters/pack-houses, 
implementation of traceability, training and control of 
farmers;  
x Pest Control Products Board (PCPB) - authorization of Plant 
Protection Products (PPPs) formulation analysis of PPPs, 
registration and controls of PPP retailers and storage 
facilities;  
x Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI): research on 
Integrated Pest Management. 
 
HCDA (Export) Order No 190 of December 2011 replaced the 
previous Order of 1995 (HCDA 2012). It empowers the authority to 
facilitate and enforce standards for all horticulture produce. The 
provisions include requirements for the safe use of pesticides and for 
traceability (detailed rules for traceability have yet to be adopted). 
Exporters have to be registered annually, and must have own 
production schemes or contracted growers. Exporters must keep 
records of their transactions and submit quarterly returns to HCDA. 
The order also provides for sanctions. 
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2. Official controls of pesticide residues in food of plant origin 
Article 46 (1)(b), (c), (d), (e) and (h) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 
stipulate that EU controls shall have, inter alia, particular regard to: the 
existence and operation of documented control procedures and control 
systems based on priorities, the CA's capability to enforce applicable 
legislation, the resources including diagnostic facilities available to 
competent authorities, the training of staff in the performance of 
official controls and the assurances which the third country can give 
regarding compliance with, or equivalence to, EU requirements (Official 
Journal of European communities, 2004).  
 Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 stipulates that food and 
feed imported into the EU for placing on the market within the EU 
shall comply with the relevant requirements of food law or conditions 
recognised by the EU to be at least equivalent thereto (Official journal 
of European communities 2002a).  
 Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 requires that products 
covered by Annex I of the same Regulation shall not contain, from the 
time they are placed on the EU market as food or feed, any pesticide 
residue exceeding EU MRLs, or 0.01 mg/kg for those products for 
which no specific MRL is set (Official journal of European 
Communities, 2005). The CODEX has also established MRLs for 
pesticides, which are considered for the establishment of EU MRLs 
(CAC/MRL 1-2009).  
 Commission Directive 2002/63/EC establishes EU methods of 
sampling for the official control of pesticides residues in and on 
products of plant and animal origin or equivalent international 
standards ( Official Journal of European Communities 2002b) (e.g. 
CODEX Guidelines CAC/GL 31-1999). Article 10 of Regulation (EC) 
No 852/2004 in connection with Article 6 of the same Regulation 
requires that every FBO shall notify the appropriate CA of each 
establishment under its control that carries out any of the stages of 
production, processing and distribution of food (Official Journal of 
European communities 2004b). 
 The first national monitoring plan in Kenya for pesticide residues 
was implemented in 2009 with the assistance of the Horticultural 
Produce phyto-sanitary Certification and Quality Assurance 
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(HORTICAP), funded by the European Union. Before the 
implementation of the plan, a training supported by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and HORTICAP was held. Monitoring 
has continued until the time of the audit. During the year 2012-2013 a 
total of 532 samples were taken and analysed by KEPHIS at the 
KEPHIS Analytical Chemistry Laboratory. Samples were taken in nine 
regions. A total of 46 samples tested positive with a total of six 
pesticides, which relates to 8.6 % of the samples. Following the 
inclusion of Kenyan peas and beans in Regulation (EC) No 669/2009 
(Official Journal of European communities 2009), the monitoring plan 
was enhanced to include a more extensive number of samples of peas 
and beans in pods and other commodities. The plan provides for 8 000 
samples to be taken per year, including 6 000 samples of peas and beans 
for export to the EU. KEPHIS stated that the number of samples and 
the sampling points are designed to provide statistical confidence of 
compliance for exported produce. 
 Risk factors are not included in the design of the programme. 
Samples are taken by trained HCDA staff from production areas, 
collection centres and pack houses, for analysis by KEPHIS. The 
sampling procedure followed the CODEX Guidelines CAC/GL 33-
1999. To date, 270 samples of beans and 187 samples of peas have been 
sampled within the extensive programme. The main problems are 
maximum residue limits with dimethionate being the pesticide that 
caused the most common. 
 Exporters and pack-houses processing peas and beans for export to 
the EU are registered, as required by Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 
(Official Journal of European Communities 2004b). Effective 
traceability systems have been implemented by the exporters, and the 
KEPHIS laboratory is accredited to ISO 17025 and has adequate 
facilities. 
 
 
 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
90 
3.2.5 Compliance and Certification Processes in Kenya’s 
Horticulture Sector 
During the survey, it was observed that exporters are increasingly using 
standards for Quality Management Systems (QMS), this is more 
relevant due to the large number of small scale producers in the sector, 
a phenomenon which poses major challenges when monitoring them 
for compliance. Results from the survey indicate that farmers have to 
comply with various standards already summarized in table 3.3. 
However the most common are GAP and traceability standards, which 
are vital for the management of the supply chain. The standards were 
also observed to be getting complex as the chain progresses, in that at 
the exporters end, they have to comply with more and more standards, 
spot checks and inspections than at the production end as is illustrated 
in table 3.3.  
The results from this survey indicate that most of the mandatory 
standards are actually met at the exporter level and not at the level of 
small-scale producers. While exporters have to obtain phyto-sanitary 
certificates and are mandated to meet MRLs, farmers are only mandated 
to meet GAP, traceability and social welfare standards. Other standards 
such as product specificity and product conformity are predominantly 
met at the exporter level unless packaging takes place at farm level as 
was observed in some few cases of passion fruit packing in Mwea 
/Kimbimbi area (See table 3.3 below).  
 
Table 3.3: Summary Compliance Exporters vs. Farmers in the Horticulture 
Industry in Kenya 
Compliance Requirement Exporters Farmers Including Small Scale Producers 
Phyto-sanitary Certificate All N/A 
MRL Tolerances All N/A 
HACCP All N/A 
Traceability All All but through exporters 
GAP/Environmental All 77%% 
Social Welfare All 41% 
Packaging Specificity All 4% 
Product Conformity All 4% 
Source: 2009 Survey data 
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Exporters are therefore faced with the task of monitoring their 
respective producers and ensuring that their produce meets the required 
standards. However the survey further shows that in order to mitigate 
challenges posed by monitoring, the main chain players have adopted 
different systems for achieving compliance and certification especially 
with respect to GlobalGAP.  They do this mainly through contractual 
arrangements with individual farmers as well as with producer 
organizations, which are an integral part of the chain.  
In view of this, findings indicate that there are predominantly 2 
options for certification; option 1 is the individual certification and 
option 2 is the group certification mainly for producer organizations. 
Under the individual certification option, an individual producer applies 
for the GlobalGAP certificate for one or more sub scopes.  This usually 
entails putting up the required infrastructure and a Quality Management 
System (QMS) according to GlobalGAP requirements. External audit 
and inspection by a certification body is then carried out and a 
certificate issued thereafter if all the requirements are met. Large-scale 
producers and exporters mostly use this option. Small-scale producers 
who get certified through producer groups on the other hand, mostly 
use option 2. In this scheme of certification, groups of farmers are 
allowed to comply as a unit but only after satisfying requirements of 
both external and internal Audits (see fig 3.4 below). 
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Figure 3.4: GlobalGAP Option 2: Group Certification for Producer 
Organizations 
 
 
Financial requirements for GlobalGAP certification in Kenya are 
high especially for small-scale farmers. These usually entail an initial cost 
of setting up which includes putting up the necessary infrastructure18, 
additional labour requirements, additional managerial inputs and 
payment for soil testing and analysis.  According to data from this 
survey, the initial cost of setting up these infrastructures and other 
additional requirements is approximately US$ 1200. Initial auditing costs 
are about US$ 300 per day for audit fees paid to the certification body 
(usually takes about 2 days), auditor sustenance fee of US$ 100 per day 
and a report fee of about US$ 125 (table 3.4 below).  
The process of auditing a farmer for certification entails a checklist, 
which is used, and which requires 95% compliance for one to receive 
certification. Once certification is received, yearly inspection and 
auditing is done before renewal which implies recurrent costs. Clearly it 
is easier for large farms to comply than smaller farms and more 
specifically small-scale farmers who find it more difficult to comply 
                                                 
18 Infrastructure includes pesticide and fertilizer storage, grading shed, cooling 
shed, toilet and bath, and hand wash facilities and sanitizers. 
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because of the cost implications. To reduce these costs for small farms, 
they use a collective certification scheme (GlobalGAP Option 2). Under 
this option, its costs approximately US$ 500 per farmer to implement 
the Global Gap certification, about US$ 400 is used as an initial cost for 
setting up the necessary infrastructure while the rest are recurrent costs 
(Table 3.4 below). Findings indicate that only 6 per cent of farmers 
interviewed were certified under option one, these were predominantly 
farmers with a larger farm size of about 10 acres who obviously had 
more resources; whilst 24 per cent were complying under option 2 
through their respective producer organizations. However during the 
fieldwork, the issue of sustainability was raised because most of the 
producer organizations were initially being supported by donors and 
NGOs. However, they were not able to sustain the programs after the 
funding was stopped. 
It is apparent that the second option offers a cheaper alternative 
especially for small-scale farmers and therefore makes it possible for 
them to get into the market. Still, there were certain cases where farmers 
did not belong to a group and were not able to comply on their own 
due to financial constraints leading to their exclusion. Also in some 
cases, some producer groups which previously received financial 
support from NGOs and other donors failed to renew their certificates 
due to lack of financial capability. In such cases, the groups did not 
disintegrate because new developments have enhanced the coordination 
of chain activities by exporters to ensure quality and upgrading.  Under 
these new arrangements, farmers who were initially facing exclusion 
from the market are now able to comply through exporters with whom 
they have contractual arrangements. In this survey, this constituted 
about 33 per cent of smallholders (Fig 3.5 below). In this type of 
arrangement, the exporter is certified, and has the responsibility of 
ensuring that the farmers with whom they have contracts are complying 
and hence they provide loans for putting up the infrastructure and they 
audit the firms based on the GlobalGAP criteria. This is another step 
towards solving the problem of exclusion for smallholders. 
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Table 3.4: Summary GlobalGAP Certification Costs Option 1 vs. Option 2 
Item 
 Option 1: Cost (US$) Option 2: Cost US$ 
Non-
Recurrent Recurrent 
Non-
Recurrent Recurrent 
Physical 
Infrastructure 1200 - 400 - 
Auditing - 800 - 50 
Report Fee - 125 - 25 
Soil Testing and 
Analysis - 155  - 25 
Total 2280 500 
Source: Survey data, 2009 
 
Figure 3.5: GlobalGAP Compliance of Individual Smallholders Through 
Exporters 
  
 
3.2.6 Localizing Global Standards in Kenya’s Horticulture 
Sector 
From a developmental perspective, localization and harmonization of 
global standards and procedures at the national and sectoral levels 
reduces compliance costs and testing and helps countries to achieve 
some form of equivalence (Otieno & Knorringa 2012). In addition, 
requirements such as traceability, record keeping and third party 
monitoring may also improve chain management and competitiveness, 
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transparency increases and trade becomes more predictable and easy to 
control (Kaplinsky, 2006; Tander and Tilburg 2007). In Kenya, there 
have been two main attempts at localization of global standards - the 
KS 1758 code of practice, a public mandatory standard for the 
horticulture industry and the KenyaGAP, which is based on the 
GlobalGAP initiative.  
 The KS 1758 code of practice was launched in 2002 and developed by 
the technical multi-stakeholder National Food Safety Committee under 
the aegis of the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS). Stakeholders 
involved in the process were representatives in the technical committee 
and were from Ministry of Agriculture, Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate 
Services KEPHIS, KFC, HCDA, FPEAK and the Ministry of Trade. 
The code of practice has its origins from the Fresh Produce Exporters’ 
Association of Kenya’s (FPEAK) and the Kenya Flower Council (KFC) 
code of practice of 1988 and covers both fruits and vegetables. Its 
objective was to have a national baseline standard where all producers 
and exporters would be able to have clear and comprehensive 
production guidelines for the export market. It encompasses food safety 
and health, environmental concerns and worker welfare and safety. This 
code was harmonized with international agencies such as the UK’s 
Integrated Crops Management and the USA’s Environment Protection 
Agency. 
 However, the implementation of this code of practice and 
subsequent compliance has not been effective as close to 70 per cent of 
farmers interviewed in this study have never heard of it.  In addition, its 
requirements entail high start-up costs, and having a management and 
traceability system in place which most farmers cannot afford. 
Furthermore, it is not required in the export destinations and would 
entail additional costs for exporters. Most importantly, since the code of 
practice has not gained international importance, complying with it 
would still not guarantee market access in the EU or other major export 
destinations. Exporters therefore, prefer to comply with existing 
standards in order to access markets in the EU.  
 The KenyaGAP Initiative was an attempt to benchmark standards 
based on GlobalGAP (then EUREPGAP). After the Kenyan experience 
with standards, there was a realization that there was a need for a 
localized standard for fresh fruits and vegetables. From 2002, the 
KenyaGAP initiative was developed from a revised code of FPEAK at 
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the same time incorporating principles of GlobalGAp and HACCP 
(FPEAK, 2007).  Due to the need to localize and understand the 
aspects of GlobalGAP (then EUREPGAP), its formulation involved 
consultations with key industry stakeholders through a technical 
committee consisting of government ministries and bodies including 
agriculture, KEPHIS and HCDA, exporters and their associations, 
farmers and producer organizations and sector umbrella organizations 
such as FPEAK.  
 The process, interpretation and benchmarking of KenyaGAP 
took 2 years and independent EUREPGAP appointed auditors from 
the German standards and certification body (DAP) were invited to 
audit the standard. It became the first national scheme incorporating 
both industry and small-scale farmers concerns and covering the scope 
of fruits, vegetables and flowers. KenyaGAP has a recognized third 
party certification of farm production processes based on 
ES45011/ISO Guide 65, which specifies product handling, processing 
and packaging. In addition, it offers flexibility on compliance criteria. 
The options are Mandatory compliance (red), Required (yellow) and 
Recommended (green). This then leads to a multi-tier approach with the 
basic principles forming the Bronze code which is the minimum for all 
members including new members; Silver which is slightly more 
stringent and Gold code of practice which has the most stringent 
requirements and is mostly for the market leaders (Otieno & Knorringa, 
2012).  
 However KenyaGAP Initiative still faces some challenges related to 
its implementation, dissemination and re-affirmation. First, FPEAK is 
the scheme owner for KenyaGAP but has not had it implemented 
throughout the country with smallholders partly because the process of 
third party certification has not been properly worked out. Secondly, 
there seems to be an overlapping certification because most exporters 
and producers are already GlobalGAP certified and still have to meet 
additional standards in order to access these markets. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, KenyaGAP is not yet recognized internationally and there 
are issues regarding its market penetration especially in the EU, partly 
because GlobalGAP is a buyer driven initiative and acceptance of 
KenyaGAP may raise concerns in the market.  
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3.3 Standards and Institutional Developments in the 
Horticulture Sector in Kenya 
The institutional framework of value chains provides channels through 
which quality requirements can be introduced to producers and 
implemented. Institutions may also determine the relationships between 
chain actors and their organization and hence may influence adoption 
of certain requirements by actors Gibbon, (2001) & Laven (2007), 
furthermore actors and players in the value chain take strategic positions 
and try to influence certain functions and dictate the terms of 
participation by other actors in different functional positions in the 
chain (Laven, 2007). 
According to North (1990) & Doward et al, 2005; institutions are 
“rules of the game” defining incentives or sanctions affecting people’s 
behavior, institutions also encompass a set of structures put in place to 
‘guide’ certain relationships between different actors at different 
strategic points. The institutional framework therefore, sets the local, 
national and international conditions and policies that shape the way in 
which various actors in the chain relate to one another. Laven, 2007 
further argues that the institutional framework can either provide 
effective channels through which quality criteria can be introduced as 
part of upgrading or can create barriers against such introductions. 
Hence in this context, commodity chains are not viewed as “closed” 
systems, but as systems that receive inputs from the outside in terms of 
knowledge management, and are influenced by advocacy movements 
and by policy priorities set by governments (Laven, 2007). 
 In view of the above, institutional dynamics in the horticulture 
sector in the last 10-15 years have evolved around the establishment of 
standards, rules and regulations. Institutional organization has centred 
around 3 main types of institutions: Legal and Regulatory Institutions, 
Enforcement Institutions and Facilitating Institutions. The Legal and Regulatory 
Institutions are charged with formulating rules and regulations that 
govern the sector. These are mainly formal institutions mostly 
government and quasi-government institutions and includes the Kenya 
Bureau of Standards (KEBS) which is the National Codex Committee 
(WTO required) which handles mainly public/mandatory standards and 
the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services (KEPHIS) through which 
rules and regulation related to plant health  are handled. These 
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institutions are also responsible for disseminating information as well as 
training and capacity building for standards. On the other hand, 
Enforcement Institutions are necessary for monitoring the compliance of 
rules and regulations and are mostly related to private sector standards 
which often require third party certification. Enforcement is usually 
handled by private standardization companies such as AFRICERT, 
CMI, SGF and SGS19. These private companies often offer training, 
auditing and certification services to producers and exporters at a fee. 
Annual auditing and certification renewal is also handled by these 
private companies at a fee which is borne by the exporters/producers.  
In addition, these facilitating Institutions that are primarily concerned 
with easing the adoption process and compliance, also provide financial 
and credit services as well as address other market related constraints 
and these include NGOs and credit and financing institutions, and 
producer organizations also referred to in this study as market 
intermediaries. These market intermediaries were formed mainly to help in 
chain coordination especially with exporters. The goal was to achieve 
economies of scale in terms of sharing costs for training and capacity 
building; upgrading; auditing and compliance related costs (Table 3.5). 
Producer Organizations (POs) are further coordinated under umbrella 
producer organizations such as FPEAK and the Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers (KAM).  However, some key members of POs pointed 
out weak institutional interactions and linkages between their 
organizations and formal institutions.  
This problem led to the development of new and interesting 
innovations in the provision of financial services. On one hand, donors 
are increasingly facilitating this process through various individual 
exporters who help farmers in upgrading, training and paying auditing 
and certification costs. One of the programs was initiated by 
COLEACP20 (Europe-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Liaison Committee) - 
through the Pesticides Initiative Program (PIP). Another new 
development has seen the proliferation of donor driven government 
                                                 
19 SGS is an international organization whose role is to audit for certification 
under the ISO 9000X Series, ISO 4000, HACCP and the code of Practice. 
20 COLEACP is an inter-professional network promoting sustainable 
horticultural trade, gathering together ACP producers/exporters and EU 
importers of fruit and vegetables, flowers and ornamental plants, and other 
companies and partners operating in the ACP/EU horticultural industry 
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programs which operate as funding and support institutions (such as 
Micro Enterprise Support Program Trust (MESPT) & Assistance to 
Micro and Small Enterprises Program (ASMEP) in liaison with other 
financial institutions (such as Equity bank) that support POs for 
training and capacity building; as well as obtain certification and link the 
POs to markets/exporters. The financial institutions then liaise with 
exporters and deduct their dues from the individual farmers’ incomes. 
One of the financial institutions’ conditions is that a PO would only 
receive  funding if the PO proves that it is active by submitting records 
of meetings and books to the financial institutions.  Many farmers attest 
that these new developments in the financing of their requirements 
have helped in enhancing sustainability. The elements related to 
sustainability will be discussed further in chapter 6. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter gives an overview of the developmental aspect of 
standards within the context of Kenya’s horticulture sector. This 
analysis gives perspectives from a developing country value chain which 
is dominated by a large number of small scale producers, that are linked 
to the market via a number of intermediaries; producer organizations, 
exporters and middlemen and relatively few large scale producers.  
 Two distinct ‘types’ of standards in the horticulture sector 
emerge; mandatory (public) standards and voluntary (private) standards, 
which producers comply with in order to access the markets in 
developing countries. The direction of the flow of standards is north-
south. Governments mainly apply public mandatory standards for the 
sole purpose of ensuring the safety and health of their consumers. They 
are mandatory and are based on international agreements i.e. WTO’s 
SPS and TBT requirements - they are governed by law and are static. 
WTO regulations stipulate that countries may use additional standards 
to ensure the safety and health of the public provided the standards do 
not impede trade. The responsibility of enforcing compliance is left to 
retailers. 
 In recent years with the change of laws in the EU, there has been a 
shift in responsibility from public to the private sector leading to 
proliferation of private standards. Private standards on the other hand, 
are set to respond to continuously changing consumer tastes and 
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preferences and provide flexibility in response to this changing 
environment. Although they are voluntary,  to access certain markets 
including ‘niche’ markets, which are very important for developing 
country producers, one must comply. The standards cover other 
consumer related needs such as sustainability, ethical production, fair 
trade and traceability. They also provide additional assurances that rules 
and regulations are adhered to because they require additional 
monitoring, enforcement, certification and accreditation. In addition, 
they give retailers a competitive edge by providing for differentiated 
products and credence goods and thus raise the bar for competition 
from attribute based to quality based. 
The heterogeneity of standards makes compliance difficult for 
exporters while at the same time, it makes the analysis of their impact 
difficult. From the perspective of the horticulture sector in Kenya, 
standards embody information and technological features, which 
simplify chain management and creates opportunities for producers to 
upgrade and compete in globalized chains. Furthermore, ‘niche’ markets 
such as fair trade may have benefits for small holders due to related 
premiums. 
 Standards have implications on transaction costs in two ways; 
there are costs related to upgrading and costs related to certification, 
and as a result, the horticulture sector and chain participants have 
developed a number of ‘innovative’ ways of mitigating these costs such 
as group certification through producer organizations or through the 
use of exporters’ single certification provided they ensure that 
producer’s downstream are complying with requirements. In addition, 
the ability of producers and exporters to comply for instance to 
standards like GLOBALGAP and obtain certification substantially, 
reduces transaction costs of monitoring and thus improves chain 
efficiency especially if they are supplying to multiple retail outlets. Thus 
the cost of multiple certifications is reduced as well as testing and audits; 
furthermore, this gives Kenyan exporters the flexibility to supplying 
across the globe. 
 Attempts to localize and harmonize global standards through 
some initiatives in Kenya’s horticulture industry saw the development 
of the KenyaGAP initiative and the KS -1758 code of practice which 
have contributed to the upgrading local production. However, a major 
setback observed with these attempts is that the harmonized standards 
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are still not be acceptable at the international levels and farmers still 
need to comply with global standards in order to access global markets.  
Institutional developments presented in this chapter saw three main 
types of institutions that have come about as a result of standards. 
These are the legal and regulatory institutions that are mainly concerned 
with setting the rules and guidelines for implementation and largely 
consist of government and quasi-government institutions; facilitating 
institutions which offer both technical and financial support for 
producers and enforce compliance and largely consist of NGOs and 
credit institutions; and enforcement institutions which are mainly third 
party standardization bodies concerned with monitoring compliance 
and the issuing of certification. A ‘new’ crop of market intermediaries 
have also emerged such as producer organizations and other market 
dynamics that help farmers not only to comply, but also to access 
markets and reduce transaction costs. 
From a developmental perspective, we can conclude that as a result 
of the proliferation of standards, development related outcomes are 
twofold, positive and negative. Some positive outcomes include the 
introduction of new ways of efficiently governing high value chains 
through the use of standards including ‘new’ forms of intermediaries 
that lower transaction costs for exporters and help farmers to access 
markets; the ability of the said standards to transfer technology and 
information and thus enable the upgrading of production chains hence 
the production of uniform quality and standardized goods thereby 
raising the bar for exporters and producers and increasing 
competitiveness. On the negative side, complaiance may lead to the the 
increase of transaction costs of for producers and lead to the exclusion 
of very small scale producers who are not able to comply as a result of 
the high transaction costs. The dynamic nature of standards may also 
further complicate the production processes for smallholders, as they 
may have to change their production processes to cope up with changes 
that may crop up such as additional standards. 
Finally, the responsibility to ensure food safety and health rests with 
retailers who have since developed their own standards and means of 
verifying compliance. In effect, they have transferred these 
requirements (and costs) downstream to producers and exporters, 
which then predefines the governance of these structures and the power 
relations and ultimately the distribution of value and incomes along 
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these chains. Given these developments in the sector, the gist of this 
research is to present an inquiry into the impacts and the development 
related aspects of standards on different chain participants in the 
subsequent chapters. 
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4 Effects of Standards on Kenya’s  Horticultural Export supply 
 
 
4.1 Background  
4.1.1 Introduction 
Recent developments in global trade have seen a decline in tariffs and a 
relative increase in the importance of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs).  
Standards have thus become an important element in the regulation of 
global trade. As seen in previous chapters, although standards have 
been design to protect consumer safety and health, they have the 
potential to act as trade barriers with fixed and variable costs falling on 
developing country producers.  These constraints may ultimately affect 
bilateral trade flows. Indeed, recent trade theory suggests that fixed cost 
measures such as product standards might play an important role in 
explaining the pattern of trade (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 2008).
 The increasing share of high-value commodities in the consumption 
basket of the households in Europe, higher incomes and urbanization, 
changing lifestyles, market integration and trade liberalization at global 
level have led to an increase in the demand for horticultural products in 
Europe. Much of the high value products come from tropical countries. 
In these countries, it is believed that the horticulture sector can be 
promoted as a means of agro-diversification, providing the much-
needed impetus to the growth of the agricultural sector which supports 
over 60 per cent of the population in many of these countries through 
increase in trade, income and employment generation. This ultimately 
contributes to poverty reduction.  
 Standards and regulatory requirements can have implications on 
exports in several ways: one strand of literature quantifies the impact of 
standards on trade largely depending on panel data and cross country 
studies. Findings are that by and large standards are generally trade 
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restricting in a sample of developed countries (Moenius, 2004, 2006; 
Disdier, Fontagne & Mimouni 2008, Wilson & Otsuki, 2004; Anders 
and Caswell 2007, Burnquist & Souza 2010). The second strand of 
literature focuses on the effect of standards on costs of production and 
subsequent welfare of exporters and producers and how they create 
(Jaffee & Henson, 2004; Matoo 2000, Lacovone 2002). Other studies 
have also focused on the broader welfare and poverty effects of 
standards (McCulloch and Ota, 2002; Barron and Rello, 2000; Maertens 
and Swinnen, 2009a).  Another strand of literature reveals that standards 
are generally trade restricting except in cases where standards are 
harmonized (Portugal –Perez, Reyes & Wilson, 2009; Czubala Sheperd 
& Wilson, 2009). 
 Although there is considerable anecdotal evidence that standards 
affect trade in the agricultural sector, quantitative evidence remains 
scarce and few studies have been done to assess this. Besides this, 
developing countries are known to face many constraints that ultimately 
increase trade costs. Other factors related to the macro-economic 
environment include Foreign Direct Investments (FDI); Infrastructure; 
and NTBs such as standards that may also affect supply capacity and 
subsequent export growth. 
A number of studies (Oyejide, 2004; Oyejide et.al, 2004a, 2004b; and 
Ajakaiye & Oyejide, 2005) suggest more broadly that the export supply 
capacity constraints which face many African countries largely reflect 
weaknesses in their macroeconomic and trade regime, deficiencies of 
trade-related infrastructures and inefficiencies in trade-related inputs 
and services.  In Addition, African countries face many export supply 
constraints related to trade facilitation, inefficient markets and 
international trade barriers such as standards. A study by Oyejide (2007) 
examines how policy regimes can provide complementary or 
compensatory measures to achieve exports; the study also identifies 
exchange and tax rates as major factors impeding exports in most 
countries in Africa.  Infrastructure acts as a major impediment because 
most delays are caused by infrastructure related problems, infrastructure 
is therefore an important component of trade costs (Mbekeani (2007).  
Lyakurwa (2007) has examined supply constraints related to 
transactions costs, and identifies 5 major types: constraints related to 
production; distribution constraints; trade financing and related 
constraints; trade facilitation related constraints; and marketing 
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constraints. Manduna (2005) also explores supply constraints facing 
Africa and comes up with the same classifications. Sector specific 
studies have also been done, specifically in Kenya by Graham et al. 
(2007) on the impact of EUREPGAP on several small-scale vegetable 
growers. Constraints were mainly identified as infrastructure based and 
those exacerbated by stringent standard requirements in the EU and 
other export markets (Onjala & Otieno, 2010). 
 Several approaches have been used in quantifying the impact of 
standards on exports. Welfare effect measures, cost benefit analysis, 
price wedge measures, surveys and gravity models are some of the 
different approaches that have been used. As evidence suggests, there 
are limitations associated with these methods as they mostly concentrate 
on inventories such as frequency while disregarding the regulation 
content and/or process attributes underlying the regulations (Fasarella 
et al, 2011). These studies also do not consider other macro-economic 
variables within the market that may affect exports. 
This study contributes to existing empirical literature in two main 
ways; a quantitative analysis of the impact of standards on the 
horticulture sector gives a developing country perspective on an agro-
food industry–horticulture21 using a country specific, sector specific 
approach. Second, this dataset allows for the determination of the 
effects of standards on export supply in view of other factors that may 
constrain exports. This then raises the question: how much can we 
attribute these effects to standards? The chapter is organized in 4 main 
parts, the preceding section gives the introduction; this is followed by 
some empirical evidence in section 2; section 3 of this chapter gives an 
overview of the methodology used to measure the impact of various 
standards on Kenya’s horticultural exports, section 4 presents and 
discusses the results of the analysis, and section 5 is the conclusion. 
 
                                                 
21 The sector is critical a critical source of foreign exchange and important to 
the country’s economy as it contributes 33 per cent of GDP. 
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4.1.2 Horticulture Sector Exports and Performance 
As already mentioned in previous chapters, horticulture is the fastest 
growing agricultural sub-sector in Kenya, contributing close to 13 per 
cent of the GDP and it is the second biggest foreign exchange earner 
after tourism. The sector supports about 50,000 smallholders and at 
least 2.5 million Kenyans earn from horticulture (Omosa, 2004).  As an 
export success story, the industry stands out from other agricultural 
sectors. Of the horticulture exports in the last ten years, flowers 
(specifically the export sector) lead with a 57 per cent value share. 
Fruits, on average, contribute seven per cent while vegetables are at 37 
per cent.  
Favourable climatic conditions allows for a wide range of crops 
including fruits (tropical and temperate), vegetables (indigenous and 
exotic), nuts, herbs and spices, and flowers (summer and temperate).  
These crops are rain fed as well as irrigated. The variety of the 
horticultural crops grown in the country is varied and is seasonally 
erratic. Production is geared for both the export and the domestic 
market, there is incredible diversity in farm sizes, variety of produce, 
and the production systems employed. For purposes of this study, two 
main sub-groups fruits & vegetable and cut flowers will be looked at. 
Fruit Production - consists mainly of tropical fruits - banana, 
avocado, mango, passion fruit, pineapple, pawpaw, citrus, white sapota 
and custard apple; temperate fruits - apples, plums, pears and peaches; 
and Nuts - macadamia nut. Vegetable production - consists of data on 
exotic export vegetables - cabbage, kale, tomato, onion, carrot, spinach, 
garden peas, French beans, baby corn, leeks, cauliflower, broccoli, 
shallots and lettuce. It also includes data on Asian vegetables and herbs 
and spices (chilli, garlic, coriander and celery). Cut-flower production- 
mainly temperate flowers (roses, carnation, statice and alstromeria) and 
summer flowers (arabicum, tuberose and erygnium).  Ninety nine per cent of 
cut-flower production is geared towards the export market and is grown 
by a handful of large-scale farms. 
Despite the general slowdown in agricultural output in the last ten 
years, the horticulture sector has grown rapidly in importance, driven 
mostly by flower exports. Flower exports now accounts for 2.5 per cent 
of GDP, which means it accounts for between 10 and 13 per cent of all 
exports. Kenya is now the leading flower exporter to the European 
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Union, with approximately 31 per cent of the market. Between 1995 
and 2012 horticultural sector rose by 173 per cent in volume terms and 
959 per cent in value terms (Figure 1). The main market for 
horticultural exports from Kenya is the European Union in particular 
Germany (6%), Netherlands (42%), United Kingdom (37%), France (9) 
and rest of EU (3%).  
 
Figure 4.1: Trends in Horticulture Exports in Kenya 1995 – 2012 
 
Source: HCDA 
 
From figure 4.1 above, it is evident that exports have been rising 
steadily over the years, except for a dip in 2000 and 2004, which 
happened because of a temporary ban on some products from Kenya 
because they did not meet requirements of GLOBAL GAP (then 
EUREPGAP) because they exceeded maximum residue limits 
repeatedly. So far, the success of the Kenyan export horticulture 
industry has been attributed in part to Kenya’s natural advantages for 
the production of horticultural crops. The agro-climatic conditions are 
ideal and Kenya’s location on the equator enables round the year 
production–a characteristic not shared by competitors such as Egypt 
and Morocco (McCulloch & Ota, 2002). In addition, production is 
highly intensive in the use of relatively low skilled labour and therefore 
in keeping with Sub-Saharan Africa’s comparative advantage in the 
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production of land and labour intensive goods. Kenyan exporters have 
also ensured that they supply high quality produce, in good time to their 
customers. The process was aided by the introduction of EUREPGAP 
(now GLOBALGAP) which is an equal partnership of agricultural 
producers and retailers whose aim is to establish certification standards 
and procedures for Good Agricultural Practices (GAP).  
Trends show a general decrease in rejetions of cut flowers for 
documentation reasons - while the rejections of fruits and vegetables are 
almost double thaat of flowers. There are also a low number of 
rejections for cut flowers due to pesticide residues andut there are much 
higher figures for fresh fruits and vegetables. Fluctutations are also 
evident in th e number of rejections due to micro-organisms. The total 
number of reections have also continued to fluctuate. 
4.2 A Review of Empirical Literature 
Studies on export supply such as those of Goldstein and Khan (1978) 
have used two approaches, namely the equilibrium and disequilibrium 
models. The equilibrium approach embodies the hypothesis that as the 
price of exports rises relative to domestic prices, production for export 
becomes more profitable and, hence, exporters will supply more. More 
recent studies on export supply response have also applied 
methodologies similar to Goldstein & Khan (1978).  
Islam (1990) identifies various factors affecting horticultural 
exports from developing countries, including GDP, the exchange rate, 
production, and social and physical infrastructure, and calculates the 
effect of these variables by estimating regressions in logarithmic form. 
In the first model, production, GDP, the real exchange rate, and the 
index of trade dependence are found to significantly affect exports. In 
the second model, GDP is replaced by two variables representing 
physical and human infrastructure, both of which are found to be 
significant. The share of manufacturing exports in total exports is also 
found to have a significant positive effect. The study calculates the price 
and income elasticities for the demand and supply of horticultural 
exports as: –0.71, 0.74, and 1.08, respectively. It also helps to identify an 
important variable, i.e., GDP, which can be used to capture the effect of 
the market size. 
A study of the Australian citrus fruits industry by Gunawardana 
et al, (1995) explores the supply response of the industry using a “small 
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country” assumption and uses co-integration and error correction 
techniques using quarterly data from 1983 to 1993. Results from this 
study indicate that even in the long run, the supply of citrus exports is 
inelastic with respect to relative price. According to the findings, the 
domestic capacity also has a significant positive impact on export 
supply. In a study of the Brazilian export supply response, Carvalho J.L. 
and Haddad C.L (undated) tries to measure the effect of the main policy 
instruments, as well as the other exogenous variables, on export growth 
for manufactures and non-coffee NRB goods, covering the period 
1955-74. The study uses a “small country “ approach to explore the 
effect of various variables on export growth such as real exchange rates, 
the variation in real exchange rates, world imports, domestic income 
and short run changes in income and capacity utilization. The results 
from this study suggest that the altered real exchange rate was an 
important factor in Brazil’s successful export growth of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. The elasticity of world imports was also found to be 
positive and significant especially in growth of NRB exports. 
A number of studies (Oyejide, 2004; Oyejide and Ogunkola 
(2004), Oyejide et.al, 2004; and Ajakaiye & Oyejide, 2005) suggest that 
more broadly, the export supply capacity constraints which face many 
African countries largely reflect weaknesses in their macroeconomic and 
trade regime, deficiencies of trade-related infrastructures and 
inefficiencies of the trade-related inputs and services.  In this context, 
while considerable progress has been made in many African countries 
with regard to stabilizing their macroeconomic policy environment as 
well as liberalizing and rationalizing their trade regimes, much remains 
to be done. African Countries face many export supply constraints 
related to trade facilitation, inefficient markets and international trade 
barriers such as standards (Oyejide, 2006).  
Biggs (2007) points to a large literature dating back to the 1970s 
that identifies government-imposed distortions in trade policy and 
regulation (e.g., taxes, labor laws) as key impediments to export 
development in low-income countries (Balassa 1971, Little, Scitovsky 
and Scott 1970). These distortions alter the allocation of domestic 
resources so that they are no longer guided by comparative advantage 
that creates an anti-export bias in incentives which make it attractive to 
invest in import-substitutes and unattractive to invest in export 
activities. The culprits cited are high and non-uniform nominal tariff 
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rates across sectors and over-zealous regulation. High tariffs provide 
negative protection to emerging export activities and high effective 
protection to import-substitutes, in some cases with negative value 
added, contributing to resource misallocation and the underutilization 
of capital in capital scarce economies. Excessive regulation increases 
compliance costs, which encourages an anti-export bias, and hinders the 
reallocation of resources in cases where trade liberalization necessitates 
adjustment.  
Lyakurwa (2007) examined supply constraints related to 
transactions costs, and classified the constraints into 5 major types: 
constraints related to production; distribution constraints; trade 
financing and related constraints; trade facilitation related constraints; 
and marketing constraints. Manduna (2005) also explores the supply 
constraints facing Africa and mainly comes up with the same 
classifications.  
The exchange rate can be a driver of export growth and 
diversification. Undervaluation (overvaluation) of the currency can 
bolster (undermine) export competitiveness, as it raises (lowers) returns 
to entrepreneurial activity, especially in the area of discovering new, 
high-productivity exports. What matters for incentives is the real 
exchange rate, the level of which is often rendered uncompetitive in 
low-income countries by poor macroeconomic management and 
turbulence in financial markets. Volatility of the real exchange rate is 
also very high for the same reasons, creating a risky climate for new 
export investment, as it makes future returns and payments uncertain 
(Biggs, 2007). Oyejide (2007) has identified exchange and tax rates as 
major factors impeding exports in Africa.  
Kiptui M. (2007) study investigated the impact of the real 
exchange rate on the demand for Kenya’s exports in an export demand 
framework which also includes economic activity for Kenya’s major 
export categories: tea, coffee, horticulture and manufactured goods. 
Bounds testing and ARDL approaches to the analysis of long-run 
relationships and error correction modelling were applied. The existence 
of long-run relationships is established for coffee, tea and horticulture 
exports but rejected for manufactured goods exports. The results 
indicate that the real exchange rate has positive effects in the short-run 
but the effects are found to be statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, 
the short-run elasticities are high and positive as in the case of coffee 
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and manufactured goods which are close to unity. The results however 
confirm the dominant role played by economic prosperity of the export 
destination countries as demonstrated by significant positive long-run 
and short-run elasticities. The short-run income elasticities are close to 
one for tea, horticulture and coffee. The long-run income elasticities are 
high, ranging from 1.0 for tea to 2.4 for horticulture and 2.8 for coffee.   
While their exports face increasingly stringent and complex 
health, safety and environmental standards (Oyejide et.al, 2001), they 
also lack the appropriate standard, quality assurance, accreditation, and 
metrology (SQAM) systems for meeting these requirements.  African 
countries do not, typically, have access to cost-effective systems of 
certification.  Furthermore, constraints at the firm level relating to 
production and marketing know-how, access to finance and the 
institutional structure of production limit export supply response even 
when macro-level reforms are adequate (Biggs et.al, 1994). 
Poor infrastructure is generally regarded as one of the main 
causes of Africa’s low competitiveness, especially as it imposes high 
costs and risks on investors (Oyejide, 2006; Mbekeani, 2007).  These 
deficiencies frustrate the development of higher value added export 
products that depend on timely delivery.  To the extent that inadequate 
infrastructure impedes the integration of markets – nationally, regionally 
and globally – the attractiveness of specialization in high value export 
products is limited. But, while Africa needs infrastructural services such 
as telecommunications, power, transportation, water, sanitation and 
finance, their efficient development in the region is rendered especially 
difficult by the region’s low population density and the large number of 
small and landlocked counties.  Hence, a comprehensive export 
development strategy should include appropriate measures to support 
the strengthening of production and technical learning as well as 
international linkages aimed at the transfer of technology and “best 
practice” production and marketing methods (Oyejide, 2006). 
In their analysis of the FDI in Kenya, Mwega and Ngugi (2007) 
indicate that FDI has not played an important role in the Kenyan 
economy despite the reforms that have been undertaken and the many 
incentives provided to foreign investors. They note that FDI flows to 
Kenya have not only been highly volatile, but they generally declined in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The FDI mainly went to agriculture, 
manufacturing and services. The contribution of FDI to Kenya was 
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crowded by the deteriorating business environment characterized by 
rising costs, ethnic infighting and persistent corruption.   
The literature review highlights two important points. First, it 
supports the use of co-integration to analyse time-series data; second, it 
helps to identify the major variables determining the export of 
perishable goods at the macro-level. As mentioned earlier, this study 
was conducted to evaluate the impact of major variables (domestic 
production, GDP, infrastructure, and the relative price index) on 
horticultural exports from Pakistan using co-integration and ECM 
techniques. 
4.3 Empirical Approach 
4.3.1 Data  
The data on exports runs from 1995 to 2012 and is obtained from 
EUROSTAT and HCDA, other variables such as FDI is obtained from 
World Bank Database and covers both Private and Public investments, 
CPI, GDP and Exchange rates are obtained from the Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) (Statistical Abstracts, Economic Surveys) 
and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), standards data is obtained from WTO’s Database and 
information from Kenya’s HCDA. Variables of importance include 
Exports (exp), GDP per capita (GDPcapita), Real Effective Exchange 
Rate (reer) which is computed using data from UNCTAD, Inflation 
(CPI), Public Investment (INVpub), Private Investment (INVpri) and 
FDI (FDI-flows), Standards notifications (STwto, STtbt a) and data on 
rejections of produce. All the data is presented on a quarterly basis. 
 
4.3.2 Methodological Framework 
The performance of exports depend on the interaction of the demand 
and supply-side factors. The demand side factors are often external to 
the country in question and most often are related to tariffs, or rules 
and regulations of the importing countries.  Other non-price factors 
such as Non-Technical Barriers to trade such as SPS measure and other 
quality control measures may also be considered as demand side factors 
affecting export supply. Among the factors in the macro-economic 
environment that impinges on export supply response capacity at the 
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aggregate economy are the investment regime, the level of investment – 
both domestic and private investment; real effective exchange rates; and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Investment in the exporting 
sectors is critical for sustenance of export growth and ensuring 
technological capability. There are compelling reasons for expecting 
exports to benefit differentially from public and private investment 
since they all tend to target different types of capital (i.e. public 
investment might target some infrastructural capital such as roads, 
electricity, water etc. while private investment might target technological 
capability). 
This infinite elasticity of export demand allows for the estimation of 
a single equation for export supply function. Therefore in modelling 
horticultural exports trade, a supply function derived from the 
assumption of profit maximization on the part of producers and 
exporters is specified. Since the exports are supply constrained, an 
increase in the production capacity of the economy is likely to have 
appositive effect on the exports and vice versa  
Both supply side and demand side constraints may affect export 
supply. In this case demand side constraints from developing countries 
are mainly standards and regulations and preferential market access. The 
supply side constraints are economic variables within the exporting 
country that may affect or constrain exports.  
An export supply response model of horticulture exports is 
estimated using co-integration and ECM techniques applied to 
secondary quarterly data for the period 1995–2012 collected from 
various sources including the FAO database, and various volumes of 
the government of Kenya Economic Survey and Horticultural Crops 
Development Agency (HCDA). Johansen’s approach is used to test for 
co-integration between horticultural exports and its explanatory 
variables, and the ECM is used to estimate short- and long-run 
elasticities. The Granger causality test is conducted to determine the 
direction of causation between variables to draw policy conclusions. 
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Variable Description 
1. Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER) 
Over the past several decades, Kenya has moved towards increasingly 
market-determined trade and exchange rate regimes. Kenya’s fixed 
exchange rate regime was replaced by a crawling peg which, in turn, was 
eventually replaced by a floating regime. Figure 4.2 below show the 
trends in exchange rates between 1995 to 2012 and there is a general 
steady increase with some fluctuations. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Trends in exchange rates 
 
Source: KNBS 
REER is defined as the measure of nominal exchange rate adjusted 
from for price differentials between Kenya and its trading partners. The 
real exchange rate is an important price transmission instrument for 
exports decisions. REER is computed using nominal the exchange rate 
data relative to price differentials between Kenya and its trading 
partners (mainly the EU). The annual data on REER was obtained from 
UNCTAD and interpolated into quarterly basis using E-views version 
nine. 
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Algebraically,  
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it*  is the effective relative price 
indices or the  weighted wholesale price index of trading partners and 
the consumer price index for the home country. The subscripts j, i and t 
represent country, trading partner and period respectively. P*it  is the 
total trade weighted wholesale price index of the trading partners 
representing the price of tradable, and Pjt is the CPI of the domestic 
country used as a  proxy for price of non-tradable. 
On the other hand,      »»¼º««¬ª uxxxuu  ss nt wt wNEER ni1100  . In compact notation 
this can be written as,  
 
u 
n
i
iw
s itNEER
1
*
*100  . 
s
ss
i
it
it
0
   , Rs itit
1  and 1
1
 ¦

n
i
iw  where ¦
 
  n
i
i
i
i
w
ww
1
 and 
vwvww mimxxi  1  
Where  
 
n
i
iw
s it
1
*
*  =product of the shares of the exchange rates of 
the individual trading partners (exchange rate in the period under review 
divided by exchange rate in the base period) raised to the power of their 
weights in the base period.  
Rit =nominal exchange rate of shilling per unit of the currency of 
the i-th trading partner in period t. 
Sit = 1/nominal exchange rate of the shilling per unit of the 
currency of the i-th trading partner 
Sit*  =index calculated as a share of the exchange rate of  the currency 
of the i-th trading partner per 1 shilling in period t divided by  exchange 
rate of the foreign currency of the i-th trading partner in the base period 
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wi = sum of the standardized weights of the shares of the foreign 
trade of the individual trading partners equals 1 
Wi =weighted average of the share of the i-th trading partner’s 
exports and imports in the exports and imports of the Kenya 
 W xi = share of the exports of the i-th trading partner in the total 
exports of Kenya 
V x  = share of the exports of Kenya in the total turnover of Kenya 
Wmi  share of the imports of the i-th trading partner in the total 
imports of Kenya 
V m = share of the imports of Kenya in the total turnover of Kenya 
 
Evidence already adduced provides strong indications in the 
literature which link exchange rate policy to export performance. 
Maintaining realistic exchange rates is one of the key components of a 
rational export regime. Allowing exchange rates to adjust to more 
realistic levels could lead to significant increases in the production and 
export of such items as high-value horticultural products for which 
many African countries may have an underlying comparative advantage. 
2. Income Per Capita 
A single variable – income per capita - cannot by itself explain the 
structure of the exports trade. However, per capita income reflects the 
effects of economic processes and is usually regarded as an indicator of 
country’s level of development. If the predictions of the Hecksher-
Ohlin theory are correct, we expect to find (a) a positive relationship 
between income per capita and the share in the total industrial exports 
of (human and physical) capital intensive goods and (b) a negative 
relationship for labour intensive goods. 
3. Inflation (CPI) 
Inflation triggers a host of other things such as a rise in the prices of 
inputs and consequently this increases the cost of production and may 
be a disincentive for exports (Biggs Tyler, 2007; Oyejide, 2007). Data on 
inflation was obtained from KNBS in quarterly form.  
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4. Foreign Direct Investment  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can play a significant role in promoting 
economic development in low-income countries by serving as a 
mechanism through which superior technology and managerial know-
how can be transferred to such countries. The sign and magnitude of 
the net incentive generated by the public and private investment will be 
different over various time periods and across a number of export 
product groups. An important part of this study is to draw inferences 
on the net incentive regarding investment policy (reflected by FDI 
flows, private, and private investment) on horticultural exports. 
FDI flows can play a significant role in promoting economic 
development by serving as a mechanism through which superior 
technology and managerial know-how are transferred to the country. 
FDI capital flows are virtually everywhere subject to a mix of 
restrictions and incentives. An export incentive framework is embedded 
in the incentive regime of any typical country which has implications 
not only for the allocation of savings but also for exporting activities 
generated by the FDI flows (Oyejide, 2007).  
5. Standards 
Standards affecting Kenya’s horticulture sector are classified according 
to process and product standards as well as private labelling and 
traceability and based on SPS WTO notifications. A further 
classification is based on the private voluntary standards that key players 
in the horticulture industry have to comply with on order to access the 
EU market. The classification in this paper is therefore based on the 
WTO notifications and information related to standards (chapter 2 
above) and classified into 2 main categories: WTO sanitary and phyto-
sanitary (SPS) measures and TBT measures. These are then further 
classified into product measures, process measures, conformity 
assessment, and traceability requirements (Appendix 4.1). Data on 
WTO notifications was obtained from WTO database. The other data 
used is rejections data which is a proxy for stringency. The rejections 
data is obtained for both flowers and fresh fruits and vegetables and is 
obtained from RASFF data base. 
 Border rejections of Kenya’s exports intensified since the 
introduction of EUREPGAP and the revision and introduction of EU 
regulations already discussed in the above sub-sections. KEPHIS has 
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pointed out that 52% of interceptions are attributed to documentation 
while 48% is due to quality parameters. Of the 48 per cent attributed to 
quality about half are attributed to harmful micro-organisms ie bacteria, 
fungi and viruses while 23.8 per cent can be attributed to pesticide 
residues. The pesticides exceeding EU Maximum Residue Level (MRLs) 
in these checks included acephate, chlorpyrifos-ethyl, diafenthiuron, 
dimethoate, indoxacarb, methomyl, methamidophos and omethoate. In 
a few cases, the concentrations detected presented a possible acute 
health risk to consumers. For instance in the second quarter of 2013, 
the non-compliance rate for beans from Kenya was 2.8 % and for peas 
it was 9.6 %.  Figure 4.2 below gives trends in rejections from 2011-
2014 due to micro-organisms and maximum residue limits for 
pesticides. 
 
Figure 4.3(a): Trends in Export Rejections for Cut Flowers and Fruits and 
Vegetables Due to SPS measures (2011-2014) 
  
 Source: EU commission data base of food safety and plant health and RASSF 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_health_biosafety/europhyt/i
nterceptions_en.htm 
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Figure 4.3 (b): Trends in Rejections Due to TBT Measures 
Source: RASFF 
As already discussed in previous sections, the role of standards and 
other NTBs cannot be underestimated. These Standards not only act as 
barriers to trade but also increase transaction costs thereby impeding 
exports. Considering that Kenya’s exports constitute a small proportion 
of the world’s exports, Kenya therefore takes the demand conditions of 
the importing countries as given and is infinitely price elastic.  
 
4.3.3 Model Specification  
The export supply response model, which is a variant of the Ahmed 
(2000) has been used to examine the determinants of export supply - 
the gist of this study. In the model, macro-economic variables are 
incorporated to accommodate the different effects they might have on 
exports. Per capita income has been included to capture the level of 
development in Kenya. 
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 By taking the log form, we estimated a correction model for the 
equation expressed as follows:  
 
… 
…………………………………………………………………………(1) 
Where: 
HortEXPORT The value of horticultural exports  
GDPcapita The predicted values of real GDP weighted by the 
population and used as a proxy for the measure of 
incomes 
REER Real Effective Exchange Rate 
CPI  A proxy for domestic price level 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investments 
dSPS  Dummy Variable for SPS notifications 
dTBT  Dummy Variable for TBT notifications 
U   The random disturbance term wth its usual classical 
characteristics 
Kenya's horticultural export sector is seen by some as among the 
most successful in sub-Saharan Africa and a model for other countries 
in the developing world. Horticultural products have accounted for 
two-thirds of all growth in agricultural exports and recently surpassed 
coffee to become the second largest merchandise export, after tea 
(Onjala & Otieno, 2010). 
A second and third model were created to determine the effects of 
these standards on various segments of horticultural exports i.e. fruits 
and vegetables vs. cut flowers: 
………………………………………………………….…..(2) 
Where: 
CUTFLOWER  The value of cut flower exports and te rest of the 
variables s described in equation 1 above 
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dSPSFLOWERS Dummy variables for the SPS measures affecting 
flower exports 
dTBTFlowers Dummy variables for the TBT measures affecting 
Flower exports 
Rejections Rejections affecting flower exports 
 
 
…
…………………………………………………………………….(3) 
  Where: 
  FFV  The value of fresh fruits and vegetable exports and the rest of 
the variables are as described above in equation (1) 
  dSPSFFV Dummy variables for SPS measures affecting Fruits and 
vegetable exports 
  dTBTFFV Dummy variables for TBT measures affecting Fruits and 
vegetable exports 
     Rejections Rejections affecting FFV exports 
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4.4 Results and Discussion 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Exports of Horticulture 
Source Author, 2015 
 
Table 4.1 above shows the descriptive measure of the horticultural 
products under consideration in this study. Firstly it is notable that 
flowers recorded the highest average value of exports at Ksh 
2,131,886,033.5, followed by vegetables at Ksh 1,568,695,985.0 and 
finally fruits at Ksh 444,419,716.2. The total rejection of the 
horticultural seems to be registering a relatively small value. The Jargue-
Bera statistics reveals that the variables are normally distributed at 10% 
level. On the other hand, the standard deviation reveals that the export 
of vegetables was more volatile compared to the rest of the exports. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for Macroeconomic variables 
 GDP NEER CPI FDI 
 Mean  233676.8  98.69412  70.26357  33821518 
 Median  273712.9  98.54831  61.02658  19164181 
 Maximum  409404.0  117.1847  133.6271  1.93E+08 
 Minimum 8246.970  78.01750  33.06388  282444.8 
 Std. Dev.  137995.1  10.37479  29.41806  43205984 
 Skewness -0.663030 -0.205611  0.670530  2.384089 
 Kurtosis  1.872397  2.296697  2.330389  8.470192 
 Jarque-Bera  9.089776  1.991214  6.740462  157.9756 
 Probability  0.010621  0.369499  0.034382  0.000000 
Source: Author 2015 
Table 4.2 above shows the descriptive statistics for macroeconomic 
variables used in the model before logarithm transformation. The GDP 
was KSH 2.3 trillion on average while foreign direct investment 
recorded an average value of KSH 33821518. On the other hand, the 
consumer price index and the real exchange rate recorded a mean of 70 
and 98 respectively. The Jargque-Bera probability tests also reveal 
normal distribution of the variables. 
 
4.4.2 Time Series Properties of the Data 
Unit Root Tests 
As is customary in time-series analysis, prior to estimating Equation (1) 
and (2), the time-series properties of the individual series must be 
tested. The order of integration of the individual time series was 
determined using the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Phillips–
Perron (PP) unit root tests. The results, indicate that except for CPI and 
FDI all series are I(1) at a 5% significance level. This implies the 
possibility of co-integrating relationships. Unit root tests are determined 
as follows: 
Xt = 0 +t +Xt1 +  i
i=1
k¦ Xt1 +t…………………….....(4) 
Where tX = are the above variables in their log form at time trend t  
1tX is the first difference with k lags 
H is the residual white noise 
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The coefficients βo, δo, μt, αa……….αk  are parameters being estimated. The null 
and the alternative hypothesis for the existence of unit root in variable tX is:  
H0: tX(0 G  is a non stationery or contains a unit root) 
H1 tX(0: G  is stationery or non-unit root) 
 
 
Table 4.3: Results for Unit Roots (Non-dummy Variables) 
 
 *I(1) Integration of order 1 
Source: Author 2015 
 
This test shows that all the variables are non- stationary in levels at 
1per cent, 5per cent and 10per cent significance level i.e integrated in 
the order of I (1).  We then test for co-integration to determine if there 
are any variables that are related. 
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Johansen Co-integration Tests 
This step investigates whether the stochastic trends in the variable, 
which is supposed to contain unit roots, have a long-term relationship. 
For the co-integration test, the most commonly used methods are the 
Engle and Granger (1987) and the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990). The Johansen and Juselius test is a method of co-
integration testing based on the maximum likelihood estimation of the 
VAR model to determine the number of co-integrating vectors in the 
analysis. In this technique, two test statistics are involved in identifying 
the number (r) of co-integrating vectors, namely the trace test statistics 
and the maximum eigen-value test statistics. The trace statistics 
hypothesize in the null hypothesis that there is a maximum of r co-
integrating vectors against the alternative of r or more co-integrating 
vectors. Meanwhile, the maximal eigen-value statistics tests are for r co-
integrating vectors against the alternative of r+1 co-integrating vectors.  
We consider equation 4 below using Johansen’s full information 
maximum likelihood procedure: 
UUU H   ttttt yAyAyAy ...........1211 ……………………….....(5) 
 
Where ty is a k vector of non-stationary I (1) variables in the A with 
I=1…, U is a lag operator and tH is  the white noise residual of zero 
mean and constant variance and with a lag order U Akaike’s 
Information criterion (AIC) 
Since variables have unit root, we tested for long run relationship using 
the Johansen and Juselius (1990) approach to establish the co-
integrating vectors. Trace and Eigen statistics were used to test the 
number of co-integrating vectors, based on the characteristic roots 
(Table 4.4).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
126 
Table 4.4: Johansen Co-integration Tests  
 
Source: Author 2015 
 
According to the results, majority of the lag-length selection criteria 
suggest 2 lags as optimal. Additionally we carry out the rank test and 
maximum eigen value test. The rank test is based on the log-likelihood 
ratio ln[Lmax(r)/Lmax(k)], and is conducted sequentially for r = k-1,...,1,0. 
The name comes from the fact that the test statistic involved is the trace 
(= the sum of the diagonal elements) of a diagonal matrix of generalized 
eigenvalues. It tests the null hypothesis that the co-integration rank is 
equal to r against the alternative that the co-integration rank is k. The 
latter implies that Xt is trend stationary. The maximum eigenvalue test 
examines whether the largest eigenvalue is zero relative to the 
alternative that the next largest eigenvalue is zero. The first test is a test 
whether the rank of the matrix Π is zero. The null hypothesis is that 
rank (Π) = 0 and the alternative hypothesis is that rank(Π) = 1. For 
further tests, the null hypothesis is that rank (Π) = 1, 2... and the 
alternative hypothesis is that rank(Π) = 2, 3, .... until the null hypothesis 
of an eigen value equal to  zero cannot be rejected. 
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Table 4.5:  Results for Rank and Maximum Eigen value Co-integration Tests 
 
Source: Author 2015 
According to the test results above, the maximum eigen value 
indicate at least one co-integrating factor. The trace test also indicates 1 
co-integrating factor. We therefore reject the null hypothesis of no co-
integration. 
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Tests for Parameter Stability and Structural Breaks 
From figure 4.1 above some structural breaks are evident in the 
fluctuations observed in exports especially in the years 1997 and 2003 
data. For this we use the Bai peron test which basically tests whether the 
single regression line or the two separate regression lines fit the data 
best. 
 We use an f-test to determine whether a single regression is more 
efficient than two separate regressions involving splitting the data into 
two or more sub-samples. This could occur as follows, where in the 
second case we have a structural break at t: 
In the first case we have just a single regression line to fit the data 
points (scatterplot), it can be expressed as: 
  ttt uxy  10 DD ……………………………………. (6) 
  
In the second case, where there is a structural break, we have two or 
more separate models, expressed as: 
 
  
ttt
ttt
uxy
uxy
221
121
 
 
GG
EE
…………………………………… (7) 
 
 This suggests that model 1 applies before the break at time t, then 
model 2 applies after the structural break. If the parameters in the above 
models are the same, i.e. 2211 , GEGE   , then models 1 and 2 can be 
expressed as a single model as in case 1, where there is a single 
regression line.  
 
 Tests for parameter instability and structural breaks in the models 
was done using the Bai-Perron test. The Bai -Perron test provided 
theoretical and computational results allowing for multiple unknown 
breakpoints (Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.6: Results Showing Structural Breaks 
BAI-PERRON MULTIPLE BREAKPOINT TEST 
 
breaking variables: lnr_fruitsveges lnfdi lncpi lnneer c 
   
non-breaking variables: tbt_fv  sps_fv  
  Scaled Critical 
Break Test   F-statistic F-statistic Value** 
0 vs. 1 * 9.313949 46.56974 18.23 
1 vs. 2 * 20.51881 102.5941 19.91 
2 vs. 3 * 37.27587 186.3793 20.99 
3 vs. 4 * 22.00709 110.0355 21.71 
4 vs. 5 1.373369 6.866847 22.37 
* Significant at the 0.05 level.  
** Bai-Perron (Econometric Journal, 2003) critical values. 
Break dates:  
 Sequential  
1 2004Q2  
2 2000Q3  
3 1997Q3  
4 2007Q2  
   
Source: Author 2015 
 
The sequential test results in able 4.6 above indicate that there are 
four breakpoints: we reject the nulls of 0, 1, 2 and 3 breakpoints in 
favour of the alternatives of 1, 2, 3 and 4 breakpoints, but the test of 5 
versus 4 breakpoints does not reject the null. This test shows that there 
are structural breaks in 2004Q3, 2000Q3, 1997Q3 and 2007Q2. We 
proceed to model the dummies iteratively starting with the most 
significant, we start by assigning a dummy variable at 2004Q4 where the 
binary variable takes 1 at break point and zero otherwise, the iterative 
process reveals that the rest of the breaks are not significant after 
capturing period 2004. Hence the subsequent equations will have a 
dummy variable known as D2004. The results are consistent with other 
stability diagnostics tests.  
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Granger Causality Tests  
Another essential step is testing for Granger causality among the 
variables. The causality test was first done using the first difference 
version of the variables. According to Granger (1988), the co-
integration between two or more variables is sufficient to demonstrate 
the presence of causality in at least one direction (Granger, 1988). 
However co-integration does not indicate the direction of causality 
between variables. Hence, the causality test is used to verify the 
direction of causality between variables.  A prerequisite for a causality 
test is a check for co-integration as already done above. We employed 
the vector auto regression (VAR) technique and regressed on its own 
lags and the lag of other variables. From the above results we can see 
the existence of long term equilibrium relationship between horticulture 
exports and FDI There is no evidence to suggest any causality between 
the other variables. 
The hypothesis being tested is H0:b 1=b2`...........=bp=0 Against HA:not H0 i.e X 
does not Granger cause Y ……..AND 
H0:d1=d2`...........=dp=0 Against HA:not H0 i.e Y does not Granger cause X  
Rejecting the null hypothesis in each case implies that there is Granger Causality  
 
Table 4.7: Summary Results Granger Causality Tests  
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable (F-statistics) T-Statistics 
∆ln HORTEXP ∆ln FDI ∆ln GDP ECTt-1 
∆ln HORTEXP - 0.1028 4.8751** 1.6742** 
∆ln FDI 1.2098 - 0.8432 -0.3421 
∆ln GDP 1.0032 2.332** - 1.7641** 
** Significance at 5% level (The results in table 4.7  above only report variables that are significant in 
terms of granger causality) 
Source: Author 2015 
 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
131 
4.4.3 Estimation of Long Run and Error Correction Models 
(ECM) 
From the diagnostic tests in the previous section, we found that the 
variables are non-stationary and integrated. When variables are non-
stationary but co-integrated a long run co-integrating model can be 
estimated with variables. We use a two-step process involving first, the 
estimation of a long run equation and the second step which involves 
an ECM. Results are summarized in table 4.8 and 4.9 below. 
 
Table 4.8: Horticulture Exports Co-integrating Model 
 
Source: Author 2015 
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The autoregressive distribution lagged (ARDL) model estimated above 
has an R-squared 0.94 revealing that the model explains 94% of the 
variations in total horticultural exports. Total horticultural exports for 
present period are significantly affected by past exports showing that 
the variable has inertia. Per-capita income positively and significantly 
affects horticultural exports after three quarters. Total rejections of 
horticultural products negatively affects total horticultural exports 
significantly at 5% level in the current period. Notably, inflation 
negatively affects the total exports at 5% significance level. 
 
The short run model below shows a ECT coefficient of -0.957748 
which is significant at all the conventional levels of measurement. This 
confirms co-integration and also shows that 95% of disequilibrium is 
cleared in each quarter. 
 
Horticulture Export Error Correction Model (ECM) 
This model is constructed following general to specific approach.   It 
consisted of specifying a general model that was general enough that the 
error terms are homoscedastic.  Once this is achieved then we 
proceeded to eliminate the insignificant variables, while at each step 
checking that the error terms are white noise and homoscedastic.  This 
process continued until variables could not be eliminated (Table 4.9). 
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Table 4.9: Results of the Error Correction Model for Horticulture 
 
Dependent Variable: DLNFR_VEG_EXP  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Pro
b.   
DLNFR_VEG_EXP(-1) 1.401959 0.322164 4.351699 
   
0.0001 
DLNFR_VEG_EXP(-2) -0.492420 0.203624 -2.418283 
   
0.0211 
DLNFR_VEG_EXP(-3) 0.152429 0.138852 1.097783 
   
0.2800 
DLNFR_VEG_EXP(-4) -0.133601 0.138805 -0.962512 
   
0.3426 
DLNFR_VEG_EXP(-5) 0.155199 0.138062 1.124118 
   
0.2688 
DLNGDP_P(-1) -0.029025 0.065620 -0.442325 
   
0.6611 
DLNGDP_P(-2) -0.124829 0.063796 -1.956696 
   
0.0586 
DLNGDP_P(-3) 0.100780 0.064957 1.551482 
   
0.1300 
DLNGDP_P(-4) 0.083082 0.070136 1.184582 
   
0.2444 
DLNGDP_P(-5) -0.031687 0.064892 -0.488306 
   
0.6285 
DLNREER 1.899256 1.071601 1.772354 
   
0.0853 
DLNREER(-1) -1.222169 1.166358 -1.047851 
   
0.3021 
DLNREER(-3) -1.105204 1.232563 -0.896671 
   
0.3762 
DLNREER(-4) -1.962386 2.713375 -0.723227 
   
0.4745 
DLNREER(-5) 3.161333 2.670813 1.183660 
   
0.2448 
DLNCPI -0.486380 1.039945 -0.467698 
   
0.6430 
DLNCPI(-1) -1.491979 1.013233 -1.472492 
   
0.1501 
DLNCPI(-2) 1.846999 1.022865 1.805712 
   
0.0798 
DLNCPI(-3) -2.740225  1.146325 -2.390442 
   
0.0225 
DLNCPI(-4) 0.460017 1.070437 0.429746 
   
0.6701 
DLNCPI(-5) -2.405666 1.032462 -2.330028 
   
0.0259 
DLNFDI 0.018249 0.019897 0.917150 
   
0.3655 
DLNFDI(-3) -0.018979 0.019965 -0.950574 
   
0.3485 
DLNFDI(-4) -0.011244 0.019819 -0.567309 
   
0.5742 
DLNFDI(-5) 0.011846 0.019057   0.621612 
   
0.5383 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
134 
DLNREJECTIONS -0.082742 0.034450 -2.401807 
   
0.0219 
DLNREJECTIONS(-1) -0.056548 0.036541 -1.547527 
   
0.1310 
DLNREJECTIONS(-4) 0.038266 0.029427 1.300375 
   
0.2022 
SPS_FV -0.072501 0.045733 -1.585300 
   
0.1222 
TBT_FV -0.013247 0.049532 -0.267448 
   
0.7907 
ECT(-1) -0.957748 0.272703 -3.512054 
   
0.0013 
C 0.149047 0.059131  2.520640 
   
0.0166 
R-squared 0.759935    Mean dependent var 
0.0258
70 
Adjusted R-squared 0.541053     S.D. dependent var 
0.1780
90 
S.E. of regression 0.120648     Akaike info criterion 
-
1.0854
74 
Sum squared resid 0.494903     Schwarz criterion 
-
0.0238
23 
Log likelihood 67.82064     Hannan-Quinn criter. 
-
0.6659
65 
F-statistic 3.471884     Durbin-Watson stat 
2.4133
77 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000281    
 
Source: Author 2015 
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Table 4.10: Flower Export Co-integrating Model 
Dependent Variable: LNE_FLOWERS  
Method: Least Squares   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LNE_FLOWERS(-1) 1.034859 0.144710 7.151250 0.0000 
LNE_FLOWERS(-4) 0.161624 0.086892 -1.860059 0.0696 
LNGDP_P 0.260518 0.395859 0.658107 0.5139 
LNREER(-4) 1.738682 0.943249 1.843290 0.0720 
LNCPI(-2) 3.392077     1.944494 1.744452 0.0881 
LNFDI 0.034083 0.041795 0.815490 0.4192 
LNFDI(-1) -0.036299 0.041477 -0.875155 0.3862 
LNTREJECTIONS -0.118997 0.069904 -1.702292 0.0958 
SPS_FV -0.102161 0.084621 -1.207268 0.2338 
TBT_FV 0.017651 0.092103 0.191643 0.8489 
Dummy 2004 0.011885 0.121462 2.097848 0.0240 
C 1.719458 1.958444 0.877971     0.3847 
R-squared 0.940576    Mean dependent var 21.29304 
Adjusted R-squared 0.913565    S.D. dependent var 0.819556 
S.E. of regression 0.240948          Akaike info criterion 0.247486 
Sum squared resid 2.554465    Schwarz criterion 0.949981 
Log likelihood 12.95669    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.524665 
F-statistic 34.82199    Durbin-Watson stat 2.098436 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Source: Author 2015 
 
The ARDL model in table 4.10 above explains 91% of the variations 0f 
flower exports. Flower exports seem to have inertia in the sense that the 
lagged variable is significant at 5% and 10% significant levels.  The total 
rejected flowers negatively affects total exports significantly at 1% level 
with a per centage increase in rejections lowering exports by 0.11%. The 
short run model is well behaved with ECT term being negative and 
significant at all conventional levels. This confirms that 85% of 
disequilibrium is cleared quarterly. 
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Table 4.11: Results of Flower Export Error Correction Model 
 
Dependent Variable: DLNE_FLOWERS  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
DLNE_FLOWERS(-1) 0.950367 0.210278 4.519585 0.0001 
DLNE_FLOWERS(-2) -0.287968 0.147996 -1.945781 0.0589 
DLNE_FLOWERS(-3) -0.071819 0.121191 -0.592611 0.5569 
DLNGDP_P(-1) -0.185986 0.115477 -1.610592 0.1153 
DLNGDP_P(-2) -0.133726 0.118271 -1.130682 0.2651 
DLNGDP_P(-3) 0.039690 0.116209 0.341543 0.7345 
DLNGDP_P(-4) 0.057633 0.115940 0.497098 0.6219 
DLNREER 2.706094 1.940819 1.394305 0.1711 
DLNREER(-1) -1.576164 2.077659 -0.758625 0.4526 
DLNREER(-3) -1.465463 2.117974 -0.691917 0.4931 
DLNREER(-4) -6.659784 4.616855 -1.442494 0.1571 
DLNREER(-5) 9.175519 4.480168 2.048030 0.0473 
DLNCPI -1.889953 1.610228 -1.173718 0.2476 
DLNCPI(-1) -2.865145 1.767867 -1.620679 0.1131 
DLNCPI(-2) 2.429217 1.805478 1.345470 0.1862 
DLNCPI(-3) -3.783836 1.992996 -1.898567 0.0650 
DLNCPI(-4) 2.418461 1.772588 1.364367 0.1803 
DLNCPI(-5) -4.028383 1.646066 -2.447279 0.0190 
DLNFDI 0.044809 0.035399 1.265823 0.2131 
DLNFDI(-5) 0.048734 0.035253 1.382407 0.1747 
DLNREJECTIONS -0.103701 0.064285 -1.613135 0.1148 
DLNREJECTIONS(-1) -0.107250 0.066335 -1.616796 0.1140 
DLNREJECTIONS(-4) 0.075756 0.052718 1.437003 0.1587 
SPS_FV -0.193531 0.076188 -2.540185 0.0152 
TBT_FV -0.040194 0.083371 -0.482108 0.6324 
ECTF(-1) -0.811387 0.270178 -3.003152 0.0046 
C 0.309975 0.107165 2.892506 0.0062 
R-squared 0.660895     Mean dependent var 
    
0.049071 
Adjusted R-squared 0.434826     S.D. dependent var 
    
0.296478 
S.E. of regression 0.222886     Akaike info criterion 
    
0.127780 
Sum squared resid 1.937456     Schwarz criterion    1.023548 
Log likelihood 22.78327     Hannan-Quinn criter.    0.481740 
F-statistic 2.923413     Durbin-Watson stat    1.710614 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001209    
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Table 4.12:  Fruits and Vegetables Co-integrating Model 
 
Dependent Variable: LNFR_VEG_EXP  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LNFR_VEG_EXP(-1) 1.208569 0.122507 9.865315 0.0000 
LNFR_VEG_EXP(-2) 0.312823 0.126319 -2.476440 0.0165 
LNGDP_P -0.085440 0.041548 -2.056430 0.0447 
LNREER 0.275955 0.268806 1.026592 0.3093 
LNCPI -0.588104 0.571850 -1.028423 0.3084 
LNCPI(-2) 1.383857 1.026084 1.348678 0.1832 
LNCPI(-3) -0.828418 0.889150 -0.931697 0.3557 
LNFDI -0.004622 0.015824 -0.292091 0.7714 
LNTREJECTIONS(-3) 0.093660 0.040681 2.302314 0.0253 
LNTREJECTIONS(-4) 0.093630 0.037268 2.512368 0.0151 
Dummy2004 -0.005703 0.067919 -2.083974 0.0210 
TBT_FV 0.001386 0.048716 0.028458 0.9774 
SPS_FV -0.007152 0.043457 -0.164581 0.8699 
C 0.211004 1.144507 0.184362 0.8544 
R-squared 0.939769     Mean dependent var 21.35544 
Adjusted R-squared 0.924996     S.D. dependent var 0.502817 
S.E. of regression 0.137706     Akaike info criterion -0.943877 
Sum squared resid 1.005041     Schwarz criterion -0.483195 
Log likelihood 45.61987     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.761584 
F-statistic 63.61134     Durbin-Watson stat 2.132952 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
Source: Author 2015 
 
The model above explains 93.9% of the variation in fruits and vegetable 
exports. As earlier observed, horticultural exports have an inertial in the 
sense that the current level of exports is significantly affected by 
previous exports. This trend is common in agricultural production 
where there is a lagged response in output to current market prospects. 
Total rejections persistently and significantly affect exports of fruits and 
vegetables at 5% level. The persistence seems significant in third and 
the fourth quarter.   
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Table 4.13: Fruits and Vegetables Error Correction Model 
 
Dependent Variable: DLNFR_VEG_EXP  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
DLNFR_VEG_EXP(-1) 0.769074 0.166427 4.621098 0.0000 
DLNFR_VEG_EXP(-2) -0.129226 0.138909 -0.930289 0.3579 
DLNFR_VEG_EXP(-3) 0.067049 0.124491 0.538582 0.5932 
DLNGDP_P(-1) -0.047659 0.064449 -0.739483 0.4640 
DLNGDP_P(-2) -0.160860 0.066821 -2.407329 0.0209 
DLNGDP_P(-3) 0.126260 0.065342 1.932285 0.0606 
DLNGDP_P(-4) 0.083484 0.066975 1.246497 0.2200 
DLNREER 1.612574 1.078147 1.495690 0.1428 
DLNREER(-1) -0.753201 1.149050 -0.655499 0.5160 
DLNREER(-3) -0.988075 1.164569 -0.848447 0.4014 
DLNREER(-4) -2.299919 2.565335 -0.896537 0.3755 
DLNREER(-5) 4.297762 2.505660 1.715222 0.0942 
DLNCPI -1.265030 0.931540 -1.358000 0.1823 
DLNCPI(-1) -1.368344 0.999662 -1.368806 0.1789 
DLNCPI(-2) 2.236558 1.004404 2.226750 0.0318 
DLNCPI(-3) -2.471988 1.158379 -2.134005 0.0392 
DLNCPI(-4) 1.555174 0.966315 1.609386 0.1156 
DLNCPI(-5) -2.259118 0.920474 -2.454298 0.0187 
DLNFDI 0.026773 0.019556 1.369044 0.1788 
DLNFDI(-5) 0.024545 0.019162 1.280927 0.2078 
DLNREJECTIONS -0.104396 0.035093 -2.974857 0.0050 
DLNREJECTIONS(-1) -0.095160 0.034808 -2.733840 0.0094 
DLNREJECTIONS(-4) 0.032984 0.029212 1.129131 0.2657 
SPS_FV -0.141087 0.040911 -3.448636 0.0014 
TBT_FV -0.009661 0.048380 -0.199695 0.8428 
ECTF(-1) -0.343667 0.116852 -2.941053 0.0055 
C 0.165184 0.059796 2.762473 0.0087 
R-squared 0.713208     Mean dependent var 0.025870 
Adjusted R-squared 0.522013     S.D. dependent var 0.178090 
S.E. of regression 0.123125     Akaike info criterion 
-
1.059139 
Sum squared resid 0.591234     Schwarz criterion 
-
0.163372 
Log likelihood 61.95160     Hannan-Quinn criter. 
-
0.705179 
F-statistic 3.730263     Durbin-Watson stat 2.351241 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000106    
     
Source: Author 2015 
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4.4.4 Impulse Response Functions  
Unrestricted vector auto regressions (VARs) allow feedback and 
dynamic interrelationship across all the variables in the system and it’s 
highly competitive with the large-scale macro econometric models in 
forecasting and policy analysis. The unrestricted VARs model assumes 
that each and every variable in the system is endogenous and does not 
impose any a-priori causality restrictions among the variables.  
 A VAR model allows the variables to interact with each other and 
themselves too without imposing a theoretical structure on the 
estimates. Variance decompositions (VDCs) and impulse response 
functions (IRFs) are the major tools found in VAR tool kit.  VDCs 
reflect the portion of the variance in the forecast error for each variable 
due to innovations to all variables in the system while IRFs show the 
response of each variable in the system to shock from system variables. 
It traces the effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on 
current and future values of the endogenous variables 
The bench mark reduced VAR model can be written as 
X t = α0+ A1 Xt-1 + B-1 e t………………………………………………………………………………(6) 
 However the reduced form disturbances are generally known to be 
correlated hence it is necessary to transform the reduced form model 
into a structural form model. This is known as VAR identification 
process. This study relied on recursive identification scheme which 
entails that the ordering of the variables according to 
contemporaneousness. The VAR model is a vector natural logarithm of 
total Horticultural exports (LNt_HORT_EXP), Gross domestic 
product (LN GDP), export of flowers (LNE_flowers), effective 
exchange rate (LN_NEER), consumer price index(LNCPI) ,foreign 
direct investments (LNFDI) and total horticultural rejections(LNT 
REJECTIONS). 
Impulse Responses 
Impulse responses trace out the response of current and future values 
of each of the variables to a one-unit increase (or to a one-standard 
deviation increase, when the scale matters) in the current value of one 
of the VAR errors, assuming that this error returns to zero in 
subsequent periods and that all other errors are equal to zero. Impulse 
response functions (IRFs) show the dynamic behaviour of a variable as 
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given by its time path in response to exogenous random shocks given to 
this and other variables. This implies that it is possible to identify the 
pass through effects of shocks on variables. Panel A, B and C illustrates 
the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the VAR model for a period 
of 20 quarters forecast horizon. The vertical axis shows the magnitude 
of a shock while the horizontal axis shows the time path of the 
responding variable. 
 Each panel depicts the dynamic effect of a one standard deviation 
innovation on each of the variables of interest. The broken red line 
shows the 95% confidence interval generated by 1000 Monte Carlo 
simulations while the bold blue line shows the impulse response 
function of one variable due to innovation in other variable. A response 
is considered significant if it doesn’t contain the zero line or the 
horizontal bench mark line within its confidence bands.  
 In panel a shock in flower production (a sudden raise in flower 
production) remains significant in the market for four quarters before 
the stability is resumed. However a shock in economic performance 
marked by sudden raise in GDP seems not to have any significant effect 
on flowers production. This can be explained by the fact that 
agricultural production of flowers seems to be driven by exogenous 
factors rather than domestic economic performance. On the other 
hand, most of the flowers produced are for exports hence domestic 
economic performance may not have an effect on flowers production. 
A similar argument is supported by the evidence that foreign direct 
inflows have no effect on flower production. 
 Notably, a raise in flower production has an appreciating effect on 
exchange rate with the effect lasting for three quarters. Kenya majorly 
being an exporter of agricultural products, exchange rate seems to 
fluctuate in tandem with agricultural exports. On the other hand, 
consumer price index shock weakens exchange rate for 10 quarters. 
Domestic inflation raises the level of imports hence the exchange rate 
depreciates. However, depreciation has a positive but lagged effect on 
flower production since it is associated with high returns for exporters. 
The lagged effect is explained by the gestation period required for 
agricultural sector to respond to market dynamics. 
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PANEL A 
 
In panel B below, foreign direct investments has a significant effect on 
consumer price index. These can be explained by the fact that 
investments are a component of aggregate demand. Based on aggregate 
demand- aggregate supply model, it is expected that a raise in 
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investment will raise price level. However, FDI flows have no effect on 
the total export of horticultural products. It is also notable that total 
export of horticultural makes the exchange rate to appreciate. 
Depreciation lowers agricultural output in the first quarter perhaps due 
to raise in imported inputs but the output rises in the longer horizon. 
Again, depreciation raises GDP significantly in the 4th quarter perhaps 
through the exports channel but the effect is not permanent because the 
shock dies in the 8th quarter. 
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PANEL B 
 
In panel c below, rejection of horticultural exports does not reduce 
production. On the other hand, increase in horticultural production 
does not increase the level of rejected exports. 
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PANEL C 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The horticulture sector is one of the ‘success stories’ of the Kenyan 
export economy. It represents over 33 per cent of total exports and 15 
per cent of agricultural GDP. This sector is therefore critical for the 
country’s growth and development. This paper analyses the effects of 
standards on exports in view of other factors that affect export supply; 
it attempts to answer the fundamental question, to what extent do standards 
affect export supply? Findings from the study contribute to a very 
important policy debate on standards and developing country exports. 
An empirical model is specified along the standard trade models that 
incorporate real exchange rate, per capita income, CPI all which appear 
to impact on exports. An error correction formulation is used to 
distinguish between the long run and short-run elasticity. Results from 
this study indicate that the error correction term in the model is found 
to be statistically significant, confirming the validity of the long-run 
equilibrium relationship. In the short-run, real exchange rate and per 
capita income have profound influences on export performance 
including flower and fresh fruits and vegetables exports.  
 The structural break is observed to have a negative influence on 
horticulture exports and those of fresh fruits and vegetables but not 
those of flowers. The structural breaks occurred in the years after 
various rules and regulations we introduced or made tighter for instance 
the most significant break in 2004 was mainly due to the introduction of 
EUREPGAP and stricter EU regulations including harmonization of 
EU standards with WTO standards in the year 2003. 
Standards do affect exports in a negative way. The effect of 
rejections is pronounced both in the long and short run and for the 
three categories i.e. total horticultural exports, cut flowers and fresh 
fruits and vegetable exports. SPS measures have a negative and 
significant relationship for horticulture exports and for both cut flower 
and fruits and vegetable exports in the short run. In the long run, the 
effects of SPS measures are not significant. TBT measures are also 
found not to be significant to any of the export categories in the long 
and short run. In conclusion, the study shows that supply response for 
horticulture is mainly influenced by variables such as GDP per capita, 
exchange rates  
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and FDI. Standards, specifically SPS measures also affect supply 
response of horticultural produce and in the short and long run. 
Looking  
at the impulse response functions we can conclude that exchange 
rates do affect export volumes as depreciation lowers agricultural output 
ie exports in the first quarter.  
 From this chapter we can therefore conclude that as much as 
standards may affect exports in the long and short run, other macro-
economic variables such as real exchange rate, inflation and per capita 
income are also significant in determining the supply response of 
exports. From a development perspective, it is important to have sound 
macro-economic policy for export growth and for these exports to 
contribute to meaningful development. The next sections of this 
research dissertation will examine the specific value chain effects of 
standards on different actors to determine who are the losers and the 
winners in a globalized value chain and the last section will examine the 
participation of smallholders in these value chains as direct beneficiaries 
of these exports. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The high value fresh produce sector in many developing countries is a 
recently emerging non-traditional export commodity sector consisting 
of a number of key players including producers, farmers (large and 
small-scale), exporters and distributors, traders and retailers. These 
retailers are governed by standards and have reorganized their 
supply/value chains around notions of traceability, food safety, and 
quality assurance. Some authors, particularly in the economic geography 
‘school of thought’, have established a link between the roles of 
standards in shaping the governance structures of high value chains 
(Graffham et al. 2007, Nielsen 2008, Lazaro et al. 2010, Ouma 2010). 
The governance of global chains is a crucial element for efficiency 
and distributional effects - including for growth and food security. The 
chain governance itself is endogenous in an environment of weak 
contract enforcement and imperfect markets, and importantly, depends 
on the value in the chain (and on other commodity characteristics). The 
supply chain governance – or the way economic transactions in supply 
chains are coordinated (Gereffi et al. 2005) – are crucial in determining 
how economic surpluses are generated and distributed along the chain. 
There is large variation in how food and agricultural commodity chains 
are governed, with the involvement of the public sector and/or 
different private agents and the varying levels of vertical coordination 
between those actors. It has been argued and empirically demonstrated 
that the degree of vertical coordination in supply chains indeed 
influences economic outcomes, in particular efficiency and equity 
(Swinnen & Maertens 2007) this is often because large and often 
multinational companies are extracting the entire surplus through their 
bargaining power within the chains.  
There is an emerging body of literature that analyzes the distribution 
of gains along value chains. This literature can be broadly divided into 3 
strands - the first focuses on the uneven geographical incidence of price 
5 
Understanding the Distributional 
Effects of Standards: An Analysis of 
Kenya’s Green Beans Value Chain 
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variations among major players in the chains as product becomes more 
differentiated (Fitter & Kaplinsky 2004, Kaplinsky 2004, Gilbert 2006, 
Swinnen & Maertens, 2007). A common finding in these studies is that 
a larger share of the retail price is retained by retailers and processors 
(who have the monopoly and oligopoly powers in the chains) rather 
than by producers. The second strand of literature concentrates on the 
distribution of costs and margins but without linking it to any particular 
form of governance structures in value chains (Nyeko 2004, Shiferaw & 
Hailemariam, 2007) and again the findings indicate a skewed 
distribution in favour of retailers and processors. The third strand of 
literature looks at the impact of standards on the distributive outcomes 
of value chains albeit without linking it to any form of governance in 
the value chain (Sexsmith & Potts 2010, Valkila et al. 2010, Kilian et al. 
2005). These studies indicate that a bigger share of the income is being 
generated at the retailer end and the chief beneficiaries of premiums 
accrued due to compliance with standards are mainly retailers and 
processors. Pertinent questions therefore remain about how standards 
influence the governance structures in value chains and how these 
influence the distribution of costs, margins and value added among 
various stakeholders of the value chains. 
In the course of globalization, there has been a perception that the 
gap in incomes within and between countries has increased. In essence 
firms and countries are globally interlinked in a global value chain and 
therefore gaps in incomes within firms may in turn reflect to some 
extent global inequalities (Kaplinsky 1999, Gibbon & Ponte 2005). 
Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis is hence used to show how firms, 
regions and countries are linked to the global economy and how this 
largely determines how incomes are distributed. In this context value 
chain analysis is used as a tool which can provide insights into issues 
related to global income distribution. Kaplinsky (2000) and Humprey 
(1999) therefore give three components of value chains which form the 
basis of this chapter’s analytical underpinnings: (1) Value chains are 
repositories for rent and these rents are dynamic, (2) Effectively 
functioning value chains need some degree of governance and (3) 
Effective value chains arise from systemic rather than point efficiency. 
Drawing from some fundamental insights of the GVC, and of the 
international trade literature on transaction cost economics, this chapter 
attempts to investigate the patterns of governance arising in value 
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chains in which standards are the key critical success factors and how 
standards shape the governance of these chains. In addition to this, we 
analyse the resultant distributive effects on different sets of players – 
producers differentiated by type (large and small scale) exporters and 
retailers, with specific reference to the Kenya green beans value chain. 
This paper introduces two main original contributions. First, 
conceptually and empirically, we look at how standards shape the 
governance structure and the power relationships in the value chain; 
drawing on previous GVC related work by Gerreffi 1994, and Gerreffi 
et al. 2005 on different coordination mechanisms of value chains and 
the ability of standards to codify information and transactions along the 
value chain. We also draw upon the work of Kaplinsky & Morris 2001 
on the governance of value chains and how power relationships 
influence barriers to entry and rent.   
The second original contribution of this chapter is an empirical one 
in which the distribution of outcomes along the value chain is not only 
analysed in terms of prices, margins or costs, but also in terms of value 
added and incomes for different stakeholders – differentiated by their 
sizes and positions along the value chain. This type of analysis provides 
an extremely detailed countenance, which not only aims to see the 
asymmetries in incomes between developing and developed countries 
but also between the various types of producers and exporters within 
developing countries. T analysis also establishes the spread of 
transaction costs along the value chain and among actors and 
determines whether costs of complying with standards indeed form an 
integral part of the total costs along the chain and if they in-effect lead 
to marginalization of some stakeholders.  
The green beans value chain is used as a case point of analysis 
because it presents a high value chain in which global standards of a 
wide range form an integral element. It has inherent backward and 
forward linkages with many different types of stakeholders horizontally 
and vertically and is therefore representative of the many typical high-
value chains in developing countries. Furthermore, it is also a sector 
where production is predominantly carried out by numerous 
smallholders (at least 70% of production); and is invariably linked to 
poverty. 
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5.2 Case Study Design and Methodology 
5.2.1 Analytical Framework 
The green beans value chain is used to give insight into the dynamics of 
standards along the value chain from the production level, through to 
the processing and the exports level. The green beans chain was 
selected because it gives a complete Meso-level representation of the 
entire value chain. It is representative of the standards and requirements 
needed to access EU markets (mandatory and private); the activities 
(production, processing and exports), the participants (small, medium 
and large scale producers and exporters).  
A value chain22 approach forms the entry point for analysis of this 
chapter and incorporates two main features i.e. governance - the way in 
which standards drive the governance of value chains; and the way in 
which the resultant governance structure and power relationships 
influence the distribution of rents and surpluses along the chain. This is 
put into perspective using a framework, which distinguishes the forms 
of governance and the rules defining the basis of participation (Gereffi, 
1994, Kaplinsky & Morris 2001). The complexity of transactions and 
standards within the chain determines the coordination mechanism 
used in the chain, the relationships between various actors and how they 
use these coordination mechanisms to position themselves in the chain 
(Gerreffi & Sturgeon, 2003). And finally, power relationships within the 
chain and how these shape the various forms of governance is also 
important for this particular analysis. 
 The second analytical approach provides an enquiry of the physical 
flow of goods within the value chain and the distribution of costs and 
margins as well. Likewise, one of basic concepts of GVC analysis is that 
a complete value chain has different value parts and every part does not 
give rise to equal value.  This is analogous to the filiere concept which was 
applied in the 1970’s and encompasses a strong empirical perspective 
and focused on physical, quantitative and technical aspects. Durufle et 
al. 1988 use an economic and financial evaluation of filieres to analyze 
income generation and distribution in commodity chains. The same 
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approach is applied in this chapter, looking not only at the value chains 
dynamics and power relationships, but also presenting the economics of 
the filiere in terms of distribution of costs and benefits along the value 
chain. 
 Shank & Govindarajan (1992) provide a framework for the analysis 
of transaction costs in a supply chain in stages. The methodology 
involves a three stage embedded process which begins by mapping the 
value chain by first identifying the value chain structure/filiere at the 
meso-level including both upstream and downstream participants and 
their relative (power) positions in the chain. The second stage involves 
identifying the flow of standards in relation to the chain structure. This 
is followed by an in-depth analysis of costs and margins along the value 
chain – using the value chain matrix and accounting methods that 
determine the spread of costs and the distribution of gains along the 
filiere for the various ‘types’ of chain participants. The costs of 
compliance to standards are also analysed for the various actors along 
the value chain, relative to other cost components along the chain such 
as inputs, processing, labour, marketing etc; the distribution of margins 
is also determined for the various actors; and finally the value addition 
at each stage of is determined and compared with the rent received.  
As discussed before, the distribution of rents will be determined 
along the value chain, using an accounting framework which will allow 
for the value to be attached at each stage, based on the method by 
Gilbert (2006) as follows: 
 
Retail price of final product = farm/firm price + gross margin 
expressed as: 
)..(.................... imp  S   
The value share therefore becomes: 
)(.............................. iip
SZ   Where Z is the firm/farms share of 
retail price 
This can further be decomposed into: 
Retail Price = ((commodity price + transport & other export costs/exchange 
rate) + costs of raw materials+ costs of labor +costs of compliance to standards & 
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upgrading+ (costs of processing & packaging+ processing margin)+ advertising 
costs+ retail costs margin+ sales or value added tax)) 
This decomposition will be done for various segments of the value 
chain in order to determine each segment’s share of the retail price 
versus its share of the value added. This will form an accounting matrix 
for the entire value chain. 
 
5.2.2 Data 
This information has been obtained from two key sources:  the survey 
carried out between February and May 2009 and key respondents in 
each link of the chain interviewed between July and October 2009. The 
survey comprised of horticultural farmers in 5 provinces over 9 districts 
(Appendix 1 in Chapter 1). The sample consisted of 201 large, medium 
and smallholder respondents with farm sizes ranging from 5000 acres to 
.25 of an acre and having different characteristics. The survey is 
augmented with information from 18 key informants from the 
Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) and the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya 
(FPEAK); producer organizations and other institutions (Summary 
Appendix 2 Chapter 1). For this particular chapter, the green beans 
value chain is used to analyse and illustrate the distributional effects of 
standards. Out of the 201 farmers, 62 farmers grew green beans, 12 
were medium scale farmers, and 1 large scale farmer with an integrated 
pack house. 
Value chain actors from the green beans chain were selected on the 
basis that they are representative of the value chain ‘categories’ of actors 
at each stage of production, processing and exports. The key value 
chain actors in this case are: (i) production/farming- consisting of three 
main categories of actors – large scale producer, individual, small-
medium scale farmer, and small holder farmer under group certification 
(ii) Processing, packaging and exporting consisting of large scale 
integrated producer/exporter, and brief case exporters ( Figure 5.1) (iii) 
Importers – mainly supermarket chains. The value chain actors have 
different characteristics in terms of the size of farms, activities, costs 
and profit margins. Table 5.1 below gives a summary of the 
characteristics of selected value chain actors.  
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The standards taken into consideration here are mainly those that are 
predominant in the green beans value chain and are mandatory, these 
are- GLOBALGAP, Maximum residue limits, and HACCP/ISO. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary Profiles of Green Beans Farmers used in this analysis 
 
Variable Large-Scale 
Integrated 
Farmer/Exporter 
Individual 
Small-Medium 
Scale Farmer 
Smallholder 
Under Group 
Certification 
Briefcase 
Exporter 
Total Land Holdings 
(acres) 5000 12 4.8 - 
Area Under Green 
Beans (acres) 620 5 1 - 
No of employees  
Permanent  
Casual 
 
600 
4500 
 
2 
5 
 
- 
4 
 
20 
200 
Family Labour - 1 3  
Distance From 
Tarmac Road (Km) <1 8 6.5 <1 
Distance From 
Airport(Km) 98 143 121 3 
Contract Yes Yes No Yes 
Belongs to a Producer 
Organization Yes No Yes Yes 
Source: Survey results 2009 
 
Data on Prices were obtained from 12 different supermarkets in five 
countries that comprise the main export destinations for Kenya’s green 
beans in the EU i.e UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and France 
(summary table 5.2). For computation and cost accounting purposes, 
the average price was calculated. 
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Table 5.2: Summary Green Beans Prices in 2009 
Country Supermarket 
Price 
in Euros 
Price in 
Euros 
Average 
price 
    Fine Extra Fine (X-fine)   
Belgium DelHaize 9 10.2 9.6 
  Spar 9.6 10.8 10.2 
  Lidl 8.7 - 8.7 
Netherlands Alberthijn 8.3 9.23 8.765 
  Aldi 8.8 - 8.8 
  Spar 9.58 10.9 10.24 
  C1000 9.25 10.6 9.925 
United Kingdom Birmingham market 8 - 8 
  Aldi 8.7 - 8.7 
  ASDA 8.73 9.7 9.215 
  Waitrose 9.6 10.2 9.9 
  Tesco 9.5 10.24 9.87 
  Lidl 8.68 - 8.68 
  Sainsbury’s 9.5 10.15 9.825 
  Morrisons 9.18 9.98 9.58 
EU Average       9.3333 
Source: Survey Results, 2009 
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Cost Accounting Computation of Revenues, Margins and Return on 
Investments 
Cost components for smallholder farmers are identified as: variable 
costs for seed; fertilizer; spraying; weeding; harvesting, sorting and 
grading; land preparation and costs for auditing, testing and 
certification. Fixed costs are also identified as costs related to putting up 
equipment and infrastructure required to meet standards. Briefcase 
exporters and large scale integrated exporters have their cost 
components defined as: fixed cots comprising initial investments costs 
and infrastructure for standardization, pack houses and licensing. Their 
variable costs for labour, water, electricity, auditing, testing and 
certification, transport, air freight, packaging and labelling, monitoring 
and enforcement, and taxes. 
 
(i) The per centage costs for each component is then calculated as:  
  (cost component/total cost)*100 where total cost is fixed 
cost+ variable costs.  
(ii) The per cent variable costs are expressed as: (variable  costs/total 
costs)*100 
(iii) The per cent investment costs determined by : (investment 
costs/total costs )*100 
(iv) Unit variable costs expressed as: (variable costs/total output) 
(v) Unit total costs expressed as: (total costs/total output) 
(vi) Gross margin: (revenue-total costs) 
(vii) Unit profit: (Revenue-total costs)/total output 
(viii) Unit margin: (gross margin-total variable costs)/total output 
(ix) Per cent share of retail price: (sale price/retail price)*100 
(x) Return on Investments: (Gross margin/total cost) 
(xi) Value added: (Net profit – investments) 
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5.3 Kenya’s Green Beans Sector: Standards, 
Governance and the Changing Market Structures 
5.3.1 The Evolution of the Sector and Market Structures  
Kenya’s green bean industry started in the 1960s and expanded rapidly 
during the 1980s and 1990s (Okado 2001, McCulloh & Ota, 2002). The 
expansion in trade slowed down in the 1990s as the industry adjusted to 
the imposition of the International Food Safety Standards but has since 
recovered and even increased its volume of exports (Okello 2005). 
Figure 4.1 below gives the trends in volumes of exports, which indicate 
that there has been a steady increase in volumes exported up to the year 
2004/5 when exports plummeted but have since remained relatively 
steady. The EU is the most important market for green beans 
accounting for about 80 per cent, 70 per cent of which goes to the 
United Kingdom, and the rest to Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Italy and Spain. Other markets include the US and Middle 
East and South Africa and account for 20 per cent of the exports. Local 
consumption of French beans has also increased over the last few years, 
providing a local market for beans that are rejected by the export 
market.  
 
Figure 5.1: Trends in Green Beans Exports (1995-2010) 
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In order to understand the governance structures in any particular 
value chain it is basically important to analyze the market. Markets are 
the simplest form of GVC governance and governance structures can 
be internal23 or external24 to the chain. In the past, agricultural 
commodities used to be traded on the basis of arm’s length market 
relationships. These products were standardized and produced without 
reference to the needs of particular buyers and with limited information 
flowing along the chain. Many small producers could be involved and 
the output of one producer was much the same as the others (Daviron 
2002: 144). In the shift towards competition over quality as opposed to 
price (differentiated products), the amount of information that passes 
between agents in GVCs increase. This invariably leads to a transition in 
governance structures and linkages between GVC nodes and structural 
changes in production. This transition creates opportunities for some 
producers and limitations for others (Keanne 2003) as is replicated in 
Kenya’s green beans chain. 
The Kenyan green beans sector has evolved over the years from a 
more traditional market based chain in the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s where 
numerous small-scale producers sold to exporters through many spot 
market transactions. By the early 1980s the participation of smallholders 
in green beans production had increased markedly to an estimated 
15,000 smallholders (Jaffe, 1995).  Barriers to entry for producers were 
low, transactions were easily codified, product specifications were 
simple and suppliers had the capability to supply the green beans 
without input from the buyers. The complexity of information 
exchanged was relatively low, sellers set prices and producers were price 
takers (Temu & Marwa, 2007). The EU supermarkets and retailers 
purchased green beans from the wholesale market, employing wholesale 
agents working on a commission basis. This placed certain constraints 
on the supermarkets. The mixing of produce by exporters and 
importers meant that they had little or no information about the 
product’s precise origin and could not exercise any control over how 
products were produced. Further, the supermarkets could only purchase 
                                                 
23 Refer to the overall form of inter-node linkages, which result in systematic 
efficiency. 
24External governance structures include mandatory standards that producers 
must legally adhere to in order to access markets. 
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standardized products, having no control over the type or quality of 
product in wholesale markets. Finally, production could not be 
scheduled in advance. Each retailer competed for the same pool of 
produce as it arrived in the EU (Minot & Ngigi 2002, Okello 2005).  
Recent developments in the green beans sector global value chain 
have seen the transformation of the chain from a market based to a 
quasi-hierarchical type of chain. Interviews with 2 key large-scale 
exporters indicated that this transformation stemmed from several 
factors. Firstly, UK and EU multiple stores (supermarkets and major 
retail chains – e.g. Tesco) greatly increased their share of total fresh fruit 
and vegetables sales (Nagarajan et al., 1994). Secondly, the supermarkets 
by-passed the wholesale markets and worked directly with UK 
importers, delegating lower-profit functions such as quality control, 
monitoring, and distribution to their suppliers (Marsden and Wrigley, 
1996); this meant that the large scale exporters had to integrate their 
chains in order to carry out monitoring and quality control functions. 
Thirdly, there was a marked shift away from standardized, loose 
product to greater product differentiation, product innovation and 
increased packaging and processing; the large scale producers 
specifically had to upgrade their integrated chains – both process and 
functional upgrading including the acquisition of pack houses with cold 
storage, slicing dicing and cutting including pre-packaging and labeling. 
Fourthly and most important, were consumer concerns for quality and 
safety, which led to the introduction of standards and regulations 
including traceability, which was established along the chain and 
monitoring and audit regimes put in place (Jaffe, 1995, Minot & Ngigi 
2002, Okello 2005). In light of these market demands, costs of 
production rose both for large and small-scale exporters and producers 
in the entire chain. This invariably led to a fall in the share of 
smallholders participating in export markets as most of them were not 
able to cope with the rising standards; it is estimated that this share fell 
to below 40 per cent in the last decade (Okello, 2010) which reallocated 
market shares away toward larger holdings that were able to cope with 
compliance to standards (Okello 2005, Okello 2010, Minot & Ngigi 
2002). 
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The Filiere: Key Chain Components and Actors 
The commodity chain for green beans has developed to become an 
efficient supply chain where the produce passes through four stages, 
from growing in the fields to arriving on the supermarket shelves. The 
chain follow 3 distinct paths (figure 5.2): i.e. the produce is sourced 
either from smallholders or large and medium contracted farmers or 
even directly from exporters’ farms; smallholders are also organized 
formally and informally into producer groups and collectively share 
facilities such as grading sheds when they are exporting through a 
common exporter. Once harvested, the processes of sorting and 
grading often occur in the grading sheds, which are situated either at the 
farm or within very close proximity to the farms; the crop is then taken 
by the exporter, who is responsible for transport. The product 
undergoes further processing, packing and labelling. Green beans 
marketed through this chain must be certified (by an accredited third 
party) as meeting GLOBALGAP, BRC, MRLs and, in most cases, 
retailers’ private food safety protocols. A phyto-sanitary certificate 
issued by a competent authority guaranteeing absence of prohibited 
pests must accompany the beans. In addition, the beans must be 
traceable from the retailer‘s shelf back to the grower‘s plot.  
Standards requirements and specifications for export are given by 
EU supermarkets; the responsibility of ensuring quality lies on the 
exporters, exporters subsequently ensure that participants at the 
production end of the chain are adhering to set standards through 
various monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to be discussed in the 
next section. From the fore-going, three major functions within the sub-
sector can be distinguished as: production (or growing); collection, processing 
and packaging of the product; and export of the product to the consumer markets. 
The ranges of participants who fulfil these functions are the value 
chains actors (Summary Figure 5.2). 
Production 
From the fieldwork carried out in 2009, there emerged four 
differentiated kinds of producers. At one extreme are the large farmers 
at the other are the very small-scale growers. In the middle are small to 
medium farmers who grow beans primarily on contract.  
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Large Farmer 
The large farmers have farms of more than 50 acres, and produce green 
beans, other vegetables and often fruit. The large farmers use the latest 
in technologies, hire all of their labour and deliver specified quantities 
for export at specified times. The large farms are either owned by the 
medium to large exporters (vertically integrated) or by individuals who 
are on contract to large exporters. Their costs of production are fairly 
consistent and growing green beans is carried out as a business with 
tight cost controls and scientific planning. The large farmers procure all 
of their own inputs, seed, chemicals, and fertilizers. Along with the 
inputs, he must also provide his irrigation system and cover the cost of 
pumping the water in case of irrigation. The large farmer keeps very 
accurate records of all elements associated with the production of the 
beans in a given field on his farm so that he can provide accurate 
information on use of chemicals on the plants for Minimum Residue 
Limit (MRL) control. Large-scale producers are about 10 in number and 
employ considerably more than thousand workers and rely heavily on 
casual labour during glut periods. 
Small to Medium Contract Farmer 
These farmers work directly with an exporter either on contract basis or 
as out-growers. Under contract arrangements, the exporter provides the 
seed and sometimes even the fertilizers and pesticides to the contract 
farmer. Small contract farms need to plant at least one acre in size to 
have a sufficient yield to be able to make it worthwhile for the exporter 
to work with them. Even then, there needs to be a reasonable number 
of them in the same area to make it worthwhile for the exporter to 
develop long-term relations with them and therefore they are mostly 
organized in informal groups.  
The small to medium contract farmer employs quite a few labourers 
and relies heavily on family labour. The exporter visits the small 
contract farmer to pick up the product based on his own export 
schedule. This is usually three times a week during the low season and 
up to five times per week during the high season. After picking up the 
product at the farm, it is transported to the exporter’s pack house for 
re-grading and final packaging.  
Care must be taken to record the use of all inputs into the 
production of the crop. This presents more of a problem for the smaller 
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farmer, so the exporter usually develops the spraying schedule for each 
contract farmer and assigns an agronomist/field extension worker to 
work with the contract growers. The field extension workers ensure that 
all the aspects of production are done according the guidelines set out 
by the EU. Recent estimates of the number of specific out-growers 
working with exporters (being supplied) are about 4,000 small farms 
(USAID). Each of these farms employs on average of five and ten 
workers, working between three and five days a week depending on the 
season.
Individual Small Holder Farmer 
The small farmer often plants an area of one tenth and up to 2 acres. 
Farmers with less than an acre are considered to be too small by the 
contract exporters. They produce what they can and then sell most often 
to a broker or to a small exporter also known as a briefcase exporter25. 
The small farmer’s biggest disadvantage is he/she must procure seed and 
chemicals and does not get advice on the proper growing techniques. In 
many cases the farmer relies on the public sector extension staff 26or asks 
his neighbour what products to apply (learning by doing). Also, because 
he cannot afford top quality seed, he tends to grow less expensive 
varieties that are not preferred by the client and hence gets a lower price 
at the farm gate. Many of the small farmers have been or are members of 
groups that have had “contract” relations with exporters. However, 
many of them have cheated on those contract terms and subsequently 
been excluded by the exporters. Some have also been excluded by the 
exporter for not adhering to guidelines of production or not meeting the 
bare minimum standards of GlobalGAPs. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Briefcase exporters are those exporters who do not own farms but they own 
or lease pack houses during harvest season which they use to sort, pack and 
grade produce, often from individual farmers who do not have contracts with 
exporters. 
26 In this case, these are HCDA officials or Ministry of Agriculture extension 
workers. 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
162 
Figure 5.2: Kenyan Green Beans Value Chain 
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Producer Groups 
These are a concentration of farmers within a specific geographic area 
with the same agronomic and post-harvest practices. An important effort 
over the past decade has been to regroup small farmers into 
economically viable units that can produce quality product while 
monitoring their production. The HCDA, FPEAK and some NGOs and 
CBOs, have led these efforts, through funding from development aid 
organizations such as USAID, JICA COLECEAP amongst others. Many 
of the groups of small farmers are organized by and work closely with 
the exporter. The exporter still provides the inputs, as well as technical 
assistance through an agronomist or a field extension worker to the 
group of 30 or so farmers. This field extension worker supervises the 
production and manages the spraying schedules and ensures proper 
record keeping for all members of the group. He/she also keeps an eye 
on the leakage of the product to other buyers (brokers or other 
exporters).  
To make this economical, the growers must be concentrated within a 
reasonable area - about a 10 km radius - but do not necessarily need to 
be adjacent. For these groups, the exporter still prefers to have individual 
farmers with farms of at least one half acre under production, using at 
least 5 kg of seed per planting with a harvest totalling about one ton. The 
whole group should be able to provide at least 1-2 tons per collection, 
which seems to be an economic breakeven point. 
 Collection and Brokering  
Over twenty years ago, beans were collected, packed and exported by 
brokers who served the role of doing much of the collection from the 
very small farmers, buying from them at cheaper prices and reselling to 
the exporters. Today, there is much less collection by brokers, but they 
are still active. With the increasing requirements for traceability of the 
product, exporters must contract directly with the growers. 
However, the small, medium and even large exporters frequently use 
brokers to help them acquire additional products, often using them as 
agents. While serving an important economic role in the sector, brokers 
and briefcase exporters do cause quite a bit of havoc in its orderly 
functioning. As they have no up-front costs to the growers (they do not 
provide seeds, etc.) they can pay a higher price than the exporter, and 
they can pay in cash. This is an extremely attractive element for a small 
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farmer, who knows that part of his sale to the exporter will be used to 
cover the advances on seeds and pesticides. In areas where there are no 
exporters, the brokers are the main outlet for the farmers, but pay 
relatively low prices, equivalent to half those in areas with more 
competition. In areas where the exporters need to get additional 
products, beyond that from their contracted farmers, they will use 
brokers on a regular basis to buy product from farmers in the region to 
round out their loads. The number of brokers is not known, but 
brokering activity increases during the high season, when prices are 
better and there is greater demand for product.  
Processing, Packaging and Exporting  
This is the key function in the entire industry that makes it work. This 
involves the purchase of the beans from the grower, final grading into 
the appropriate categories, packing, and shipping to a buyer in Europe. 
Most of the exporters working with contract growers have trained them 
on grading and packing in crates. The produce is then re-packaged by 
exporters according to supermarket guidelines and requirements in small 
quantities and labelled ready to go directly to the supermarket shelves. 
There are three major groups of exporters: the large vertically 
integrated the small to medium, and the briefcase exporters.  
Briefcase Exporters 
They function only during the high season when prices are good and 
produce is in plenty. As they are not consistently in the market, they 
procure their product from brokers, rent space in packinghouses around 
the airport, loose pack the product, and ship to buyers in Europe. They 
do not own any farms, however they have links with European 
importers and have exporting licenses and in some cases are even 
certified by accredited standards bodies. They do not have any regular 
growers although some have recently begun having informal 
arrangements with producer organizations.  
Small to Medium Exporters 
These exporters are in the market all year long, but do not have the 
resources or ability to reach the scale of the very large. They are often 
constrained by cash flow in their attempts to grow. There are 
approximately 15 – 20 exporters in this category doing between 400 and 
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1500 tons per annum of all products, but mostly green beans. In most 
cases these exporters have their own packing houses at or near the 
airport, though some will rent space for the final pack, some of them 
also rent space in the HCDA pack-houses during the high season. These 
small to medium exporters are almost all integrated backwards into the 
production, for at least some of their green bean needs. Their farms are 
generally smaller, between 5 –20 acres, though some have much larger 
farms. They get the bulk of their product for export from growers whom 
they contract to grow for them. But they are also facing increasing cost 
and quality constraints that make it uneconomical for them to deal with 
individual small growers, so they must either work with larger groups of 
out-growers/producer groups (as described above) or with larger 
individual farmers.  
Large Integrated Exporters 
These exporters have increasingly integrated their operations both 
forwards into the markets and backwards into the production. Their 
total tonnage of exports ranges from between 2,500 tons per annum to 
15,000 tons, all products included. There are only about eight to ten 
firms that fall into this category (including KHE, Everest, Sun Ripe, 
Homegrown, East African Growers, Vegpro, Indu Farms, and Sulmac), 
with varying degrees of integration. The extreme cases may be firms like 
Vegpro and Everest, which receive 95 per cent of their product from 
their own farms and from large contracted growers. These large 
exporters have very strong market links and generally provide a fairly 
consistent amount and quality of product over the course of the year. 
Some of them, like Homegrown and Everest, are integrated into the 
markets, with shareholding in the distributors in Europe.  
Shipping/Transport  
The shipping and transport function is from the exporter’s warehouse to 
the importer’s warehouse in Europe. This function is usually paid for by 
the exporter, but is contracted out to various service providers. 
Airfreight is the most important and most expensive component of this 
function, with charges averaging about $1.2 per kg shipped. In addition 
there are taxes of costs (6 cents/kg), costs of loading the product onto 
the plane, etc. The exporter usually sells his products Cost Insurance and 
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Freight (CIF), so he pays all of the costs associated with getting it on the 
plane.  
 
5.3.2 Standards and Emerging Governance Structures in the 
Green Beans Sector in Kenya 
As was discussed in previous sections, what were previously private and 
voluntary standards over time became mandatory or at least, defacto 
mandatory (necessary in order to access markets). Consequently, the 
critical success factor for this chain is centred on standards and quality 
requirements and so are the governance structures.  
Results from the survey indicate that the standards required in the 
green beans sector are split in 2 broad clusters namely, product 
certification and quality management systems (chapter 2) and broadly 
other quality management systems such as HACCP, GLOBALGAP, 
MRLs, product conformity, packaging specificity and traceability 
requirements. In addition, handling and hygiene practices during 
harvesting, grading, and packing of green beans are all closely monitored 
by field extension workers who also carry out internal audits for the 
farms. Growers are required to have a toilet, pesticide storage unit, and a 
facility for hand washing at the farm or the grading shed. Exporters to 
the EU supermarkets test the water and soil twice a year for pathogens. 
The exporters also require farmers to keep records of the type and 
quality of inputs (pesticide, water, or soil) used. In order to enforce 
compliance with these practices, EU importers have increased their 
monitoring and coordination of input use. They generally monitor the 
exporters expecting them to monitor growers in turn. Increasingly, some 
EU importers and large-scale integrated exporters have extended their 
monitoring to farm level through regular visits. 
Various forms of enforcement regimes were observed in the green 
beans value chain. Surveillance of individual farmers and producer 
groups by exporters’ field extension workers is the method mostly  
employed to ensure compliance at the lower ends of the chain whereas at 
the exporter level, private inspection, third party certification and 
regulatory actions are used by consuming countries and third party 
organizations to ensure/ascertain compliance (Figure 5.3). The exporters 
are then accredited by third party certification bodies. 
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At the lower end of the chain farmers are organized into producer 
organizations either formally or informally and receive support from 
exporters in form of inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and pesticides as well 
as costs related to meeting standards which are given on credit to 
individual farmers and deducted from their earnings by the exporters. In 
addition, some farmers also have contracts with producers and these 
contracts basically specify the quality and price requirements for 
production, field extension officers are charged with responsibility of 
ensuring that farmers adhere to contracts. Those that do not have 
written contracts have informal word of mouth agreements with specific 
exporters. There are also a number of producer organizations that have 
benefited from various support services sponsored by NGOs and other 
development partners such as PIP/COELACP, JICA, GTZ and 
USAID. Table 5.3 below gives a summary of green beans farmers 
receiving support from exporters and/or other institutions. 
 
Table 5.3: Support Services Received by Green Beans Farmers 
Support Service 
Number of Farmers (N=72); No. 
belonging to a Producer 
Organization =67 
Inputs – Seeds 
- Fertilizer 
- Pesticides 
64 
12 
63 
Training on GAPs and Standards ALL 
Upgrading –building of 
structures/requirements for standards 38 
Compliance to standards including 
auditing 67 
Information 62 
Transport 72 
Source: Survey, 2009 
Figure 5.3 below is an illustration of how standards in this case have 
acted as an impetus for better organization and chain management and 
more sophisticated farming practices – while at the same time reducing 
transaction costs, achieving economies of scale and minimizing the risks 
of exclusion from the value chain especially by smallholders. At the 
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lower levels – because of low capabilities and competencies to meet 
required specifications, intense monitoring of smallholders and 
integrating them into the exporters’ production functions is necessary to 
ensure compliance – which demonstrates a more hierarchical type of 
governance, whereas at the higher levels of the chain – the capability and 
competency of suppliers to meet required standards is high, third party 
certification and accreditation are used for enforcement which 
demonstrates a more market oriented type of governance, this type of 
arrangement can attest to the existence of a hybrid chain which is quasi-
hierarchical. 
 
Figure 5.3: Monitoring and Enforcement Regimes in the Green Beans Value  
 
 
 
 
Standards chain 
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It emerges from the chain that importers through standards hold the 
power to specify what is to be produced and how it is produced which 
they specify to exporters though codes of practice and contracts. It is the 
responsibility of the supplier (in this case exporters) to pay for and 
provide proof of evidence of certification, failure to which they risk 
losing market access and may face fines when they don’t meet contract 
specifications. This proof is obtained by third party certification process 
through auditing which is done annually at the cost of the exporter. In 
the relationship between exporters and farmers, we observe that where 
various support services are provided by exporters, by virtue of having 
‘invested’ in them, intense monitoring takes place and the exporter 
determines the specifications of how, what, where and when the product 
is produced. There also exist various social auditing processes among 
groups of farmers. The consequence of such power relationships is that 
as more functions are pushed down the chain, so are more costs and 
more barriers resulting in the opportunity for some to obtain temporary 
rents. As part of this development, learning rents become necessary to 
support the upgrading process within the value chain especially for lower 
end participants such as smallholders. Some of these rents are created 
and earned by innovators as in product innovation driving growth 
models - while others are created institutionally to support ‘learning by 
doing’ as in how producer groups organize to ‘learn’ about the standards. 
The power relationships in this specific chain therefore influence not 
only the cost structure of the chain but also the prices and margins for 
different actors as will be discussed in the next section. 
5.4 Costs, Margins and Rent Distribution in Kenya’s Green Beans 
Value Chain 
Different chain participants have different cost structures due to factors 
related to economies of scale, information or position in the chain. The 
analysis of costs and margins is calculated for various players as already 
discussed in the previous sections: An individual farmer under option 1 
certification; a smallholder belonging to a producer organization (under 
group certification); a large scale producer/exporter and a medium scale 
exporter have different costs and margins resulting from differing 
economies of scale amongst other factors. The costs and margins are 
calculated based on the following categories (Table 5.4): 
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5.4.1 Costs and Margins for Various Segments of the Value Chain 
An Individual Farmer under Option 1 Certification  
The production of green beans for export is both labour and capital 
intensive. According to the survey carried out in 2009, only 3 per cent of 
smallholders interviewed were certified as individual farmers –under 
option 1 certification. Being under option 1- certification  entails the 
farmer paying for and getting their own certification after fulfilling 
GLOBALGAP and other requirements through various forms of up-
grading on their farms. 
 An individual smallholder participating in the export of green beans 
has to have a minimum area of one acre under green beans in order to 
secure a contract with an exporter. The farmer also has to make several 
investments in order to meet the requirements for export. For instance, a 
farmer needs to change a number of production practices and make 
significant investments including the following: i) purchase protective 
gear, including long-sleeved overalls, gumboots, rubber gloves, nose 
mask, goggles, and hat; ii) construct a shower room for use by the spray 
operators, a well-ventilated and secured pesticides store, a pesticide 
disposal pit and an incinerator; iii) apply only approved pesticides that 
are typically more costly but safer than those they replace; iv) implement 
an integrated approach to managing pest and disease problems, and only 
use pesticides when absolutely necessary (i.e., upon approval by the 
exporter’s agronomist or field extension worker); v) construct a grading 
shed (with cement floor, washable tables, and facility for washing hands) 
and a pit latrine adjacent to the shed; vi) build a charcoal cooler for 
holding graded beans prior to pick up by exporter; vii) observe personal 
hygiene at all times during grading of green beans. The hygiene measures 
taken include the use of headscarves by women and hats by men, barring 
children from the grading area, and have a designated place eating or 
smoking. 
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Table 5.4: Summary Categories of Variable Costs by Value Chain Stage 
Farm Production 
Transport, Processing and 
Packaging 
Export – 
International 
Logistics 
Land preparation 
Machinery (hired or own use) 
Seeds 
Fertilizer 
Pesticides 
Labour (planting, weeding, spraying 
harvesting) 
Transport to grading shed 
Standards related inputs 
Certification costs, auditing etc 
Transport costs form shed to 
pack houses 
Pack house costs of rent  
Electricity 
Telephone internet 
water 
Labour 
Storage costs standards and 
hygiene requirements 
Packaging and labelling 
Licensing  
Storage costs 
Loading costs 
Airfreight costs 
 
Duties and 
taxes 
Clearing fees 
Licences and 
permits 
 
Source: Author 
Below are the cost components calculated as a per cent of the total 
cost. The computations are done per acre and based on an individual 
farmer under option 1 certification and a farmer under group 
certification, a briefcase exporter and a large scale integrated exporter. 
The costing of the inputs such as fertilizers, seed, labour for land 
preparation and harvesting are estimated in comparison with the costs 
related to meeting standards. The margins are also calculated and later 
compared with other producers and chain participants. (Appendix 5.1, 
5.2 and 5.3).  
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Table 5.5: Composition of Costs for Individual Smallholder vs. Smallholder 
Under Group Certification 
Cost Component Individual smallholder 
under option 1 certification 
Individual smallholder 
under group certification 
Harvesting, sorting & grading 12 32.9 
Fertilizer 7 18.2 
Ploughing and harrowing 11.8 12.5 
Equipment for standardization 32 10.1 
Testing and accreditation 28 6.7 
Seed  2.5 6.6 
Spraying  1 5 
Weeding  3 8.1 
Source: Survey results 2009 
 
 From the table we see that the costs of standardization represents 60 
per cent i.e. 28 per cent of the variable costs for yearly testing, auditing 
and certification and 32 per cent of the initial costs for investment which 
also include the costs for infrastructure related to meeting standards. A 
smallholder farmer therefore has to have a large capital base in order to 
invest in the basic infrastructure required to participate in the export 
chains. Notably, as the acreage increases, so does the economies of scale, 
mainly because the costs related to standards do not change hence it is 
easier for larger farmers with more acreage to participate in the export 
chains. The gross margin for a small farmer given as (revenue - total 
variable costs) is obtained and is about 6386.28 per acre. The return on 
Investment (ROI) given as the (income-total cost)/total cost is 32 per 
cent is an indication of how attractive it is for farmers to participate in 
the export market instead of other ventures. 
An Individual Farmer Under Option 2 (group certification) 
An individual farmer under option 2 certification benefits from 
economies of scale arising from belonging to a producer group. The 
groups assume logistical and organizational costs and receive a 
cooperative-gate price (producer groups do not realize profits). The 
average group size was 28 people and the groups are also used for 
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training; information sharing and obtaining credit from micro-finance 
institutions. Findings from the survey indicate that 31 per cent of green 
beans farmers interviewed have contracts with exporters while the rest of 
them market their produce through their respective producer groups to 
briefcase exporters (brokers). Appendix table 5.2 gives an outline of the 
cost structure and margins for a farmer producing beans on a one acre 
piece of land for a year. 
 From table 5.5 above we can deduce that, the costs for meeting 
standards and therefore qualifying to participate in the export sector are 
17 per cent i.e. the initial investment costs for a farmer exporting 
through a producer group is much less and forms only 10.1 per cent of 
the total costs as group members contribute collectively to build grading 
sheds, and other infrastructure required for exporting.  Furthermore, due 
to group certification the costs related to meeting standards are relatively 
lower and comprise only 6.7 per cent of the variable costs in a year. 
Other costs such as equipment and spraying are also much lower 
because the exporter charges a co-operative price and the spraying is 
done under the supervision of their field extension workers. The bulk of 
the costs therefore are incurred during harvesting, sorting and grading 
which are integral parts of the value adding activities of the lower end of 
the chain. Moreover, the farm gate price is relatively lower because the 
producer groups do not bargain over the prices as they are determined 
by the exporters and specified in the group contracts at the beginning of 
each production year. The gross margin relatively higher at 990.19 euros 
per year more than doubles the gross margin of an individual small-scale 
farmer with an acre under option 1 of certification. The ROI is also 
much higher at 45 per cent making it much more attractive to participate 
in exporting under group certification. It is therefore evident that the 
economies of scale achieved by belonging to a group are more 
advantageous. 
A Broker/Briefcase Exporter 
A broker/brief case exporter often does not have a farm but may have 
links with some importing companies in the countries of destination and 
may sometimes operate seasonally. However the HCDA requires them 
to have the following in order to obtain an export license: a certificate of 
Business Registration from the Registrar of Companies; written contracts 
with farmers for supply of produce of a certain quality and standard, 
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confirmation from HCDA officials that the firm really exists packing 
facilities (own or rented pack-house); an adequate knowledge of quality 
standards for horticultural produce on the market; documentary 
evidence from their overseas client (e.g. a letter, fax or e-mail) that the 
overseas client have an agreement to export with the exporter; an export 
license from HCDA (Export License fee Kshs.5,000/- for 3 years). In 
addition, certification and accreditation is required mainly from the 
overseas clients and often a phyto-sanitary certificate from Kenya Plant 
health Inspectorate services (KEPHIS) is also mandatory including 
HACCP and ISO certification and any other industry standards such as 
BRC. 
These exporters therefore employ labourers on a temporary basis 
during the ‘high season’ with only the management being permanent 
staff. They usually have contracts with importers in the countries of 
destination to supply produce at set quantities and qualities and therefore 
they have to meet the contract terms and specifications by all means. 
This then requires them to obtain produce from their contracted farmers 
as well as other farmers. They transport the produce from the firms, 
grade and sort and package (including labelling) and the rejected produce 
are then diverted to the local markets. There are about 12 such exporters 
in the horticulture sector and they not only export beans but other 
produce27 as well. 
For this particular exporter, the exports are 2 main products- green 
beans and snap peas and the costs of production are therefore not 
limited to the export of beans only and in order to obtain the costs and 
margins of green beans the calculations include and involve scenarios of 
other products as well and calculating in addition, the contribution 
margins for each (Appendix 5.3). However, since there are multi-
products involved, we weighed each of the two major products and de-
composed the values related to green beans summarized in table 5.6 
below.  
The initial investment for a briefcase exporter participating in green 
beans exports is only 6 per cent of the total costs; this is an advantage 
because their initial investments are much lower relative to the total 
costs. Moreover the costs for meeting standards are just 1.05 per cent of 
                                                 
27 Snap beans, Asian vegetables and other exportable vegetables destined to 
Europe provided they are on season. 
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the total variable costs, which makes it much easier for them to meet the 
required standards. The costs of entry into the export chain are 8.05 per 
cent of the total costs. The bulk of their costs are in airfreight, which is 
53 per cent of the total variable costs. The gross margin is also relatively 
higher at 694726.41 euros per year for green beans. This makes the ROI 
for the beans chain much higher at 41.1 per cent, an indication that 
briefcase exporters are indeed benefiting tremendously from 
participating in the chain. The cost of meeting standards as a per cent of 
total costs is 16 per cent. 
 
Table 5.6: Composition of Costs for a Briefcase Exporter 
Cost Component Per cent (%) 
Airfreight 53 
Purchasing produce from farmers 30 
Initial investments 6 
Testing, auditing and certification 1.05 
Labour 5 
Monitoring farmers to ensure compliance 2 
Others (water, electricity, packaging and 
labelling, storage and renting a pack house) 
3 
Source: Survey results 2009 
 
Large Scale Exporter 
A large-scale exporter with integrated chain participates in the 
production, packaging and exporting and usually owns their farms as 
well as pack-houses. They may also procure some of their produce for 
export from outgrower farmers with whom they have contracts and 
whom they support by providing inputs – seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides 
on credit as well as technical advice and training on standards. Out of the 
10 major large-scale vegetable producers/exporters in Kenya, multi-
national companies comprising mainly of Dutch and British 
entrepreneurs own 7 of them. These exporters employ a large number of 
workers (in thousands) in their farms as well as in their packhouses and 
export an array of products including cut flowers. They are located in 
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geographical clusters that benefit from proximity to water and irrigation, 
and abundance of cheap labour for their farms including infrastructure. 
Most have their pack houses in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs). 
They have direct links with supermarkets in the EU and have contracts 
to export specific quantities of goods of specified quality. They therefore 
adhere not only to universal GlobalGAP and HACCP/ISO standards 
but also to retailer standards such as BRC, Tesco natures choice etc. 
Appendix 5.6 summarizes the costs and margins for a large-scale 
exporter with an integrated value chain supplying many different 
products and having supplies from their farms and from farmers with 
whom they have contracts. All aspects of production are done ‘in-house’. 
Table 5.8 gives a weighted summary of the cost components for the 
green beans production chain. The initial investments for entry into the 
chain are 12 per cent of the total costs- ie 5 per cent for initial 
investments and less than 1 per cent for standardization. Airfreight 
forms the bulk of the costs at 60 per cent while the costs for 
standardization are less than 1 per cent of the total variable costs. The 
costs from own production are much lower because the main product is 
flowers which is managed under a different integrated chain; the bulk of 
vegetables for export are purchased from farmers with whom they have 
contracts. It can be deduced that this particular producers tend to gain a 
lot from economies of scale as a result of having an integrated chain. 
Moreover the returns are huge wit the margins being about 36016176.47 
euros per annum. The return on investment is 63 per cent, which is very 
high as compared to other participants of the value chain. 
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Table 5.7: Composition of Costs for a Large-scale Producer with an 
Integrated Value Chain 
Cost Component Per cent (%) 
Airfreight 60 
Purchasing produce from farmers 8 
Initial investments and infrastructure for 
standardization 
14 
Auditing, testing and certification <1 
Labour 6.9 
Purchase of produce from farmers 2 
Transport to pack house 1 
Others (water, electricity, packaging and 
labelling, storage and renting a pack house) 
6 
Source: Survey data 
Summary Comparison of Costs, Margins and Profit among the Chain 
Actors 
From the above analysis the cost structure for each of the chain actors is 
summarized in table 5.8 below. The unit costs for an individual farmer 
are the highest even though the unit profits and the unit margins are 
slightly higher than with a farmer under group certification, this is 
because the groups often negotiate lower prices with exporters to ‘cover 
up’ for any losses due to rejection. It is also apparent that the costs of 
meeting standards are much higher for the smaller producers i.e. 28 per 
cent for an individual farmer, this coupled with high initial investment 
costs create barriers to entry for new farmers. Certification under groups, 
however, substantially reduces these costs thereby improving the 
margins albeit slightly. Comparing the ROI values indicate that exporters 
particularly have higher ROI values than farmers as they benefit from 
economies of scale gained through exporting their produce in bulk. For 
the exporters however, the bulk of their costs (more than 50 per cent in 
both instances) air freight; this is high considering that it is the exporters 
that pay for transport. 
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Table 5.8: Summary Costs, Margins and Profits for Various Chain Actors 
 
  
Individual 
farmer 
Farmer under group 
certification 
Briefcase 
exporter 
Large 
scale 
exporter 
Unit total cost 0.38 0.14 2.1 1.45 
Unit variable 
cost 0.26 0.13 15.11 1.23 
% Investment 
costs 32.40 10.34 6 5 
% Variable costs 67.60 89.66 93 86.7 
% Cost of 
standards 28.00 6.89 1.7 0.79 
Unit price 0.29 0.25 2.92 3.12 
Unit profit 0.80 0.88 0.97 1.02 
Unit margin 0.54 0.89 0.88 0.98 
% Share of retail 
price 3.3 2.78 31.90 33 
Return on 
investments (%) 32 36 41.1 63 
Source: Survey data 
The share of retail prices is summarized below shows that farmers 
smallholder farmers who form the majority of producers in the sector 
(estimated at 40000 by Okello (2005) and currently estimated at over 
70,000 by HCDA have the least share of the retail price at 3.3 per cent, 
whereas exporters and large scale producers have a modest 31 an 33 per 
cent respectively, the bulk of the share of retail price (63 per cent) goes 
to developed country importers and retailers (figure 5.4 below). 
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Figure 5.4: Share of Retail Price for Various Actors in the Green Beans Value 
Chain 
 
 
 
5.4. Distribution of Rent for the Green Beans Value Chain 
Figure 5.5 below gives a summary of the main components of the value 
chain; the value adding activities carried out by various segments; the 
distribution of retail price; the numbers of various actors, the value 
added and value capture. Value adding activities in their particular chain 
are mostly related to meeting the required standards such as GAPs, 
HACCP, sorting and grading and packaging and labelling to ensure 
traceability. This was only possible for those actors in the export chain 
within the country and was not possible for foreign importers and 
supermarket chains (table 5.9).  
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Table 5.9: Summary Components for Value in the Green Beans Chain and 
Rent Distribution 
 
Component Actors Value adding 
activities 
Price 
(euros) 
Per cent 
share of 
retail 
price 
Production Small holders, 
large scale 
integrated 
exporters 
Production, 
sorting, 
grading, 
meeting 
standards and 
related 
requirements 
(GlobalGAP) 
Farm gate 
price is 
0.29 Euros 
/kg 
3.21 
Processing 
and Air 
freight 
Exporters, 
large scale 
integrated 
exporter, 
briefcase 
exporter 
Sorting, 
grading, 
packaging, 
labelling, 
traceability 
(bar coding), 
meeting 
required 
standards, 
HACCP, ISO, 
2.11 33 
Retail and 
distribution 
Retailers Distribution to 
outlets, 
advertising etc 
9.3 
euros/kg 
63.79 
Source: Survey results 2009 
 
From the figure below, the value added at each stage of the value 
chain was found to be 30.45 per cent between the farmers and processor 
and 66.45 per cent between the processors and exporters. Much of the 
value adding takes place at the processing stage mainly done by exporters 
through sorting, grading packaging and labelling. There is also an 
additional premium received as a result of meeting certain standards. 
However the incomes are very low at the lower ends of the value chain 
with farmers receiving a paltry 3.21 per cent of the retail price. Exporters 
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earn 33 per cent of the retail price and the lion’s share goes to developed 
country importers and retailers. 
Figure 5.5: Value Addition vs. Incomes for Various Actors 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The chapter contributes to the growing literature on globalization and 
trade, specifically with respect to how standards determine the 
governance of value chains and subsequently the income disparities 
observed in these value chains. From the study there are four main 
conclusions that can be drawn. First, that standards can reshape the 
governance structures prevailing within a chain which is corroborated by 
empirical results showing that before the introduction of standards in the 
early 1990’s the green beans chain was based on numerous spot markets 
and quality was determined by colour and size, prices received depended 
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on quality of produce and prevailing demand and supply market forces. 
However after the advent of standards in the 1990’s there was a shift 
towards more coordination of activities. It is evident that standards have 
hence played a major role in determining not only the structure of the 
chain but the power relationships that prevail in this chain. Standards are 
developed and specified by developed country retail chains and passed 
on to developing country producers and exporters who have to adhere 
to them in order to access the export market therefore making it an 
important requirement for entry into the export chain. Due to lower 
capabilities to comply at the lower ends of the chain, farmers often 
receive support from exporters and other institutions and in turn intense 
surveillance of individual farmers and producer groups by exporters’ 
field extension workers was one way of ensuring compliance making it 
more hierarchical - at the lower ends of the chain. However at the 
exporters’ level enforcement by various third party certification bodies 
was observed through various audits making it more market based – the 
chain is therefore a hybrid quasi-hierarchical type. 
 Secondly, the influence of standards on transaction costs is two-
fold owing to the governance structure that prevails. Standards are 
codified and carry information and therefore reduce costs of information 
search as well as monitoring and enforcement costs. As 
suppliers/exporters are audited, certified and accredited for multiple 
sector standards, the transaction costs which would otherwise be 
involved in monitoring and enforcement is greatly reduced for developed 
country participants in the chain. However due to a considerable amount 
of upgrading resulting from standards, more costs of compliance are 
invariably pushed downstream thereby raising the barriers to entry 
especially for small holders.  
Thirdly, on a theoretical basis, comparing the costs of transactions 
among various segments of actors in the value chain it is apparent that 
there is disparity in the way costs are spread over various cost 
components. Smallholders have a comparative disadvantage in 
complying with quality standards. For instance, the cost of 
standardization as a per cent of total costs is highest for individual 
smallholders than any other actors in the value chain and stands at 14.63 
per cent. In order to mitigate the effects of rising transaction costs, 
smallholders have formed producer organizations within which they 
collectively pay for costs related to meeting standards and achieve group 
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certification thereby benefiting from economies of scale. Joining a 
producer organization reduces this cost to 7 per cent. As we move 
further along the value chain, the cost of standardization for exporters at 
this level is very low at 1 per cent or below- which is a clear indication 
that meeting required standards is relatively easier for exporters as they 
also benefit from economies of scale. 
The profit margins are highest for retailers, followed by exporters and 
lower for smallholders. Likewise, the profit margin and the ROI is also 
much lower for smallholders and much higher for large scale exporters, 
this is partly due to the fact that these exporters benefit from economies 
of scale and are able to minimize costs and remain competitive. However 
when we analyse the share of retail prices, we see that this is where there 
is the worst form of inequity; whereas farmers add around 30 per cent 
value to the produce, they only receive 3.21 per cent of the share of the 
retail price; most of the value addition occurs at exporter level where 60 
per cent or more of the value is added, yet exporters receive a paltry 33 
per cent of the retail price. This means that the largest share of the retail 
price goes to developed country importers and retail chains that get high 
premiums from the specialty beans or the high quality produce that they 
are selling. Dominant buyers such as European supermarkets are major 
drivers of the value chains in which they participate – in effect, they set 
the standards; transfer the costs of meeting standards to developing 
country producers and exporters; get additional innovative rents as a 
result of setting these standards and consequently the most benefits. 
In a world where developing countries are struggling to have 
appreciable impacts on rural poverty, export value chains for ‘high value’ 
agro-food products are seen as presenting positive ‘models’ that might 
be emulated elsewhere and across a broader spectrum of commodities. 
At the same time, standards are increasingly shaping the ways in which 
such value chains are governed, and have raised the spectre of 
smallholder exclusion. While the evidence on this is far from conclusive, 
this chapter points out the inequities that exist along such value chains 
and the impact thereof that it would have on a myriad of participants 
especially smallholders at the lower ends of the value chains – mainly 
smallholders and employees who stand to benefit from higher incomes 
and this would presumably contribute towards poverty reduction and 
subsequently, development. 
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6 
Smallholder Participation in High 
Value Chains: The Case of   Kenya’s 
Horticulture Sector 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the past two decades, the demand for high value agricultural products 
has increased exponentially in developed countries mainly due to rising 
incomes and a demand for differentiated products. These developments 
have led to new market opportunities for developing country producers 
to move away from low-income traditional exports to high value 
products often produced predominantly by smallholders. Consequently, 
efforts to encourage the production of high value food products in sub-
Saharan Africa, is often a strategic move to alleviating poverty in the 
region. The importance of market participation is based on the premise 
that incomes and, hence, the livelihoods of smallholder farmers, are 
likely to improve if they gain greater access to markets for the 
commodities they produce. Markets and improved market access for 
smallholders are a prerequisite for enhancing agriculture-based economic 
growth and increasing rural incomes. According to WDR (2008) & 
IFAD (2011), smallholder participation in global chains must be built 
upon the establishment of efficient and well-functioning markets and 
trade systems that keep transaction costs low minimize risk and extend 
information to all actors.  
 Due to changing context of trade and globalization, commodity 
chains in developing countries have undergone several transformations 
requiring higher levels of coordination of value chains partly due to the 
proliferation of standards (Reardon & Barrett 2000, Swinnen 2007, 
Narrod et al 2009). The need to control for quality and safety in high 
value chains involves specialised production – lumpy investments in 
equipment and processes, which require large capital investments, which 
smallholders cannot easily afford. However, it is often only the well-
endowed larger and skilled farmers that have the ability to be part of 
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these coordinated marketing chains and alliances. Only a small number 
of farmers in developing countries have the ability to be part of these 
lucrative foreign markets and even if they do participate in these markets, 
smallholders individually enjoy only a limited bargaining power 
(Kaplinsky & Morris 2001, Kirsten & Sartorious 2002). In the face of 
imperfect markets and high transaction costs, these smallholders are 
rarely able to exploit all the potential gains from commercialization or 
participation in global value chains (de Janvry et al. (1991), Key et al. 
(2000). In the absence of mechanisms to cope with these constraints, 
smallholders are less likely to participate in markets, or when they do, 
they are also lees likely to realize the full benefits of participation. 
From the perspective of the producer, the motivation to participate in 
high value chains, is influenced by prevailing production and market 
structures – which determine transaction costs and, or prices. It may 
emanate as a response to missing markets in an environment of 
pervasive risks, incomplete information and/or information asymmetry, 
the need to access credit to overcome input supply problems, potential 
enhancements in access to extension advice, and increased market 
integration (De Janvry et al. 1991, Govereh & Jayne 2003, Key & 
Runsten 1999, Key et al. 2000). Much of the literature takes it as given 
that producers predominantly participate in these chains in order to earn 
additional income (Little & Watts, 1994), although a subset of studies do 
acknowledge, or at least imply, that individual farmers may contract or 
participate in these value chains for differing reasons (Delgado, 1999). A 
unifying theme across the literature, however, is that informal and formal 
institutional development remains important in creating efficient market 
systems for the development of small-scale agriculture (Key & Runsten 
1999, Narrod et al. 2009). 
In addition, the changing context of trade liberalization and Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the 1980-90’s saw governments 
withdraw from their traditional involvement in agricultural markets 
increasingly obligated to do so by the international financial institutions 
as conditionality for Aid, and more recently by trade agreements such as 
the WTO. There is wide evidence that poor rural producers have found 
themselves systematically precluded from these high-value market 
chains, left to fend for themselves in traditional markets in which prices, 
as well standards and related requirements, are lower (Reardon & 
Berdegue, 2002, IFAD 2011). Moreover, the restructuring of markets 
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and power relations beyond the farm gate has been underreported in the 
debate about sustainable agriculture and rural poverty. 
The alternative method for ensuring farmer participation in these 
chains would be through exploiting other factors such as reliance on 
external rather than internal economies of scale through networking or 
clustering and other forms of alliances. These could be alliances among 
smallholders or through establishing links between exporters or larger 
integrated farmers that have already overcome the major barriers to 
market entry (Kirsten & Sartouris 2002). Some studies have shown that 
small farmers may gain market access to export markets through 
different forms of support, which include partnerships with export firms 
– including contractual arrangements, formation of Producer 
Organizations (POs) to provide economies of scale and support from 
Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Minten et al. 2005, Henson 
et al. 2005, Narrod et al. 2009). The question remains as to whether these 
arrangements are sustainable in the long run.  
This paper lays emphasis on farmer’s motivation in participating and 
remaining in high value chains, despite prevailing high transaction costs 
and skewed income distributions discussed in previous chapters. The 
second original contribution of this paper is to determine the various 
ways in which standards have shaped farmers’ participation in these 
chains through intermediaries and institutional arrangements in the 
Kenyan context.  
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6.2 Case study Methodological Approach 
6.2.1  Analytical Framework 
The starting point for this analysis is that whilst smallholders’ 
competitive advantages over large commercial farms lie principally in 
their intensive local knowledge and their ability to employ family labour 
and therefore reduce costs, their small scale leads to higher unit 
transaction costs in almost all non-labour transactions especially where 
standards are concerned (as shown in the previous chapter 5). As such, 
an exploratory analysis of constraints faced by smallholders gives a 
preliminary contextual enquiry into the production, marketing, 
information and credit constraints related to meeting and maintaining 
required standards, which may raise transaction costs and/or or limit 
their participation in HVCs. In this context, the level and nature of 
transaction costs are key determinants of market participation coupled 
with a wide range of other factors such as access to information, assets, 
and the availability of institutional arrangements that mitigate transaction 
costs.  
Underlying this analysis is the relationships between smallholder 
farmers and the product, market and the institutional environments. 
Poole and de Frece (2010) suggested a simple typology of two types of 
internal initiatives and/or external interventions, and institutional and 
organisational innovations in commercial agricultural markets in sub-
Saharan Africa. Broadly speaking, these innovations are aimed at 
redressing the management and organisational weaknesses that impair 
commercial performance and reduce the transaction costs that cause 
weak or missing markets. This framework may be employed in this case 
to determine smallholders’ motivation to participate and remain in these 
chains given the constraints, and the institutional mechanisms through 
which participation is achieved. Finally, the sustainability of these 
institutional arrangements is analysed by determining the vertical and 
horizontal arrangements and dynamics and how these affect their 
cohesion and long term benefits that they provide for smallholders 
specifically with respect to meeting the required standards for HVCs. 
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6.2.2 Data and Methods 
The study utilized primary data from a survey of participant and non-
participant farmers that was carried out February to May 2009. This was 
also informed by a qualitative research phase between August and 
September 2009, which included in-depth interviews with producer 
organizations, exporters, market intermediaries, government and non-
governmental institutions. The sampling frame was obtained from the 
Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA). The survey took 
place in 9 districts in major horticultural producing areas in Eastern, 
Central, Coast, Rift Valley and Nairobi provinces. A total of 203 
respondents (including exporters) were interviewed in the first round. 
They included those involved in the production of flowers, fresh fruits 
and vegetables. The second round of interviews involved 18 key 
informants from various institutions, and a total of 18 producer 
organizations and 3 major producer umbrella organizations.  Data from 
181 smallholders in the horticultural production was used in this 
section’s analysis. A multinomial logistical regression was applied in 
analysing the determinants of smallholder participation in the various 
marketing arrangements and their participation in the export market. 
Variables included the socio-economic characteristics such as age, 
gender, education and farm size (capital endowments); farm 
characteristics such as distance from market and number of labourers; 
market access factors such as access to information and credit and other 
explanatory variables explained below.  
Exploratory data analysis is largely used to describe the nature and 
characteristics of smallholders in the horticulture sector in Kenya whilst 
an econometric approach is used to comprehend the determining factors 
for their participation in HVCs. To augment this discussion, a qualitative 
analysis of data from key informants was carried out to understand the 
institutional support mechanisms that exist for farmers and their 
sustainability in the long run. 
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6.3 The Kenyan Context 
6.3.1 Smallholders in Horticulture HVCs and Their 
Constraints 
Characteristics of Smallholders in the Horticultural Sector in Kenya 
In Kenya, close to 70 per cent of agricultural production is done by 
smallholders; 65 per cent of horticulture exports and 90 per cent of 
domestic horticultural production is directly attributed to smallholders. 
The smallholders in HVCs in Kenya are characterized very small sized 
landholdings (.25 to 10 ha) whose average is 2.39 acres. Findings from 
our field survey in 2009 indicated that on average, the area under 
horticulture is about 1.98 acres. Production is mainly rain fed although 
23 per cent of farmers interviewed used some form of irrigation during 
the dry season. Smallholders in Kenya often employ family labour on 
their farms and mostly engage casual labourers during the planting and 
harvesting seasons to reduce the workload. The percentage of farmers 
who rely on both family and hired labour is 56.3. On average, where 2 
family members work on the farm, an additional 2 casual labourers are 
employed (Table 6.1). Thirty three per cent (33%) of the farmers had 
written contracts, which specified product quality and quantity including 
price whilst 28.7 per cent had verbal contractual agreements with various 
intermediaries. Of the farmers interviewed, 70 per cent belonged to a 
producer organization (PO) either formally or informally. The average 
age of respondents was 35.9 years and average years in education are 
11.8 years. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary Characteristics of Smallholders in FFV Sector in Kenya 
(N=181) 
Average years in Horticulture export farming 8.5 
Average years of education 11.8 
Average age of respondents 35.9 
Average land holdings (acres) 2.53 
Average area under horticulture (acres) 2.19 
Average size of labour (Number) 3.9 
Per centage farmers using family labour 56.3 
Farmers with written contracts 33.1 
Per centage farmers belonging to POs 70.1 
Per centage farmers with access to credit 25.7 
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Most of the export products are sold to brokers and middlemen who 
take 39 per cent of the market share. Thirty three per cent (33%) of the 
respondents sold their export produce to large and small scale exporters 
through contractual agreements and 34 per cent sold to the local market 
and had no prior agreements with exporters or brokers (figure 6.1). 
Brokers buy from farmers who have organized themselves in producer 
groups that constitute a very important component in linking farmers to 
export markets. 
 
Figure 6.1: Summary Market Players for Smallholders in Kenya’s 
Horticulture Sector Value Chain 
 
Source: Survey 2009 
 
Further analysis of the data suggests that 70 per cent of producers 
belong to (POs). These are key market intermediaries through which 
farmers organize themselves not only to access markets, but also to be 
able to lower their costs of compliance with standards (table 6.2). The 
survey indicates that market access is the principal reason for joining a 
producer organization and lowering costs of compliance is the second 
most important reason for joining a producer organization. Respondents 
also feel that by joining a PO they have a better bargaining power for 
prices and related quality requirements. POs are also important sources 
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of information and technology for smallholders’ upgrading of their 
production. 
 
Table 6.2: Smallholders’ Reasons for Joining a Producer organization 
Reason per centage 
Guaranteed market for produce 78 
Better negotiated prices 53 
Assistance with meeting standards 93 
Access to credit (collateral) 51 
Access to information 67 
Access to technology and capacity building 72.4 
**Multiple responses allowed 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, these chains are governed by 
numerous standards, which are often costly. On average, the cost of 
meeting standards for smallholders is about 7-13 per cent of their total 
costs of production. In addition, the HVCs in Kenya are quasi-
hierarchical and vertically coordinated, meaning that nearly all aspects of 
the chain management - production, transport and marketing, are mostly 
controlled by the exporters and middlemen. This implies that the 
smallholders access markets via contracts with exporters or through their 
POs or through other intermediaries. They have no direct access to 
markets, which means they have no control of quality specifications or 
standards (Figure 6.2). Middlemen and brokers seem to have an 
important role in determining the prices and quality of produce that 
farmers produce for export. To some extent, POs are important for 
bargaining for the farm gate prices but not very significant in bargaining 
for quality specification, as they are already set and there is no room for 
bargaining. 
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Figure 6.2: Who Determines Price and Quality of Produce in Kenya’s HVCs? 
 
Source: Survey 2009 
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Constraints Faced by Smallholders in Kenya’s HVCs  
In Kenya, smallholders dominate agricultural sector and they produce 
about 65-70 per cent of all agricultural production. In essence their 
success in farming should tremendously improve incomes and 
subsequently have a positive impact on rural poverty and development. 
In the last two decades, owing to the falling prices of traditional export 
products such as tea and coffee in the world markets Kenyan producers 
have diversified their exports into non-traditional high value export 
crops such as fresh fruits and vegetables and cut flowers. However, these 
high value chains are governed by numerous health & safety; 
environmental; and labour standards and often, in addition, require 
traceability. Meeting these standards is a prerequisite for staying in the 
export business, but at the same time a major challenge because of their 
dynamic nature and related costs. Evidence suggested that some fresh 
export vegetable farmers were being marginalized by these requirements 
(Okello 2005, Maertens 2006) while other studies however found that 
compliance to these requirements improved increased their incomes 
(Asfaw, 2009). 
Kenyan smallholders who have succeeded in producing for the export 
market are facing new challenges related to new consumer demand for 
food quality and safety. European Union (EU) retailers are increasingly 
demanding that produce be certified according to specific food safety 
and quality standards (Muriithi et al, 2010) all of which require some 
changes on the part of smallholders. Results from our survey in 2009 
gives a number of constraints faced by smallholders as ranging from high 
cost of inputs, limited access to extension services, lack of irrigation 
infrastructure, and limited access to direct markets, high costs of meeting 
standards, information asymmetry and low produce prices among others 
(Table 6.3). 
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Table 6.3: Constraints Faced by Smallholders in Kenya’s Horticulture Sector  
(N=181) 
 
Constraint 
%Very 
Severe %Severe %Moderate Not Severe 
Not  a 
constraint 
Costs of meeting standards 46.0 19.9 13.0 8.1 13.0 
Access to information on 
standards 20.3 12.2 36.2 12.4 18.6 
Access to Credit 54.9 17.9 11.0 6.4 9.8 
Access to extension services 17.8 13.8 19.0 26.4 23.0 
Direct access to Markets 50.9 15.2 14.6 5.3 14.0 
Low produce prices 58.5 20.1 11.4 6.7 3.3 
Poor Infrastructure 31.8 11.3 21.2 8.7 28.5 
Distance to markets 39.1 23.6 19.0 5.0 12.5 
Source: Survey Results 2009 
From the above table it is clear that the most severe constraints are 
related to low producer prices, access to credit, access to markets, and 
those related to meeting standards - in that order. Smallholders felt that 
they receive very low prices for their produce and the exporters often 
decide on prices and there have no say. Access to credit is also a major 
problem facing smallholders as they do not have collateral and are often 
shunned by regular banks. The findings are that groups of farmers can 
be given credit only if they are registered, have been in existence for at 
least two years, and can provide collateral from their produce through 
their respective lead firms and/or intermediaries. These requirements 
pose a major challenge for smallholders’ access to credit. In addition, 
smallholders also expressed concern over the costs of meeting standards, 
which are prohibitive unless they comply  under group certification. 
In view of these constraints, there are a number of strategies that  
these smallholders have adopted to mitigate the costs related to meeting 
standards; some of these strategies include joining a PO. Within these 
groups, smallholders are able to access information related to meeting 
standards; access training on technical aspects of meeting the standards; 
access credit for the initial investments to meet these standards; sharing 
costs in a pool and obtain contracts with exporters. There are also a 
number of intermediaries operating in the sector to reduce this burden, 
some of which include NGOs, middlemen and brokers.  
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6.3.2 Factors Determining Smallholder Participation in 
HVCs in Kenya  
Given the above characteristics and constraints, smallholders may 
choose to participate in markets using different intermediaries owing to 
the benefits they may derive from such participation and also because of 
logistical and informational benefits that may reduce their costs of 
transaction. Furthermore, certain household and farm characteristics may 
influence the access to resources and services and therefore influence the 
motivation to participate in value chains. Standards may pose a 
constraint and therefore hinder participation, but in cases where there 
are certain institutional or organizational interventions, this may be a 
motivation to participate in HVCs. Therefore, in analysing the 
motivation of smallholders to participate in high value chains a 
Multinomial Probit Model (MNPM) is applied. According to survey 
results, there are three main channels through which farmers will sell 
their produce:  
(i) Spot (local) market 
(ii) To brokers/middlemen through POs 
(iii) To exporters through contracts 
 
Variable Description 
It is expected that small-scale producer participation in the export of 
FFV is determined by human capital variables, farm characteristics and 
assets and transaction costs. A critical issue in empirical analysis in this 
context is that some of the hypothesized variables are not directly 
observable, for example, expected price and transaction costs and their 
determinants. Hence there is a need to utilize proxy variables to help 
control for the effects of these unobservable determining factors (for 
example David & Han, 2004). The expected relationship between the 
dependent variables (Table 6.4) and each explanatory variable is 
presented below. The predicated relationships are based on the series of 
in-depth interviews with small-scale POs during the qualitative phase of 
the research and a review of literature from past studies.  
 
 
 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
196 
Table 6.4: Explanatory Variables of FFV Smallholder Participation in Export 
Market in Kenya’s Horticulture Sector 
 
*significant at 10% level 
**significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
According to the demographic characteristics for the data 
summarized in table 5.3, 33 per cent of smallholders participated in the 
spot market only, while 67 per cent participated in export markets either 
through contracts with exporters or through arrangements with POs to 
sell to middlemen. Of these, 88 per cent of participants in the export 
markets were male while 71 per cent of those participating in spot 
markets are female. There is no significant difference in the average age 
of those participating in export markets either through contract or with 
POs, and those participating in spot markets. Farmers with contracts 
have slightly larger farms and tend to have more labourers on average 4.8 
against 2.8 for other farmers. There was also a marked difference in the 
distance from the nearest tarmac roads. The average was much higher 
for spot market participants; it was the same case for distances to 
airports. Farmers who have contracts have higher access to credit 
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because they can often use their contracts as collateral when borrowing 
from financial institutions. These farmers also tend to have better access 
to extension services because exporters often have their extension agents 
monitoring the production processes of farmers with whom they have 
contracts to ensure compliance with requirements. 
The relevant variables for which participation is regressed include 
both economic and social factors. These variables are hypothesized to 
explain chain participation and according to literature, would give some 
expected signs.  For instance, the variable gender takes the value of 1 for 
male respondents and zero for female ones. In Kenya, men traditionally 
manage cash crops, and therefore being male is highly likely to facilitate 
participation in the export market. The effect of age, given in years is 
likely to be related to the years in horticulture farming and therefore 
older farmers with more experience are likely to participate in the export 
market rather than the domestic one.  Levels of education are likely to 
influence the ability to decipher information and requirements for the 
export markets and hence higher levels of education will positively 
influence participation in export chains. 
Other farm characteristics and resource endowments may also 
influence participation for instance the farm size and area under 
horticulture given in acres are likely to have a positive effect on 
participation. The number of labourers in a farm may also positively 
influence participation because horticulture production is a labour 
intensive exercise and therefore may influence the ability of a farm to 
produce for export. Distance from the tarmac road and distance from 
the airport given in kilometres are likely to have an effect on transaction 
costs related to transport and hence farmers who closer to tarmac roads 
and airport are likely to participate in horticulture production for export.  
Finally other variables such as access to credit and access to extension 
services may also positively influence the participation of smallholders in 
the export markets. Credit may stimulate investments for meeting 
standards or for the expansion of the area under horticulture while 
access to extension services may provide vital information needed to 
upgrade production, meet market requirements or access certain 
markets. Belonging to a producer organization is a variable that is likely 
to influence the ability to participate in export markets positively since 
for most exporters, obtaining a contract and group certification is a pre-
requisite and reduces transaction costs. 
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Econometric Approach 
Under the logit model, we assume that that a farmer a farmer participates 
in the export market if the utility (benefit) the farmer receives is greater 
with participation and otherwise does not. Let Yi =1 if the farmer has is 
participating in the export value chain i and Yi =0 otherwise. The utility 
or profitability of participation is hypothesized to be a function of a set 
of exogenous variables Z. Technology adoption can be characterized as:  
Y= X¢g + e …………………………………………… ..(1) 
 where g is a vector of parameters and e is an error term that 
includes measurement error and unobserved factors that affect 
participation (Amemiya, 1981).The probability of adoption is given 
by:  
……………………………………... (2) 
Where e is the exponential function. 
 
In our case the logit model would take the form: 
 
………. (3) 
Intercept D ; 1X = Dummy for Gender (1=male);  2X Age; 
 3X Education (YEARS IN SCHOOL); 4X = Farm Size (acres); 
 5X Area under Horticulture (acres);  6X Experience in horticulture 
(years);  7X Number of labourers (number); 8X =Distance from 
Tarmac Road (KM);  9X Distance from Airport (KM);  10X  Dummy 
for Contractual agreement (1=yes);  X11  = Dummy for membership in 
a PO (1=Yes); X12 = Dummy for Access to credit (1=Yes),  =  P Error 
term. 
However the application of the multinomial probit offers several 
advantages over the logit model. It allows for different degrees of 
randomness of the utilities assigned to the choice alternatives and 
accounts for interdependence among them and can accommodate 
reasonable assumptions about subject’s preference structures (Haussman 
and Wise, 1978). First we can simply admit two alternative choices, i.e 
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participate in export market (j=1) or not to participate (j=0). Secondly 
we can then detail the various forms of participation as (participation 
through contracting or participation through middlemen).  
In this paper a multinomial probit estimation procedure is applied 
based on Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment in which the choice 
probability for a given alternative j from a choice set of C containing K 
elements. The model assumes that individuals select one of the three 
mutually exclusive alternatives. The random utility of farmer i, i=1…..N 
for choice j, j=1….N and formulated as: 
 
……………………………………… (4) 
 
Where Xi is a (KX1) vector of explanatory variables for individual i 
which may contain individual specific characteristics and alternative 
attributes faced by the individual (in this case farm characteristics, 
institutional variables, infrastructure etc). εi = εi1+ εi2+ …….εiN which is 
a vector of stochastic terms that are assumed to be distributed as a 
trivariate ( in our case of 3 choices) identically and independently across 
N individuals with zero mean. Usually this is J regressions one each 
comparing to the benchmark. 
 
…………. (5) 
 
Where: 
 αj is the intercept in regression involving the difference in utility between option j and 
option 0 and 
 
βj1 is the coefficient on the first explanatory variable in the regression, this applies to 
βj2 to βjk and 
X1ij…………..XKij are explanatory variables summarized above 
 
We present the three alternative cases in which the smallholders are 
faced with more than one choice of participation. They may decide to 
participate/sell in spot markets; or they may also decide to export by selling to 
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exporters through contractual arrangements; or sell to brokers/middlemen through 
their producer organizations.  
 
We take the spot market as a reference. In the specifications below: 
 
Ui1=α1+β11+…β1k+β12ProbCONTRACTi - β32ProbSPOTi+εi1…(6) 
AND  
Ui2=α2+β21+…β2K+β22ProbMIDDLEMENi-β32ProbSPOT+εi2 (7) 
Where (β11+……..β1k) (β21+……..β2K) and are the range of variables that 
might affect farmer participation ie, (farmer characteristics, farm characteristics, 
infrastructure variable, credit, information as outlined above). 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 6.5 below gives a summary of the results from multinomial probit 
estimates. Among farmer specific characters age does not play a very 
significant role participation in export markets through any of the 
choices. Education is also not significant in explaining any of the choices 
farmers make while exporting, however the variable for gender is 
significant at 10 per cent level for contracted farmers. A male farmer are 
most likely to be contracted by exporters and this can be explained by 
the fact that contracted farmers have to provide evidence of their assets 
at farm level as a pre-requisite for being issued with contracts. In a 
patriarchal society such as in Kenya, these assets are predominantly 
owned by men. 
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Table 6.5: Multinomial Probit Estimates 
 
 
N=181; Pseudo 
2R =0.312; LR Chi2 (10) = 41.37; Prob > Chi2 = 0.004; Log Likelihood =   -79.38 
*significant at 10% level 
**significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Other characteristics such as size of the farm and size of the area 
under horticulture are significant. The farm size is only significant at 10 
per cent level for farmers exporting under contract option. Farmers with 
larger farms have more land that they can dedicate to horticulture 
production and therefore more likely to be contracted. The area under 
horticulture is significant at 1 per cent level for all the options for 
exporting, the larger the area of a farm under horticulture the more likely 
a farmer is able to participate in export value chains. 
Experience in horticulture which is denoted by the number of years 
spent in horticulture farming is also very significant variable. This is 
more significant at 1 per cent level for contracted farmers than for 
farmers who export through middle men because the more the years one 
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participates in horticulture production, the better the skills in horticulture 
production, more experienced farmers have a better understanding of 
the market landscape and are therefore more likely to be contracted by 
exporters or to seek contracts with exporters. The number of labourers 
is also important for contracted farmers at 5 per cent level of significance 
compared to the other options for exporting where the number of 
labourers is important for determining participation at 10 per cent. The 
distance from tarmac roads and distance from the airport negatively 
influences the ability to participate in export market; this is more 
pronounced for farmers exporting through middle men. Access to credit 
is significant at 1 per cent level for farmers who participate in export 
markets through contracts, access to credit increases the likelihood of 
being contracted by 24 per cent. This is because these farmers are not 
only able to secure credit by using their contracts as collateral but they 
are also able to access the finances required to upgrade their production 
and meet required standards. 
The results of the logit model are not significantly different from 
those of the multinomial probit model above. Table 6.6 reports the 
maximum likelihood estimates of the logistic regression model. A closer 
look at the table reveals that most of the variables have expected sign. 
Diagnostic tests were used to verify the reliability of the results. Analysis 
of variance inflation factor (VIF) and contingence coefficients revealed 
that multicollinearity was not a problem for continuous and discrete 
variables, respectively. 
On farm characteristics, farm size is significant at 10 per cent level 
but area under horticulture is significant at 1  per cent level ie a unit 
increase in area under horticulture would increase exports by 9 per cent. 
Farmer characteristics such as education are not significant but 
experience in horticulture farming is significant at 1 per cent level.  
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Table 6.6: Results of the Logit Model 
Variable  Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect Std error p-value 
Gender (male) 0.072 0.027 0.184 0.153 
Age (years) 0.011 0.016 0.024 0.021 
Education (years) 0.068 0.012 0.154 0.214 
Farm Size (acres) 0.108* 0.123 0.321 0.062 
Area under horticulture 
(acres) 0.294*** 0.134 0.059 0.001 
Experience in horticulture 
(years) 0.104*** 0.035 0.108 0.009 
Labour (Number) 0.128* 0.031 0.169 0.073 
Distance from tarmac 
road (KM) -0.297** 0.075 0.131 0.019 
Distance from airport 
(KM) -0.254* 0.091 0.027 0.066 
Contractual agreement 
(yes) 0.112*** 0.073 0.119 0.004 
Membership in a PO 0.214* 0.092 0.095 0.074 
Access to credit  0.119*** 0.105 0.126 0.001 
Constant -0.332   0.257  0.001 
N=181; Pseudo 
2R =0.226; LR Chi2 (12) = 48.99; Prob > Chi2 = 0.00; Log Likelihood =   -81.91 
*significant at 10% level 
**significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
The infrastructure variables which are related to transaction costs 
were found to be statistically significant and negatively related to farmer 
participation in export horticulture, the longer the distance from tarmac 
road the less likely a farmer is able to participate in export markets.   This 
would mean an increase in transaction costs related to transport and time 
taken in accessing remote villages.  
Having a contractual agreement is significant at 1 per cent level as this 
would increase the likelihood of exporting by 7 per cent. Membership in 
a producer organization is also significant at 5 per cent level. Access to 
credit is also significant at 1 per cent level and increases the likelihood of 
farmer participation in export value chains by 12 per cent. Variables such 
as education, age and gender are not significant. 
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6.3.3 Intermediaries for Smallholder Participation in HVCs and 
Their Sustainability 
Inclusion or exclusion is not defined in terms of the farmers’ situation at 
a single point in time, but rather in terms of the capacity of small-scale 
producers to sustain their participation in a given supply-chain. The 
initial entry and continued participation of smallholders in HVCs is 
influenced by the intermediaries in the sector. When asked about how 
they first learnt about horticulture export, producer groups are seen to 
play a major role together with extension officers and NGOs (figure 6.3) 
 
Figure 6.3: Key Intermediaries for Initial Participation of Smallholders in 
Kenyan’s Horticulture Value Chain 
 
Source: survey 2009 
 HVCs are evolving and becoming ever more challenging and 
competitive especially in chains that are largely governed by standards 
(Vorley, 2001). The structure of Kenya’s horticulture value chain is 
market led; basically because prevailing standards and requirements form 
an integral part of the chain coordination and control mechanisms used 
by buyers. Smallholder participation in this chain is always centred on 
meeting the necessary standards and/or requirements for this market, 
failure to which farmers are automatically excluded from the chain. 
Results from the survey indicate that POs are still pivotal in providing 
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the necessary information on new standards and links with HCDA are 
also important in providing the necessary information for farmers’ 
continued participation in these chains (figure 6.4). According to the 
figure HCD is a key intermediary in transmitting standards related 
information. Producer organizations are also key in transmitting this 
information to individual farmers after they obtain it from the exporters.  
 
Figure 6.4: Key Intermediaries for Providing Information on New Standards 
in Kenya’s Horticulture Sector 
 
Source: Survey 2009 
 
Given the perishable nature of horticultural produce, and the demand 
for quality and safety attributes, relationships, networks, skills, and 
coordination mechanisms are necessary for managing the flow of 
products between intermediaries and to ensure that the quality 
specifications are met. In effect, critical success factors for the proper 
coordination of the horticulture sector include: traceability of produce 
(farm to fork principle); economies of scale related to initial investments 
and recurrent transactions for compliance to standards; access to 
transport taking into consideration the product’ perishable nature; access 
to markets by consistently meeting the requirements for that particular 
market; dissemination of information to a large number of smallholders 
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who are dispersed; and ensuring consistent and quality supply of produce 
from a large number of producers who are differentiated.  
Smallholders lack the capacity both financially and technically, to 
overcome constraints related to meeting these requirements and as a 
result, market intermediaries are found to be the pivotal element in 
ensuring smallholder participation in HVCs. This section looks at 
various mechanisms by which smallholders in Kenya’s horticulture 
sector use intermediaries to overcome constraints and participate in 
these value chains. 
Producer Organizations and Smallholder Inclusion in Kenya’s 
Horticulture Sector  
Monitoring and enforcement costs for the buyers tend to be higher 
because smallholders are often dispersed and differentiated. In addition 
the traceability requirements of GlobalGAP cannot be fulfilled if small 
quantities of produce are sourced from dispersed farmers. To overcome 
this problem, buyers tend to prefer dealing with groups of farmers, 
which guarantee volumes, quality, and consistency of produce. 
In Kenya’s horticulture value chain and producer organizations can 
be traced back to the late 1990s to early 2000’s when the standards and 
requirements for export into the EU reached its peak. Initially, most 
horticultural produce were sold in spot markets or through middlemen 
who then sold them to exporters. With rising standards and the need for 
traceability, a number of things changed, and the entire chain was 
restructured becoming quasi-hierarchical (as seen in the previous 
chapters). Due to the high financial costs related to setting up 
infrastructure and complying with required standards, many smallholders 
were not able to cope. Subsequently, it is estimated that 40 per cent of 
smallholders participating in the export sector had to drop out for failure 
to meet the required standards (Okello et al, 2007), this was further 
exacerbated by the lack of traceability for buyers which meant that the 
chain had to be restructured to accommodate these changes.  
As a result, buyers developed strategies for reducing transaction costs 
related to monitoring and enforcement by introducing group 
certification schemes. These schemes involve groups of farmers 
clustered in a common location and growing the same or similar export 
crops. Under these schemes, the groups of farmers are allowed to 
comply as a unit but only after satisfying requirements of both external 
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and internal audits (Otieno & Knorringa, 2012). To facilitate this, 
smallholders come together in groups of 30 or more and have common 
infrastructure which all members of the group can access. Other 
requirements imposed by the buyers include minimum acreage (1 acre 
for each producer), groups should be officially registered and guarantee a 
certain minimum volume of produce which would be agreed upon in 
advance. In addition, the buyers provide written or verbal contracts 
either individually to group members or to the group as a unit. 
Eventually this phenomenon has been replicated across the sector and 
has since become the norm.  
In the fieldwork survey, 18 groups (POs) (See Appendix 6.1) were 
visited and out of these, 13 groups were registered, 10 had group 
contracts and only 7 had valid group certification at the time of the 
survey. The rest of the groups had failed to renew their group 
certification schemes (which are renewed yearly) due to financial 
incapacity. However, FGDs with farmers revealed that a further 3 of the 
groups that do not have contracts are still able to export through verbal 
agreements with exporters, some of the groups also sold their produce to 
brokers/middlemen who then exported them to overseas markets. 
Furthermore, some groups did not have valid certification but still had 
contracts to export; these group members were certified individually 
through their exporters (Figure 6.5).  
 
From the above analysis, POs are not only important for helping 
farmers to access the requirements they need to fulfil in order to comply 
with standards but are extremely important for the logistical 
coordination of the value chain and thus determines to a large extent 
whether or not a farmer will be able to access the market. In addition, 
exporters provide various forms of support such as credit for 
compliance requirements, technical capacity building and logistics for 
transportation. On the other hand, exporters need POs to be able to 
coordinate a large number of farmers who are differentiated; ensure 
traceability and consistent quality and they need the numbers in order to 
make economic sense when buying from farmers in a specific region. 
Further interviews revealed that farmer also organize themselves in 
groups in order to access credit from financial institutions or from 
exporters and they recognize the importance of POs in guaranteeing 
collateral. POs also provide an easier avenue through which information 
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concerning standards or any related market changes is passed down to 
farmers. Exporters often manage their POs through field extension 
officers (Table 6.2).  
 
Figure 6.5: Producer Group Dynamics: Registration and Contract Status in 
Kenya’s HVCs 
 
 
Source: Survey of 2009 
 
Empirical Evidence on Contract Farming in Kenya’s Horticulture Sector 
Contract farming in Kenya’s horticulture sector has been revolutionized 
by the necessity and requirement to meet export standards. These 
requirements have hence formed an integral part of these contractual 
arrangements. These agreements are either done through POs or directly 
through individual farmers and consist of a written legal contract or a 
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memorandum of understanding between the parties. Most contracts 
specify terms such as duration, agreed quantity and quality and terms of 
payment. Findings from fieldwork in Kenya indicate various ‘models’ of 
contracting exist in Kenya’s HVCs: 
a. The ‘centralized model’ consisting of an exporter procuring from 
a large number of smallholders. The cooperation is vertically 
integrated with services such as pre-financing for inputs, 
technical support and transport provided by the exporter. 
b. The ‘multi-patriate model’ consists of two or more organizations 
or intermediaries where the exporter buys from group/groups of 
farmers that are financed by an NGO, some donor or the 
government. The NGO would act as the main financier for 
inputs, meeting technical standards and providing technical 
support to farmers. The first agreement is usually between the 
exporters and the farmers, the second one between the exporter 
and NGO or government and the third one is a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the three parties. 
c. Individual contracts were mostly between medium and large 
scale farmers and exporters. 
 Obtaining a contract with an exporting firm is not guaranteed and 
depended on several factors including:  
x the size of the farm – farmers with less than an acre under 
horticulture could not obtain written contracts with exporters;  
x the physical and capital base of the farmer – farmers with larger 
farm who have installed the required infrastructure to meet 
standards became automatic candidates for contracts,  
x a farmers membership in a PO – farmers not belonging to POs 
only obtained contracts if they had large farms and were able to 
meet the standards and requirements on their own and;  
x the registration status of the PO – POs that are not registered 
could only get verbal agreements and prices were not agreed 
upon in advance.  
x Presence of internal control mechanisms within the group such 
as group by-laws. 
x The state of infrastructure in a particular areas 
 
 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
210 
Table 6.6: Nature of Contractual Arrangements in Kenya’s Horticulture 
Sector 
 
Type of contract Specifications Contract benefits 
Per 
cent 
Written Individual 
contracts 
between farmer 
and exporter 
x Initial investments in 
infrastructure for standards 
should already be established 
and the farm should be large 
enough (5 acres and above). 
x Quality and price specified in 
advance. 
x Lead firms often provide seeds, and 
may assist farmers with certification 
costs.  
x Transport is also provided as produce is 
sold farm gate. 
5% 
Written group 
contracts 
between farmers 
and lead firm 
through their 
respective POs 
x The PO should be registered 
with no less than 30 
members. 
x Minimum area under 
horticulture should be 1 acre 
for each farmer. 
x Contract run for a year and 
have quantities and prices 
specified. 
x The lead firm provides support in initial 
investments for standardization such as 
a grading shed and provides for a group 
certification scheme.  
x Inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and 
pesticides are provided for by lead firm 
and deducted from farmer’s earnings.  
x Lead firms provide extension services 
and closely monitor farmers. 
15% 
Written group 
contracts 
between farmers 
and lead firms 
through their POs 
and 
intermediaries –
often NGOs or 
larger farmers 
x Intermediaries should be 
registered and certified.  
Intermediaries often have a 
number of POs in a certain 
region.  
x No minimum acreage required 
for farmers but a minimum 
quantity is specified to the 
intermediary.  
x Contracts run for a year and 
have prices and quantity 
specified. 
x Lead firm provides information and may 
assist with certification costs for 
intermediaries.  
x Intermediaries ensure each farmer 
complies and provide inputs, and 
collateral for credit.  
x Farmers are monitored by the 
intermediary who provides extension 
services. 
8% 
Spoken contracts 
between 
unregistered POs 
and exporters 
x POs must be committed to 
supply a specified quantity 
within a specified time. 
x Prices are negotiated at 
harvest time. 
x Contracts are not binding and 
both parties can opt out. 
x The lead firms. 
x No requirements for minimum 
farm sizes. 
x Inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and 
pesticides are provided to farmers and 
deducted from their harvest. 
x There is no guarantee that the farmer 
will sell his produce to the exporter with 
whom they have contracts. 
x Most often groups of farmers are in 
need of inputs or other forms of support 
such as compliance to standards.  
5.1% 
 
Table 6.6 above gives a summary of the findings from the survey. It 
indicates that exporters and lead firms play a major role in ensuring 
quality throughout the chain. Contractual arrangements provide for 
seeds, as well as costs of compliance of standards including packaging 
material in some instances as well as transport costs because produce is 
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mostly collected at the farm. In addition to this, exporters have 
undertaken to building structures for producer groups with whom they 
have contracts. Exporting companies offer extension services including 
advice on good agricultural practices and training on standards and other 
requirements. Many of these exporters’ functions are subsidised by 
development donor funding programs such as PIP/COELACP, JICA, 
GTZ and USAID. 
Emerging Innovations for Inter-sectoral Partnerships and Implications 
for Smallholders Inclusion into the Kenyan HVC  
Inter-sectoral partnerships in Kenyan HVCs were observed to be 
between different entities - government agencies, private sector, NGOs 
and donors and POs. Each of them has a different role to play in the 
value chains and most of the roles played are aimed at reducing 
constraints related to production and markets. In HVCs where there are 
requirements related to meeting standards, inter-sectoral partnerships are 
often aimed at providing information, technical assistance and mitigating 
transaction costs in these chains (Markelova et al, 2009). In some cases 
these partnerships may also enable producers to negotiate power 
relationships along the chain and reach more favourable terms of trade 
(Markelova et al 2009; Thorp et al 2005).  
In Kenya’s HVC dynamics in the 1990s, coupled with liberalization in 
the sector, led to the changing roles of horticultural Crops Development 
Authority (HCDA)28. Initially, the HCDA was mandated with regulation 
of the sector and marketing roles including price fixing, trade regulation, 
and operation of processing facilities, extension and capacity building of 
farmers. However private sector lobby groups (mainly large flower 
farmers) felt that there was too much interference in the market and 
their lobby led to the withdrawal of HCDA from the market. In 1995 
HCDA functions were trimmed by an act of parliament, to date the 
organization only performs regulatory functions and provides advisory 
services to stakeholders. Left with no support, many smallholders were 
excluded from the market and subsequently these roles were taken up by 
the private sector and NGOs. These dynamics saw an emergence of 
various forms of partnerships. 
                                                 
28 HCDA is a government parastatal whose mandate is to regulate the 
horticultural industry. 
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Donor-Private Sector Partnerships for Smallholder Compliance 
In Kenya’s HVC, the role of private sector in facilitating farmers to meet 
required standards and to access certification is often purely for profit 
and the financial obligations for this is met by the farmer through 
informal credit arrangements with the exporters. Other arrangements 
were between the exporters and donors, through which exporters apply 
for funds, which enable them to provide capacity building, technical 
assistance and infrastructure for compliance to standards including 
certification to groups of POs who export through them. These 
arrangements were however found to be unsustainable because when the 
funding ran out then some farmer organizations failed to renew their 
certification and were locked out of the market. One such arrangement 
was the PIP29/COLEACP30 grants which the European Development 
Fund (EDF) provided. The PIP program focused on maintaining the EU 
market access for producers and exporters of African Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries in the face of changing regulatory and market 
requirements. It focused its support on small-scale growers and rural 
women. Through this program, exporters were also able to access 
capacity building on issues relating to standards and requirements for 
exporting to the EU (Figure 6.6) 
Through these arrangements, farmers were able to receive 
information relating to standards; relevant training and capacity building; 
financial support for setting up the necessary initial infrastructure such as 
grading sheds, pesticide stores, coolers and rest areas; free farm inputs 
and free auditing and certification. The only condition was that farmers 
had to belong to a PO that was registered with a minimum membership 
of 30. The exporters on the other hand also received free training and 
capacity building on standards and financial support for auditing and 
certification.  
However these arrangements were found to be unsustainable because 
as soon as the funding ran out, some farmers were not able to afford the 
annual auditing and certification. During the course of the fieldwork in 
                                                 
29 PIP is a program financed by the EDF and was established by the EU at the 
request of ACP countries to prevent the negative effects of regulatory changes 
in the horticulture export sector. 
30 COLEACP is an inter-professional network of horticultural industry 
stakeholders in the ACP and EU countries. 
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2009, six producer organizations had earlier benefited from this program 
through their exporters, however, when the funding ran out, the 
producer groups were unable to renew their yearly certification and 
hence lost their export certificates.  
 
Figure 6.6: Donor-Private Sector Partnerships through PIP/COLEACP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four of these groups resorted to informal arrangements between the 
exporters and the smallholders in which the exporters would provide the 
necessary extension services by carrying out all the required spraying, and 
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compliance monitoring through their respective field officers. These 
services were offered to farmers on credit by exporters and deducted 
from their income at the end of the harvest.  
Donor-Government –Private Sector Partnerships 
More recently, the government has stepped up its involvement in 
providing services to the sector through partnerships with intermediaries. 
In this regard, there are numerous donor-funded initiatives which are 
given through government institutions31 for various programs in the 
horticulture sector. Donor financing in the agricultural sector in the last 
two years has reached over 6 billion Kenya shillings with horticulture (a 
priority sector) receiving close to 20 per cent of this funding. Funding is 
disbursed directly to the target geographical areas for specific 
programmes such as capacity building, and the installation of the 
required infrastructures to meeting standards. The government through 
its extension workers provides the necessary support to the POs who 
have to be registered (Figure 6.7).   
Recent developments in the sector have seen an emergence of new 
partnerships, which are aimed at increasing the participation of farmers 
in export markets by providing relevant support systems. One such 
programme is through the EU funded Micro-Enterprises Support 
Programme Trust (MESPT) – a micro finance trust whose main 
objective is to promote economic growth, employment creation and 
poverty alleviation through support to enterprises. MESPT works with 
intermediaries that provide financial or business development services to 
improve the performance of enterprises in all sectors and to all kinds of 
stakeholders including smallholders. Their aim is to strengthen financial 
intermediaries in order to establish a strong, stable, market-based micro-
finance sector in Kenya. In the horticulture sector, MESPT provides 
loans to financial intermediaries such as producer Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) at very low interest rates. These 
SACCOs then provide loans to producer organizations also at very low 
interest rates of about 1%. However, to ensure that loans are utilized for 
the intended purposes and are repaid, the SACCOs form partnerships 
with exporters in arrangements where exporters will provide capacity 
building on issues related to standards and set up infrastructure including 
                                                 
31 Institutions include: ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of trade, ministry of 
Industry, HCDA, KEPHIS, and more recently micro-finance organizations 
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costs for auditing and certification. The funding is disbursed directly to 
exporters by the SACCOS and the POs enter into contracts with both 
the exporters and the SACCOs. The exporters provide these services to 
farmers; they provide collateral for the loans and make repayments to the 
SACCO on behalf of the farmers (Figure 6.7). They also provide market 
linkages and monitoring and extension services to farmers. 
 
Figure 6.7: Donor-Government- Private Sector Partnerships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the course of fieldwork in 2009, there were six such 
arrangements between MESPT and several SACCOs32. One such 
                                                 
32 Taita Taveta Teachers SACCO which at the time had about 10 producer 
groups with about 300 farmers producing for both export and domestic 
market; Small and Micro-Enterprise Program (SMEP) which is s micro-finance 
institution targeting smallholders and SMEs among others. 
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arrangement involved MESPT and Taita Taveta Teachers SACCO who 
benefited from a loan of Kshs 10 million for asset and agricultural 
financing for smallholders. The SACCO provides loans to farmers 
through their POs which are 53 in number with about 1300 smallholders 
in both export and domestic markets. This was done in collaboration 
with two export firms; Vegpro and Patel involved in green beans and 
mango exports. The conditions for loans to farmers included, 
membership in a PO; a PO that had a group account with the SACCO; 
farmers must have a savings account with the SACCO; the farmers must 
have a written contract with an exporter; and must be in agri-business. 
The exporters provided necessary infrastructure for standards, training 
on standards, farm inputs and extension services all of which were paid 
for by the loan. The exporters also provide collateral in form of income 
from sales which they remit a percentage to Taita Taveta Teachers’ 
SACCO on behalf of the farmers for repayment of the loan. The interest 
rates on the loan is 1.5% and farmers are given a grace period of 
between three months to the time a crop is harvested. 
These arrangements have ensured that exporters closely monitor 
farmers who receive these loans and loan repayment rates were very high 
at 89 per cent. These types of arrangements were found to be more 
sustainable even though they involve many players. The changing roles 
of the private sector and other intermediaries in relatively ‘new’ forms of 
collaboration have been highlighted, and they allow otherwise excluded 
smallholders to participate in the export markets. 
6.4  Conclusion 
As already demonstrated from previous chapters, the nature of the HVC 
chain in Kenya is quasi-hierarchical and as such, the buyers/exporters 
have sophisticated forms of coordination and integration, and rules of 
participation. As we see in this chapter, the rules of participation in this 
quasi-hierarchical supply chain dominated by both public and privatised 
supermarket standards and the rise of contracts and specialised 
intermediaries are proving to be powerful drivers of divergence and 
within farming communities. Unlike previous research on standards and 
smallholders in global value chains, this chapter highlights different 
dynamics surrounding the constraints, opportunities and sustainability of 
smallholder participation in HVCs in the south. 
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First, by their nature smallholders in this chain comprise of ‘family’ 
farmers who have traditionally constituted the bedrock of the rural 
economy. They own small fragmented farms with low levels of 
capitalization and poor integration with actors in markets. They mainly 
depend on family labour or seasonally hired labour and hence can 
effectively participate in high value fruits and vegetable production, 
which are rather labour intensive.  Their constraints include access to 
finance, meeting market requirements (standards), direct access to 
markets, low levels of technology, poor infrastructure and lack of 
information and extension - in that order.  
Empirical results on participation are consistent with other studies 
(Blandon et al 2009) in which human capital variables such as age, gender 
and education are not important in determining participation in HVCs. 
Rather, farmers who participate in these chains are those who have 
higher levels of capitalization or bigger pieces of land; more experience 
in horticulture farming and a larger acreage under horticulture. Most 
significantly, having a contractual arrangement is very important in 
determining a farmer’s participation in export horticulture. Belonging to 
a producer organization is also one of the most important factors 
determining smallholder participation in these chains, this is not only for 
lowering costs or achieving economies of scale but also mainly for chain 
coordination.  Smallholders who have poor capitalization, low acreage 
and fewer years in horticulture risk being marginalized. Other factors 
such as poor infrastructure and distance to markets are negatively 
associated with participation as these raise transaction costs.  
In order to overcome these transaction costs and constraints, various 
market intermediaries have emerged in Kenya’s HVC in a bid not only to 
improve participation of smallholders in HVCs but also to ensure their 
sustainability. Findings from the study indicate that various 
intermediaries perform various functions ranging from reducing 
transaction costs; economies of scale through collective action; and 
providing various forms of support services that are otherwise not 
provided by the government such as extension. Three main forms of 
intermediaries are predominant in this value chain: contractual 
arrangements, producer organizations and PPPs.  
Contracts are largely being used to organize groups of fragmented 
producers in a bid to include them in these chains and to ensure 
consistent quality and quantity specifications as required by market 
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standards, and to fulfil traceability requirements. As is evident from the 
analysis, a significant factor in determining participation of farmers in 
HVCs is the possession of a written or verbal contractual agreement, 
which gives quality specifications that have to be adhered to. This also 
provides a framework with which traceability as required by market 
standards can be ensured along the value chain. Contracts also ensure a 
guaranteed market for smallholders ad provide a means by which 
technical advice and credit can be availed to producers by lead firms and 
hence are seen by many stakeholders as a more sustainable approach 
towards inclusion of smallholders in HVCs. However there are some 
indications that the contract specifications required by most lead firms 
such as the need to have minimum one acre under horticulture and the 
requirement for a farmer to belong to a registered PO (for legal reasons) 
may lead to the exclusion of smallholders with lower acreage and a lower 
capital base. For these farmers, the alternative way to participate in these 
chains is through POs. 
The role of POs in Kenya’s HVC has evolved over time with the 
changing nature and structure of the chain. Requirements for standards 
and traceability of produce have led to a quasi-hierarchical chain in 
which strict monitoring is carried out by lead firms. As such, fragmented 
and differentiated farmers who have limited capital base are organized by 
their respective POs for ease of coordination and monitoring by lead 
firms to ensure consistency and traceability. POs have become an 
integral part of the coordination of these chains as they can now manage 
and monitor quality. POs offer farmers economies of scale in order to 
reduce transaction costs for compliance to standards and improve access 
to credit, they also help improve the bargaining power of farmers for 
better producer prices and access required technical skills and support 
for accessing high value export chains. 
Liberalization of agricultural markets relocates risk from the state onto the 
individual (McDonald, 1999), and also elevates the importance of the private 
sector and off-farm capital as arbiters of sustainability. As is evident in this 
chapter, the Kenyan government withdrew from heavy involvement in 
the horticulture sector and only plays a regulatory role. Its roles of 
extension and information provision, capacity building and marketing 
have largely been be replaced by direct dealings between farmers and 
lead firms. Subsequently, forms of intermediaries have emerged with the 
government playing a facilitating role and donors providing the funds 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
 
219 
with which these relationships can thrive. In this chapter, new 
innovations of collaboration between the government, the private sector 
and NGOs have not only improved smallholder participation in HVCs, 
but have also provided access to credit, capacity building and upgrading 
opportunities for smallholders and linkages between farmers and lead 
firms. The presence of government in these PPPs also provides a clear 
regulatory framework within which contracts are governed.  
In conclusion, the study has highlighted the implications of 
smallholder participation in HVCs while taking into consideration the 
role of standards and the changing industry structure. In these chains 
transaction costs remain a critical issue coupled with standards and 
requirements that are used for chain coordination and management. 
Therefore smallholders will only participate if it makes economic sense 
to do so and likewise, exporters will only procure from them if it is 
economical to do so. In order to prevent marginalization and exclusion 
of smallholders, intermediaries are increasingly becoming important for 
chain consolidation, monitoring and chain management while at the 
same time ensuring inclusion of smallholders in HVCs. However, the 
sustainability of their participation is only dependent on dynamics that 
will ensure that these relationships are sustainable in the long run. For 
instance, continued reliance on donor support may not be sustainable 
unless the links and networks are self-maintaining even without the 
presence of donor financing. In addition, the strengthening of POs and 
the redefining of contractual agreements are more sustainable 
alternatives for smallholder participation. 
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7 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
7.1 A synthesis of findings 
This research sought to understand key issues for policy and 
research with respect to emerging globalization of value chains, 
the role of standards and subsequent governance structures and 
how they influence different aspects of development from a 
developing country perspective. The presumption is that trade is 
supposed to contribute to poverty and development; however, 
standards may act as barriers to trade and affect export 
competitiveness. The approach used for analysis involved 
seeking specific answers to specific questions at different levels 
of analysis – macro, meso and micro using a range of 
methodological approaches with a view that doing so would 
illuminate in a more enhanced way, the various dynamics related 
to trade standards and development and thus ‘paint’ a holistic 
picture of the realities at different levels and for different players 
both global and local.  
As such the previous chapters provide insights on how the 
globalization of supply chains, the emergence of standards and 
their increased consolidation into the governance structures of 
these chains have led to different developmental outcomes. 
Furthermore, this approach narrowed the focus of this research 
to looking at the direct links between standards at different levels 
of analysis and using different dynamics and case studies. The 
study did not focus on labor effects but rather directly on the 
high value chain transactions and its intricacies. This chapter 
provides a synthesis of findings drawn from various levels of 
analysis and how these impact on different perspectives of 
development. Key policy discourses that are relevant for 
developing countries and their sustainable participation in HVCs 
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including emerging institutional dynamics are also provided. 
Finally while each chapter draws its on conclusion based on 
findings, most importantly this chapter integrates those 
conclusions into an argument that is plausible and in line with 
the core argument of this thesis. 
 
7.1.1 Standards and Development: Emerging 
perspectives 
Development can be viewed as a long term process of structural 
and societal transformation; in the short to medium term, 
development is viewed as a process of achieving desirable targets 
and outcomes such as poverty alleviation and raising incomes of 
countries (Sumner and Tribe, 2008). Classical economists 
believed economic development could be achieved through free 
trade, self-regulating markets with limited government 
intervention (Adam Smith 1776). Half a century later David 
Ricardo outlined economic development through comparative 
advantage in which countries gain when they trade in products in 
which they have comparative advantage. More recently, new 
trade theories suggest that export competitiveness is crucial in 
integration in global markets, which is believed to be beneficial 
for economic growth as a broader development agenda 
(Baghwati and Srinivasan, 2002, Dollar and Kraay 2002). 
 As such agricultural trade in Africa; and more specifically 
horticulture sector in Kenya have continued to play a critical role 
in economic development and poverty alleviation. Horticulture is 
one of Kenya’s top Foreign exchange earners; it is linked directly 
with economic development as more than 5 million individuals 
in Kenya participate in the high value export market including 
smallholders, large scale producers, labourers, exporters among 
others. After trade liberalization and removal of tariffs in the 
early 1990’s, trade became freer and there has been a dramatic 
growth in sector coupled with a dramatic rise of investments in 
the sector. As is evident from this research; globally, there has 
also been a rise in retail chains and food markets; these markets 
are governed by standards and regulations requiring food safety 
and quality, traceability and ethical production among others. 
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The proliferation of these standards is a result of: (i) Public 
concerns on food safety and health (ii) prevention of food 
adulteration and misbranding – resulting in government 
regulation and public standards (iii) evolving consumer demands 
and activism from civil society organizations leading to private 
standards (McCluskey, 2007). This has resulted in standards and 
certification requirements that are both public (mandatory) and 
private (voluntary) but which concern safety, health, nutrition, 
characteristics, geographic origin, organic status, ethical 
attributes and traceability as firms try to competitively position 
themselves in high value chains. 
  Therefore, understanding the link between standards and 
development is crucial in designing broader development goals. 
This is because compliance with standards in global value chains 
is a requirement and pre-requisite for accessing developed 
country markets and thus has implications for developing 
countries.  
As is evident in this study, standards are set in the north 
(developed country markets) and passed down to the south 
(developing country producers) alongside priorities and 
requirements of the north (Tallontire, 2007, Blowfield & Dolan, 
2008). The standards are also public mandatory (governed by 
WTO and developed country governments) and in addition, 
private (voluntary- develop and governed by retailers who have 
due diligence to ensure that what they sell is safe healthy and 
meets requirements of their markets. In effect the extent and 
magnitude of standards is numerous and this has various 
financial and technical implications for developing country 
producers wishing to access these markets. Thus, standards have 
become important tools for shaping and governing global food 
system and high value chains by determining, what is produced, 
by whom, where and how it is produced and for whom it is 
produced. They are also an important pre-requisite for accessing 
markets in the north and subsequently participating in global 
high value chains. As a result and as presented in literature and in 
this study, there are two opposite views of standards from a 
development perspective. 
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 The first view is that standards is that they are beneficial to 
developing countries in several ways: they embody technological 
and informational characteristics that are beneficial to developing 
country producers as this enables transfer of technology and 
knowledge spill-overs that allows them to upgrade their 
production and subsequently become more competitive in 
globalized chains. Information contained in the standards helps 
to increase chain efficiency by providing a ‘common language’ 
between suppliers and producers and lowering transaction costs 
related to information asymmetry (Grossman & Helpman, 1989, 
Wilson & Abiola 2003; Otieno & Knorringa, 2012), making trade 
more transparent and predictable (Tander and Tilburg, 2007).  
Most importantly complying with standards allow producers 
access to high value export markets which provide higher 
incomes for participating producers thereby impacting directly 
on poverty and economic development (Maertens and Swinnen, 
2007).  In this study it is evident that standards have helped 
thousands of smallholders to upgrade their production either 
individually or through producer groups and access markets 
through various options for certification and various forms of 
intermediaries which help to mitigate transaction costs. Through 
standards and emerging governance structures of the chains have 
also helped organize the sector, improve on chain efficiency and 
reduce transaction costs all of which are positive aspects of 
development. 
  The second view of standards and development that can be 
confirmed from this study is that standards may act as barriers to 
trade and subsequently lead to exclusionary effects which may 
affect smaller farmers and thus impact negatively of poverty 
alleviation and development. Many authors (Jaffe & Henson, 
2004; Wilson and Abiola 2003) posit that standards may impede 
trade by acting as barrier to trade and reduce trade at a macro 
level, however they may also lead to high transaction costs of 
compliance especially for developing countries who do not have 
adequate financial and technical capacity to comply with 
requirements. Furthermore standards have exclusionary 
tendencies especially due to the high cost of compliance for 
smallholders (Gibbon 2003, Reardon &Barret, 2000, Reardon et 
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al, 1999) and increasing levels of vertical coordination, which 
favours only a certain ‘type’ of farmer with larger production and 
capitalization. However this can also be seen as a step towards 
increasing efficiency of production in the value chain. 
 Other aspects of standards and development that are 
emerging from this study are linked to institutional 
developments. From a perspective of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE)(North, 1961), the process of globalization of 
the value chains and the development of standards has seen a 
change in social structures (at a micro-level) and the rise 
pertinent institutions (at meso-and macro level) which are 
necessitated by  – (i) requirements of public or mandatory 
standards for example WTO’s NEPs at macro level (ii) changes 
in global governance mechanisms which require institutions for 
monitoring and enforcement at meso-level and even contractual 
arrangements that ensure compliance and (ii) social micro 
processes ( at micro-level) requiring intermediaries such as 
Producer organizations which mediate key constraints for 
smallholders such as transaction costs of compliance, access to 
credit and inputs and links to markets and contributes immensely 
to their continued and sustainable participation in high value 
chains. 
Finally and interestingly, the localization and harmonization 
of global standards as an attempt to enhance the developmental 
relevance of global standards have seen the translation, 
adaptation, and customization of different global standards to 
local conditions. This saw two attempts of localizing standards in 
Kenya’s horticulture sector (Otieno & Knorringa, 2012); the first 
attempt was the localization of the GlobalGAP (EUREPGAP) 
standard into KenyaGAP and acquiring GlobalGAP equivalence. 
KenyaGAP, which gives flexibility on control points and 
compliance criteria and is inclusive in that it takes into 
consideration local conditions as well as concerns of local 
producers. The second attempt was the localization of a public 
mandatory standard, which was harmonized with US’s 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and UK’s Integrated 
Crop management. While these two attempts provide for local 
actors a more context sensitive way of certification and chain 
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management with reduced costs, they still face some key 
challenges (Otieno &Knorringa, 2012) in the global food systems 
and have limited success because leading retailers do not have 
incentives to contribute to the process and other value chain 
actors are not yet convinced of the relevance of such initiatives. 
Moreover, their ‘acceptance’ in markets in the north still remains 
to be seen. 
7.1.2 A synthesis of Empirical findings 
The conceptual approach applied to enhance the understanding 
of the link between standards and development in this study was 
to use a three persectives and three different levels of analysis of 
different aspects to determine the degree of congruence (or 
incongruence) with the standards development debate and 
determine policy relevance.  In doing so we were not only able to 
analyse the economic impact of standards on export supply level 
but also to unveil how standards have impacted on other aspects 
of development not often covered by many authors; such as 
governance and management systems and how these have 
subsequently resulted in different outcomes for different 
stakeholders in the value chain and the social micro processes 
that determine sustainable participation in these HVCs all of 
which have policy relevance to poverty alleviation and 
development. 
 The trade enhancing or reducing effect of standards was 
analysed using an export supply response model. This was done 
in view of other macro-level factors that affect exports such as 
FDI, GDP, real exchange rates, inflation among others, in order 
to determine to what extent the constrained trade can be 
attributed to standards. Findings from this analysis indicate that 
there is a causal relationship between standards and exports; in 
the short run, the number of rejections reduces exports while in 
the long run SPS measures were found to have a reducing effect 
on export supply. Moreover after running an export supply 
response model, macro-economic variables such as an increase 
in exchange rate and inflation have a negative effect on export 
supply. GDP per capita is also shown to have an effect on 
export growth. 
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 The second perspective represented a case study analysis 
of the distributional outcomes of key players and a value chain 
approach was applied to the green beans sector. The value chain 
approach used in this level of analysis presents linkages in key 
activities of the chain and key standards along the value chain. A 
filiere concept was then applied to calculate the distribution of costs 
and benefits along the value chain. This analysis makes three new 
contributions to literature on value chains, standards and 
Development. First, these findings are consistent with findings 
from previous studies (Gerreffi and Sturgeon, 2003, Konefal et 
al, 2005, Tallontire et al, 2011) that value chain governance is 
crucial for management and efficiency HVCs and that standards 
do shape the way these value chains are governed and managed, 
the way contracts are drawn and the structure of compliance to 
standards which influences the distribution of costs and benefits. 
Findings here indicate that the value chains are quasi-hierarchical 
with standards flowing from retailers to producers; a strong 
monitoring and enforcement by retailers and third party 
certification is part of the chain management system; and 
subsequently more power rests with lead firms – in terms of 
setting standards, value chain control and enforcement. 
Producers are mostly standard takers and costs of compliance 
are pushed downstream. 
 The second main contribution of the case study is that of 
the transaction cost perspective of standards. Standards have led 
to a shift in competition away from price towards quality 
(Daviron 2002, Keanne 2003). In doing so there has been an 
increase transaction costs along the value chain; they act as 
repositories for rent and subsequently influence the distribution 
of rent along the value chain (Sexmiths and Potts 2010, Valkila et 
al, 2010). Analysis from this study reveals that due diligence and 
compliance lies with exporters and producers and this increases 
their transaction costs. Costs of compliance are pushed down the 
value chain. Further results reveal inequalities in terms of 
distribution of costs among different stakeholders along the 
value chain with the major cost aspect downstream (about 14-15 
per cent by producers and only 1 per cent borne by exporters). 
Moreover distribution of incomes along the value chain also 
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confirm the inequalities, producers earn a paltry 3 per cent of the 
mark up price while exporters earn 33 per cent 
 Finally , the significance of ‘institutions’ for governance of 
value chains is emphasized through evidence which suggests the 
importance of contracts, third party certification and producer 
organizations in mitigating some of the costs of compliance. In 
this study evidence shows that economies of scale and 
subsequent reduction in costs of transaction are achieved 
through various mechanisms: obtaining group certification 
through producer organizations, which reduces costs of 
complying with standards by 8 per cent. In addition these 
institutions help increase chain efficiency by providing the 
avenues through which monitoring and enforcement is done. It 
is also easier for traceability of produce when farmers have 
contracts or when they are organized in groups. 
 The social micro processes of standards and sustainability 
of smallholder participation in HVCs were investigated. 
Motivation for smallholder participation in high value chains 
with high transaction costs (of compliance) is influenced by 
prevailing market structures and infrastructure (Govereh and 
Jayne, 2003), farmers’ resource endowments, contractual 
arrangements and collective action (Blandon et al, 2009). This is 
corroborated by this study’s findings that smallholders who 
participate in Kenya’s horticulture value chain are those with 
higher acreage under horticulture and thus higher capitalization; 
have contracts with exporters and can access group certification 
through producer organizations; and are closer to infrastructure 
which is important for accessing markets such as road networks. 
Other factors, which aid in eliminating information asymmetry 
and related costs of transactions such as extension services and 
access to information, are also important for ensuring continued 
and sustained participation of smallholders in these value chains. 
  From the study, the importance of intermediaries for the 
sustainability of resource poor smallholder participation in high 
chains is underscored. As evidence suggests that standards in 
these value chains have led to the marginalization of 
smallholders who are resource poor. However intermediary 
organizations – producer organizations, contracts and PPPs have 
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provided value chain interventions which provide ancillary 
services to farmers and reduce transaction costs; reduce 
information asymmetry; link farmers to markets; provide 
extension and advisory services and even provide easier access to 
credit; all of which are important elements for overall 
development and poverty outcomes for farmers participating in 
these chains and can ensure their sustained participation in these 
chains. 
7.2 Institutional dynamics, intermediaries and the 
Standards debate 
The contribution of NIE to development arises from the 
recognition that economic actors face a particular problem as a 
result of imperfect information about the behaviour of other 
actors in transactions; and institutions play an important role in 
addressing these problems (North 1995). There are different 
types of institutional approaches: institutions, institutional 
arrangements (such as contracts) (Davis and North 1971) and 
institutional environment i.e. property rights, enforcement 
mechanisms and power relations. All these provide structures 
within which economic decisions are made. 
 From a standards perspective and as is evident in this 
study, there are three main views of institutions: 
- First, institutions are formal written rules as well as 
typically unwritten (informal) codes of conduct and 
regularized behaviour that underlie and supplement 
formal rules. In fact some view rules as ‘tools’ that 
allow individuals to solve collective dilemmas. 
‘Institutions are among the tools that fallible humans 
use to change incentives to enable fallible humans to 
overcome social dilemmas’ (Ostrom 2005: 125). In 
this regard, institutions are set up (at a macro-level) in 
order to facilitate the implementation of policies, 
rules and regulations and hence facilitate 
coordinated exchange of these goods in the context 
of standards. From this study, due to the 
proliferation of standards, there has been a change 
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in the legal and regulatory institutions, which 
facilitate the formulation of laws and regulatory 
environment for standards to be implemented. 
These are mostly in conjunction with public 
mandatory standards such as the WTO, SPS and 
TBT measures, the setting up of national enquiry 
Points and KEPHIS – to ensure adherence to SPS 
measures. 
- The second view of institutions is from a transaction 
cost perspective. Transaction costs are involved in 
the establishment of enforcement of the standards 
and requirements of the goods being exchanged and 
the transaction risks are involved because of failure 
to comply with requirements and hence complete a 
transaction exchange. These transaction costs and 
risks arise due to difficulties in obtaining 
information related to the required standards, or for 
resource poor economic actors - difficulties in 
meeting the required standards due to high 
transaction costs of compliance. The general 
hypothesis is that institutions are transaction-cost 
reducing arrangements that may change and evolve 
with changes in the nature and sources of 
transaction costs (Doward et al, 2005). They 
facilitate low cost exchange and resource 
management (at a meso –level) and as such contracts 
and enforcement institutions play a major role in 
mitigating transaction costs. Thus an analysis of 
Kenya’s meso-level institutions reveals that; in a 
quasi-hierarchical structure of the value chain – 
which are other institutions, contracts play a major 
role in facilitating exchange between partners; these 
contracts are enforced and monitored by third party 
certification agencies. Here power relations also play 
a major role in determining the relations between 
actors and how the lead firms use the institutional 
arrangements to monitor and enforce standards and 
regulations. In addition, we see the role of collective 
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action institutions such as producer organizations in 
mitigating transaction costs for a value chain actors 
in the lower end i.e. smallholders. These 
intermediaries are further discussed at the micro-
level. 
- Thirdly, institutions provide incentives for exchange 
and resource management (Doward et al, 2005). In 
this view institutions and institutional arrangements 
provide social networks within which actors can 
informally relate their values and conventions. 
Through collective action actors of similar values 
and trust collaborate to accomplish an outcome 
(Sandler, 1992) at a micro-level. There is 
interdependency among participants and without 
collective action they would all be worse off. Thus in 
this view, due to the high transaction costs in 
meeting standards, cost mitigating measures among 
smallholders have evolved around social networks 
and collective action. These are informal 
arrangements but without which resource poor 
smallholders would be marginalized from 
participating in export markets. In this regard, 
intermediaries emerge at the micro-level, as a way of 
mitigating transaction costs, achieving economies of 
scale and ensuring sustainable participation of 
resource poor smallholders in value chains. 
Institutions at this level are mainly informal, and 
formed on the basis of trust, cohesiveness and 
values.  
Another major insight on institutions is the role they play in 
enhancing the technical capacity. Findings here indicate that this 
role cuts across all the three levels. However the technical 
capacity needs may differ at different levels for different players. 
At a macro-level, the role of WTOs trade development facility in 
providing technical capacity to policy makers in order to 
implement various trade agreements related to standards such as 
SPS and TBT measures. Capacity building at meso and micro 
levels is related to content and context of standards and 
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requirements for major value chain participants including 
exporters, smallholders and is mainly facilitated by lead firms 
together with support from government extension agents, and 
financed through donor funding. The importance of donors and 
the various partnerships they have with public and private sector 
is also underscored in this study. 
From the foregoing, in Kenya’s horticulture sector, evidence 
suggests that institutional dynamics occur at all the three levels 
of analysis.  And occur in a certain ‘mix’ i.e. formal and informal 
with different functions ranging from technical capacity, legal 
and regulatory at macro level; coordination, enforcement and 
monitoring at meso-level; and co-ordination and upgrading at 
micro-level. Technical capacity function of institutions cuts 
across all the levels (Figure 7.1). Thus analysis institutions in 
Kenya’s Horticulture sector have significant social and economic 
functions. Their role have been emphasized in facilitating 
coordination of the value chains, linking actors and marginalized 
groups by providing information concerning standards and 
linkages with markets; and from a transaction cost perspective- 
achieving economies of scale and lowering transaction costs 
especially at the meso and micro levels. 
7.3 Policy Implications 
The debate on trade and development has been going on for the 
last century or so. It is believed that integrating developing 
countries in the global trade arena will stimulate economic 
growth, improve incomes and subsequently lead to development 
(Dollar and Kraay, 2002). However over the past two decades 
global trade arena has undergone fundamental changes with a 
shift from tariff barriers to trade liberalization and an increase in 
non-tariff barriers including standards. The impact of standards 
and technical regulations33 on trade is at the forefront of global 
policy discussions. Understanding the link between standards, 
technical regulations, and trade is crucial in the design of broader 
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developmental goals that can create new opportunities for pro-
poor growth (Wilson & Abiola, 2003).  
     An on-going debate on standards and development has led 
to two main arguments. First, standards are ‘new’ forms of non-
tariff barriers and therefore result in trade distortions with a 
trade reducing effect (Maertens and Swinnen, 2007, Athukorala 
and Jayasuriya 2003). However findings from this study indicate 
that the magnitude with which standards affect export supply is 
much lower than other supply side constraints at the macro level. 
These findings cast doubt on whether standards is the real 
culprit for reducing trade or whether developing countries have 
other serious trade reducing factors at a macro-level such as 
inflation. Of policy relevance therefore is that developing 
countries may need to address supply side issues at macro-level 
in order to enhance their trade volumes alongside dealing with 
non-tariff barriers such as standards. 
The second argument is that standards lead to high 
transaction costs, and this together with increasing levels of 
vertical coordination may lead to the exclusion of resource poor 
farmers from competitively participating in these chains and 
becoming marginalized (Gibbon, 2003, Key and Runsten 1999, 
Swinnen, 2007). The critique also points out that the distribution 
of rents in these chains is not equitable as a large portion of the 
profit is extracted by large multinationals. While this may be true 
to some extent, findings from this study indicate that standards 
do increase transaction costs, but further goes to unravel the 
distribution of outcomes along the chain; the costs are mostly 
borne by lower end producers while the benefits are mostly 
reaped by high end retailers and exporters along the chain. This 
raises an important policy issue concerning the way standards are 
used to govern value chains, the power relations in these chains, 
and how these shape the distribution of economic benefits in 
these chains. Another important insight from this study is that 
various institutional arrangements and intermediaries that 
mitigate transaction costs and help them to achieve economies 
of scale facilitate the participation of resource poor smallholders 
in these chains. The developmental relevance of intermediaries 
i.e. contracts and producer organizations is emphasized as key 
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institutions for linking farmers to markets, obtaining information 
related to these markets and subsequently facilitating their 
participation in the global trade arena. 
 Finally, another important finding of policy significance in 
agricultural development in Africa is the importance of 
institutional changes occurring as a result of standards. Past 
studies (Wilson and Abiola, 2003, Jaffe and Henson 2005) show 
that developing countries lack institutional and technical capacity 
to comply with standards and this essentially locks them out of 
the global trading system. However, findings from this study 
indicate that institutional developments related to standards not 
only provide technical and capacity building to implement 
international requirements, but they also act as important 
intermediaries in facilitating not only compliance to requirements 
but also help to mitigate transaction cost effects of standards, 
economies of scale, information and are important for value 
chain coordination, enforcement and monitoring. The successes 
of the above high value export chains and subsequent 
sustainable participation of smallholders in export markets is 
highly dependent on prevailing institutions and intermediaries.  
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Figure 7.1: Institutional changes and standards in Kenya’s 
Horticulture  
7.4 Conclusion 
The impact of standards on poverty and development has been 
on the global trade-poverty debate for the past few decades. And 
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while numerous studies have looked at different issues related to 
standards, poverty and development; this study specifically from 
different perspectives of Kenya’s horticulture sector has shown 
that shown that there are many counter- arguments to the notion 
of standards acting as non-tariff barriers to trade and restricting 
trade; and the general view that standards act as dis-incentives to 
resource poor smallholders and thus causes exclusion, the study 
has re-affirmed the importance of institutions and intermediaries 
for inclusion of smallholders in export value chains.  
Furthermore, the study has also confirmed the view that there 
exists a standards divide – where developing country producers 
are standard takers and power relationships in quasi-hierarchical 
chains governed by standards lead to inequitable distribution of 
outcomes in value chains. 
Although the study has contributed to a number of policy 
findings which can contribute to useful changes in the standards- 
poverty debate. The study is not without its limitations; first the 
study did not look at the standards- labour-poverty discussion or 
standards- welfare effects discussion in which labour or ethical 
standards may contribute to and enhance incomes and welfare 
effects, which are linked to development. The study also did not 
look at technological and innovation related arguments 
concerning standards and their contribution to upgrading and 
subsequent competitiveness. These aspects have been widely 
discussed by other authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
236 
 
8 Appendices 
 
Appendix 1.1 : Questionnaire : Producers & Exporters 
A GENERAL INFORMATION 
1.1 Name of Respondent (Optional) _______________ 1.2 
Designation______________ 
1.3 Name of Firm/Farmer 
(Optional)__________________________ 
 
1.4 Address of Firm/Farmer
 ________________________________________________ 
 
Telephone________________________________________________ 
E-mail address______________Website____________________ 
 
1.5 Type of Firm 1. Exporting       2. Production       3. Production 
and Exporting                          4. Packaging        5. Distribution 6. 
Other (specify):________________ 
 
1.6 Year of Establishment ____________________   
 
1.7 Year of Inception of Horticulture Production 
___________________________  
1.8 Legal Status of Firm 1. Sole Proprietorship  2. Partnership
 3.Private limited 4.Other 
(specify):_______________ 
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1.9 Ownership 1. Foreign 2. Joint – foreign and local 3. Local 
 
1.10 Total Land Holdings (Acres)_______________________ 
 
1.11 Area Under Horticulture (Acres) __________________ 
 
1.12 Number of Employees 
 1. Permanent ___________________ 
 2. Casual __________________________ 
 3. Family Labor __ Number of Family Members __________ 
 
1.13 Location of Farm 
 1. Distance from all weather road _______________________ 
 2. Distance from main road ____________________________ 
 3. Distance from tarmac road __________________________ 
 4. Distance from airport ______________________________ 
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B OUTPUT 
2.1 What are the main products produced and 
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2.2 To whom or where do you sell your products? 
Sources  Quantity Price Contractual        
Arrangement? 
Yes 
No 
Large Scale 
Producer(specify) 
_ 
   
Exporter 
(specify):  
   
Broker (specify):     
Producer 
Organization 
 
   
CBO/NGO 
 
   
Direct to Export 
Market (specify):  
   
Local 
Supermarket  
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Packaging/Distrib
ution Firm 
(specify):  
   
Other (specify):  
 
   
 
2.3 Who determines the Prices of your products? 
1. Bargaining (with whom) 
specify:______________________ 
2. Broker 
3. Price as per contract 
4. Exporter/distributor 
5. Retailer in foreign market 
6. Price bargained through Producer 
Organization/CBO/NGO 
7. Other (specify): ______________________ 
 
 
2.4 Are Prices pegged on Quality?  
Yes 
No 
 I don’t Know 
2.5 If Yes in 2.6 above, What aspects of Quality determine prices 
1. ____________________________________________________________ 
2._____________________________________________________________ 
3. _____________________________________________________________ 
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2.6 Who determines Quality specifications of products? 
1. Bargaining (with whom) specify: 
__________________________________ 
2. Broker 
3. Quality as per contract 
4. Exporter/distributor 
5. Retailer in foreign market 
6. Quality bargained collectively through PO/NGO/CBO 
7. Standardization body (specify): 
____________________________________ 
8. Other (specify): 
_____________________________________________
___ 
 
2.7 How is quality determined? 
Inspection by KEBS 
Inspection by KEPHIS 
Inspection by KEBS 
Inspection by private firm/exporter/broker 
Inspection by CBO/Producer organization 
Other (specify) 
1. Are you consulted 
when selecting quality parameters? 
Yes 
No 
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2.10 Has your business experienced  
1. Reduced profitability/incomes? 
 2. Increased profitability/incomes? 
3. Remained constant over the past few months? 
 
2.11 What are the reasons for 2.8 above? 
1. Increased / farm gate prices 
______________________________________ 
2. Improved access to 
markets______________________________________ 
3. Improved access to inputs (specify): 
________________________________ 
4. Upgrading and value addition (specify): 
______________________________ 
5. Other__________ 
Specify:_________________________________________ 
 
2.10 Do you perceive prices you receive to be 
 1. Low 
2. Fair 
3. High 
4. Don’t know 
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2.11 What are the reasons for 2.10 above? 
1. _________________________________________________ 
2. _________________________________________________ 
3.__________________________________________________ 
 
2.12 Which is the main market for your products? 
1. Local Markets/supermarkets (specify): ___________________ 
2. Exports to the EU (specify): ___________________________ 
3. Other exports (specify): ______________________________ 
 
2.13 What are the main constraints in accessing this particular 
market? (rank in order of importance) 
1. Stringent standardization and requirements (specify): _________ 
2. Distance to the markets/transport costs 
3. Poor local infrastructure –roads, electricity, refrigeration 
3. Exchange rate 
4. Trade related taxes (specify): _________________________ 
5. Competition from other producers/large firms 
6. Others (specify): 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
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2.14 What are the pre-conditions for exporting into a certain 
market/joining a certain chain? 
1. ______________________________________________ 
2. _________________________________________________ 
3. ________________________________________________ 
 
2.15  What are the standards and quality requirements to access the 
particular market? (Answer if you have selected 2 above) 
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           2.16 What production and related activities are carried out by your 
farm/firm? 
Activity Product    Labor  
Requirement
s 
Cost/U
nit 
labourer 
Present 3yrs 
ago 
5yrs 
ago 
Skilled Unskilled 
1. Production 
a. Seed selection 
b. Planting 
c. Weeding 
d. Irrigation 
e. Harvesting 
f. Other 
(specify): 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
       
2. Cutting, 
trimming, 
dicing 
      
3. Preservation 
/refrigerati
on/cooling 
      
4. Packaging 
 
      
5. Labeling 
 
      
6. Bar coding 
 
      
7. Transportation 
 
      
8. Distribution 
 
      
9. Marketing 
 
      
10. Others 
(specify): 
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2.17 Are any of the above activities (upgrading) part of the 
requirements for accessing the market? 
(specify): 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
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C. INPUTS AND RELATED COSTS 
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1. 
Labor 
a. 
Permanent 
b. 
Casual 
c. 
Total 
      
      
      
      
2. 
Licensing (specify): 
a. 
 
      
      
      
3. 
Electricity 
a. 
Refrigeration and 
cooling 
      
4. 
Water 
a. 
Irrigation 
b. Water supply through Municipality 
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5. 
Information 
a. 
Internet 
b. 
Telephone 
c. 
Newsletter 
      
      
      
6. 
Packaging 
a. 
Packaging Materials 
b. 
Equipment 
c. 
Labeling 
d. 
Bar-coding 
e. 
Other(specify): 
      
      
      
      
      
9. Transport 
a. Air Transport 
b. Road Transport 
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c. Other (specify):       
      
10. Marketing and Promotion  
a. Market information 
b. Advertising 
c. Exhibitions and Trade Fairs 
d. Branding 
e. Others (specify): 
      
      
      
      
      
      
11. Insurance 
(specify): 
a. 
b. 
c. 
 
      
      
      
      
      
12. Trade related  Taxes 
(specify): 
a. 
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b. 
c. 
      
      
 
1.2 In your opinion has the cost of production increased / decreased 
over the last 
One year 
3 years 
10 years 
4. Don’t know 
Is the increase/decrease commensurate with prices received/profit 
margins? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
What are the strategies taken for reducing costs/economies of scale? 
Joining a producer organization 
Pooling resources with other farmers ( informally) 
Contracts with producers/ larger exporters 
4, Others (specify): ____________________________________________ 
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D EXPORT SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS 
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Constraint & rating 
a. 
access to electricity and 
cooling facilities 
b. 
Poor road network 
c. 
access to freight 
d. 
cost of transport 
e. 
delays in transport of 
produce (specify): 
 
 
   
 
 
   
    
    
    
 
 
   
    
2. 
labor 
a. 
lack of skilled labor 
b. 
cost of labor 
c. 
availability of labor 
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3. 
axes and related constraints 
    
4. 
constraints related to 
meeting standards 
    
5. 
constraints in accessing 
Markets 
    
6. 
access to credit and related 
financial services 
    
7. 
access to Information 
    
8. 
access to extension services 
    
9. 
policy environment 
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E NETWORKS, AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES, AND   INSTITUTIONAL 
SUPPORT  
5.1 Do you have a contract? 
1. Yes __________ Duration ___________________ 
2. No 
If Yes go to 5.1.1 if NO go to 5.2 
5.1.1 What is the type of contract? 
1. Written 
2. Spoken 
3. Other (specify): 
5.1.2  With whom is your contract? 
1. Producer Organization (specify):______________________________ 
2. Exporter _________________________________________________ 
3. Broker___________________________________________________ 
4. Distributor ________________________________________________ 
5. Overseas supermarket (specify): _______________________________ 
6. Local Supermarket __________________________________________ 
7. Other (specify): _____________________________________________ 
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5.1.3 What are the contract terms/specifications? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1.4 What are the costs related to obtaining and renewing and breaching 
a contract? 
1. Obtaining ______________________________________________ 
2. Renewing ______________________________________________ 
3. Breaching ______________________________________________ 
5.1.5 Do you have a say in the terms/specifications of the contract? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
5.1.6  Specify: 
1. Prices 
2. Quality specifications 
3. Time/duration 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
257 
4. Legal specifications of contracts 
5. Other (specify): 
5.1.7 Services offered by contract (tick all that apply) 
Credit 
Seeds 
Pesticides and fertilizer 
Training 
Upgrading 
Costs of compliance to standards 
Extension services 
Transport 
Information 
Promotion and marketing 
Guaranteed market access 
5.2  Do you belong to any groups/producer organizations? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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If Yes go to 5.2.1 if No go to 5.3 
5.2.1 Specify groups/organizations 
1. Producer organization(s) 
(Specify)________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
__________ 
2. Informal group 
3. Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK) 
4. KENFAP 
5. Community Based Organization 
(Specify)________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
_______ 
6. Others   
(specify):________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
______  
 
5.2.2 How large is the membership and how much is the fees? (Specify for 
each group)   
     
               Group 
 
      NO. Of 
Members 
 Membership fee  
(annual) 
 Onetime 
  payment 
Pproducer Organization(s)    
Iinformal Group    
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FPEAK    
KENFAP    
CBO    
Others (s)    
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5.2.3 How does the producer organization raise its funds? 
1. Assistance form Government 
2. Assistance from CBOs and NGOs 
3. Assistance from Private firms 
4. Contributions from Farmers 
5. Others (specify): 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
_________  
5.3  Do you bear the costs for risk and responsibility of goods until they 
reach the buyer? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t Know 
If yes go to 5.3.1 
5.3.1 Are the risks or responsibilities for goods specified in the 
contracts/Incoterms? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t Know 
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 If Yes go to 5.3.2  
5.3.2 What type of incoterm do you have with your buyer? 
1. Ex-works -buyer collects goods from your farm/firm 
2. CIF – you transport goods to market and are responsible for cost of 
freight and insurance 
3. FCA – you hand goods to a first carrier specified by your buyer (name 
of carrier)  
4. CIP- Cost Insurance Paid- you pay transport costs but risk and insurance 
are paid by buyer 
5. DDU – Delivered Duty Unpaid – you deliver the goods to its destination 
and buyer pays duty and clearance fees 
6. DDP – You have to pay for delivery of goods to your buyer’s destination 
5.4 Approximately what are your costs for freight and insurance if any? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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1 HCDA – Horticultural Crops Development Authority 
1 KARI – Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
1 KEPHIS – Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services 
1 KEBS – Kenya Bureau of Standards 
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5.6 Rate the Following institutions in Terms of Quality, Affordability and 
Accessibility of their services 
( Rate on a scale of 1-5 (Very good-very poor)) 
Services Offered 
  
Quality 
 
Accessibility 
 
Affordability (Don 
not tick if Services 
are Free 
 
Producer 
Organization(s) 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
 
 
 
  
   
   
   
 
FPEAK 
 
   
 
CBO(s) (specify): 
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1. 
2. 
3 
   
   
 
NGO(s) (Specify): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
   
 
HCDA 
   
 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
   
 
Ministry of Trade 
   
 
KARI 
   
 
KEPHIS 
   
KEBS    
 
KIRDI 
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Private 
Company(ies) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
   
   
   
   
 
5.7 Do you pay for any of the above services? 
1. Yes (specify): 
a. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
2. No 
5.7.1 If so approximately how much? 
Specify for each item: 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
___________________________ 
5.8  How would you rate the 
cost of the above services? Rate on a scale of 1-5 ranging from( too 
expensive to too cheap) 
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FINAL REMARKS 
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
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Appendix 1.2: Interview Guides for  Government, Quasi-Government Institutions and Producer 
organisations 
SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION 
1.1 Name of Respondent (optional) 
_______________________________________  
1.2 Designation_________________________________________________ 
1.3 Name of Organization 
________________________________________________ 
1.4 Address of Organization
 ____________________________________________ 
 
Telephone____________________ 
E-mail address_____________________  
Website______________ 
 
1.5 Type of organization (tick as applicable) 
 1.Government Ministry (specify):_________________________     
 2. Parastatal       
 3. Research Institution 
4. Regulatory Institution 
5. Standards Certification or Accreditation___________________        
 6. Other (specify):________________ 
 
1.6 Year of Establishment ____________________   
 
1.7 Status of Organization 
1. Full Government   
2. Quasi - government  
3. Private  
3. Other (specify):_______________ 
 
 
501809-L-bw-Otieno
 
  
 
 
269 
SECTION B: MANDATE AND FUNCTIONS 
2.1. What are the core functions of your organization? (tick all that apply) 
Service Provided Specify  
1. Policy Formulation   
2. Legal and 
Regulatory 
Frameworks 
(implementation) 
  
3. Standards 
Setting/Harmoniza
tion 
  
4. Testing and 
Certification 
  
5. Research and 
Extension 
  
6. Information 
Dissemination 
  
7. Contract 
Enforcement 
  
8.  Marketing / 
Promotion/ Branding 
  
9. Insurance Services to 
Farmers 
  
10 . Representation of 
Farmers in Policy Round 
Tables 
  
11. Others (specify):   
1.2  
What is your role in the process of standardization testing and 
certification? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
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1.3 With whom do you coordinate to fulfill your functions/core 
mandate? 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
Are you directly involved with exporters in the sector? How? (specify):  
Training and capacity building 
Providing information on standards 
Providing information on markets 
Testing and certification 
Linking farmers to markets 
Others (specify) 
Are you directly involved with farmers or producer organizations? (specify): 
Training and capacity building 
Providing information on standards 
Providing information on markets 
Testing and certification 
Linking farmers to markets 
Others (specify): 
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1.4 According to your 
knowledge what standards are complied with in the sector? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1.5 What are the 
compliance and certification processes in the sector? (elaborate): 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
What is the cost of compliance and certification? 
Compliance - elaborate processes including upgrading 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1. Certification 
(elaborate): 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
2. Accreditation (elaborate): 
 
1.6 What is your perception 
on this cost? 
__________________________________________ 
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1.7  What steps are 
necessary or are required to receive certification or renewal or 
accreditation from a standards body? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1.8  Who pays for this 
requirements? 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
1.9 What are the various 
arrangements for smallholders in order to meet these standards? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
SECTION C: POLICY AND REGULATORY/INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 How would you describe the institutional environment for the 
standardization process in Kenya? (favorable/unfavorable) 
explain: 
_________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
_________________________________________ 
2.2 What role (if any) do you play in assisting small holders to 
comply with standards? 
_________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
_________________________________________ 
 
2.3 Do you play any role in the formulation, harmonization or 
implementation of standards? Specify: 
_________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
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_________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
_______________________________________ 
2.4 With whom do you coordinate the above mentioned roles? 
_________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
_________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 3.1: Summary Key Institutions Interviewed in the 
Horticulture Sector 
 
Source: Survey results 2009 
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Appendix 4.1: Specific Standards Compliance for Kenya’s Horticulture 
Sector Exporters 
Category Classification/Category 
 WTO Sanitary and 
Phyto-sanitary 
Measures 
A100 prohibition or restriction of products for SPS reasons 
A110 – Temporary geographic prohibition for SPS reasons 
A120 –Systems approach 
A150 –Registration requirements for exporters 
A200 – Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) 
A210 – tolerance limits for residues or contamination by certain substances 
A220 – Restricted use of certain substances in foods 
A300 – Labeling requirements 
A320 –Marking requirements 
A330 – Packaging requirements 
A400 – Hygienic requirements 
A410  Microbial criteria 
A420 good hygienic practices and water quality requirements 
A600 - other requirements on production or post production 
A800 – conformity assessment related to SPS 
A810 – product registration 
A820 – Testing requirement 
A830 – Certification requirement 
A840 - Inspection requirements 
A840 – Traceability requirements 
TBT Measures B150 – Registration requirements for TBT reasons 
B200 – Tolerance limits for residues and other substances 
B220 – Restricted use of certain substances 
B300 – Labeling marking and packaging requirements 
B400 – Production or post production requirements 
B700 – Product quality performance requirement 
B800 – Conformity assessment  
Private standards Global GAP 
ISO 9000 
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British Retail Consortium (Covers Tesco’s and M&S, ) 
Max Havelor 
Food safety system certification 22000 based on ISO 22000:2005 
International Food Standards (IFS) also based on ISO 22000 
SA 8000 
Source: Author 2015
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Appendix 5.1: Production costs per acre (4046.86m2) per year for an 
individual smallholder under option 1 certification 
Production Costs Kshs Euros** 
Totals/year (4 
seasons ) 
Fixed Costs       
Equipment* 100,000 980.39   
Total   980.39 980.39 
Variable Costs (Per season/acre)     
Variable costs 
per year 
Seed (20-25 kg/acre) @ 120 3000 29.41 117.65 
Ploughing and harrowing 9000 88.24 352.94 
Fertilizer 2bags/acre @ 2700 per 
bag 5400 52.94 211.76 
Weeding (3 people*8 days*100) 12000 117.65 470.59 
Spraying 6 Sprays @ Kshs 250 1500 14.71 58.82 
Harvesting/sorting and grading  
(7people/day/acre for 2 weeks)       
(7*14*100) 9800 96.08 384.31 
Machinery 6,500 63.73 254.90 
Total 47200 462.75 1850.98 
** Standards- Testing, Inspection 
& Auditing       
Auditing 64,000 627.45 627.45 
Report fee 10,000 98.04 98.04 
Soil Testing and Analysis 12400 121.57 121.57 
Total 86,400 847.06 847.06 
Total Variable Costs 133,600 1309.80 2698.04 
Total costs     3678.43 
Output       
2000 kgs per acre @ 30 per kg for 
4 seasons 240,000 2352.94 9411.764706 
Gross Margins (Revenue-Total  
costs)     5733.33 
* equipment include investment costs for physical infrastructure and protective 
gear 
** these are costs of renewing certification annually 
Source: Author 2015 
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 Appendix 5.2: Production costs per acre (4046.86m2) per year for a 
farmer under group certification 
Production Costs Kshs Euros** 
Totals/year (4 
seasons) 
Fixed Costs       
Equipment* 32,000 313.73   
Total   117.65   
Variable Costs (Per season)     
Variable costs 
per year 
Seed (20-25 kg/acre) @ 78 1950 19.12 76.47 
Ploughing and harrowing 3000 29.41 117.65 
Fertilizer 2bags/acre @ 2700 per 
bag 5400 52.94 211.76 
Weeding (3 people*8 days*100) 2400 23.53 94.12 
Spraying 6 Sprays @ Kshs 60 1500 14.71 58.82 
Harvesting/sorting and grading  
(7people/day/acre for 2 weeks)       
(7*14*100) 9800 96.08 384.31 
Machinery 700 6.86 27.45 
Total 24750 242.65 970.59 
** Standards- Testing, Inspection 
& Auditing       
        
Auditing 4,000 39.22 39.22 
Report fee 2,000 19.61 19.61 
Soil Testing and Analysis 2000 19.61 19.61 
Total 8,000 78.43 78.44 
Total Variable Costs     1049.03 
Total costs     1166.68 
Output       
2000 kgs @ 26 per kg for 4 
seasons 208,000 2039.22 8156.862745 
* equipment include investment costs for physical infrastructure and protective 
gear 
** these are costs of renewing certification annually 
 
Source: Author 2015 
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Appendix 5.3: Cost and Margins for a Briefcase Exporter 
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Source: Author 2015 
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Appendix 5.4: Costs and Margins- Large Scale Integrated Exporter 
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Source: Author 2015 
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Appendix 6.1: List of Producer Organizations and their characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 2015 
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